Volume 78 — Connecticut Reports

Application to Hon. Edwin B. Gager, a judge of the Superior Court, for the appointment of appraisers of two shares of the stock of the New Haven and Derby Railroad Company owned by defendant. A demurrer to the applieation having been overruled pursuant to the advice of this court (77 Conn. 417), an answer was filed, containing two defenses.

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Patrick Fitzgerald of New Haven, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Robinson, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.

Action to recover a balance due for coal sold, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Hubbard, J.; verdict for the defendant to recover $439 upon his counterclaim, which the trial court, upon motion of the plaintiffs, set aside as against the evidence, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to foreclose a mortgage of real estate, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant Catherine Keating.

Appeal bjr the plaintiffs from a judgment in favor of the defendant in the District Court of Waterbury. In this court the defendants filed a plea in abatement, upon the ground that the appeal was not seasonably taken.

Indictment for murder in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Oase, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused for alleged errors in the charge of the court.

<p>Actions to recover damages for injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant in allowing electricity to escape from its trolley wires into the highway, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried together to the jury before Dow, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in each case, and appeal- by the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court in New Haven County (Robinson, J".), in receivership proceedings, disallowing a claim presented by James E. Crouch.</p>

Action to recover the amount of a death benefit, brought to and tried by the District Court of Waterbury, Cowell, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for the alleged illegal suspension of the plaintiff from the defendant order, also for an injunction, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Hubbard, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>A plaintiff who has alleged with reasonable clearness several acts of negligence as apparent grounds of recovery, and proved one or more of them, ought not to be deprived of a judgment merely because in a subsequent paragraph of his complaint he has referred to but one of those negligent acts as causing liis injury, and has failed to prove that particular one. And this is especially true upon a hearing in damages in which the defendant has contested the truth of all the alleged acts of negligence.</p> <p>Want of precision in alleging the cause of an injury for which a recovery is sought is waived by the defendant by suffering a default and contesting the cause upon its merits, in a hearing in damages, without questioning such defect.</p>

<p>The defendant, who had been appointed on June 18th, 1903, judge of the City Court of New Haven “for the unexpired portion” of a term ending April 1st, 1905, claimed that in legal effect his appointment ran until June 18th, 1905, under the 20th Amendment of the Constitution,which provides that judges of city courts shall be appointed for terras of two years. In quo warranto proceedings at the relation of one appointed as his successor, it was held that the defendant’s appointment and the limitation affixed to his term were so dependent and inseparable that both must stand or fall together and as a whole ; and therefore, if the limitation was unconstitutional and void, his appointment was also void and he became nothing more than a de facto judge, certainly after April 1st, 1905; while on the other hand, if the limitation was valid, the defendant’s right to'the office ceased upon April 1st, 1905, when the relator’s term began.</p> <p>When a statute is in part consistent with the Constitution and in part inconsistent with it, the former part may be held to be operative, and not the latter, if they can be thus separated from each other and treated as independent provisions without doing violence to the apparent purpose of the legislature; otherwise they must be treated as a whole and the statute must be held to be void.</p>

Action to recover for personal injuries caused by an alleged defective highway, brought to and heard in damages by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Ralph Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $3,000, and appeal by the defendant.

Complaint for bastardy, brought to the Town Court of Milford and thence, by a binding-over of the defendant, to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, and tried to the jury before Bishop, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Application in the nature of an appeal from the action of the town of Groton in dissolving the First School District and forming therefrom two school districts, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New London County, George W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>A dividend declared by the directors of a corporation in favor of those who are then its stockholders, though payable at a future date, severs the fund to be so distributed from the assets of the corporation. The share of each of the payees so named thereupon vests in him as an individual, and he does not lose it on ceasing to be a shareholder.</p> <p>A proposed reduction of $100,000 in the capital stock of a national bank was approved by the comptroller of the currency, provided this amount, or so much of it as might be necessary, was first used to charge off certain bad, doubtful, and unproductive assets, and the balance only paid over to the stockholders. This was agreed to, the reduction was voted by the stockholders, and the bad and doubtful assets were then charged off and set aside by the directors as a trust fund for the benefit of those who were stockholders of record at the date of the comptroller’s approval. Subsequently, and upon the expiration of its charter, the affairs of the bank were.wound up and the proceeds of this fund, then amounting to over $20,000, became available for distribution. Held:—</p> <p>1. That the action taken by the directors in respect to the charged-off assets was simply one form of declaring a dividend, and therefore the fund and its proceeds belonged, not to the bank or its stockholders at the expiration of its charter, but to those individuals who were stockholders when the fund was severed from the assets of the corporation and set aside for their use and benefit.</p> <p>2. That their right in this fund was assignable by each of said individuals, with or without a transfer of his shares of stock.</p> <p>Whether such proceeds would have belonged to those who were stockholders of record at the date of the reduction of the capital stock, had no such action in reference to the charged-off assets been taken by the directors and with the approval of the comptroller, quaere.</p>

Suit to terminate a testamentary trust and obtain a distribution of the trust estate, brought to and reserved* by the Superior Court in New London County, Ror abade, J., upon demurrer to the complaint, for the advice of this court. William H. Mason, a resident of Thompson, died in 1860, leaving a widow and three sons, his only heirs and next of kin. The eldest son, Amasa, was the child of a former wife.

Prosecution for a violation of a city ordinance forbidding certain projecting signs over streets and sidewalks, brought to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in New London County and tried to the jury before Noyes, J. ; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Prosecution for the violation of a by-law of the New London Cemetery Association, brought to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in New London County and tried to the jury before Noyes, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the defendant.</p> <p>The accused was convicted under Chap. 134 of the Public Acts of 1903, p. 96, which, as an amendment to § 4453 of the General Statutes, provides that “ towns, cemetery associations, and ecclesiastical societies may enact by-laws providing for the care and management of all burial lots, and the protection of all shrubs, trees, fences, and monuments thereon, and may appoint superintendents and sextons for their cemeteries, who shall have the exclusive right to direct as to the opening of graves; and no grave shall be opened in any cemetery except with the consent of the superintendent or sexton. The violation of any by-law made as aforesaid by any person to whom said by-law has been made known shall be a criminal offense punishable by a fine of not more than ten dollars.”</p> <p>These facts appear to have been proved at the trial: The New London Cemetery Association was organized in 1851, as a joint stock corporation, its stock originally consisting of one hundred shares of the value of $50 each, afterwards increased to two hundred shares, and was the owner of a large cemetery in New London known as the Cedar Grove Cemetery. On August 20th, 1904, at a duly called meeting, the association, by a vote representing a majority of the stock but not of two-thirds of the members of the corporation, adopted the following by-law: “No person shall plant, cut or trim any herbage of any kind, or place or erect any monument or other memorial stone, or any structure of any kind, or build or construct any foundation therefor, or form, grade, dig up or deposit any material of any kind upon any burial lot or other portion of the Cedar Grove Cemetery, so-called, being the cemetery grounds of the New London Cemetery Association, except by the consent and direction of the president or superintendent of said association. . . . ” On September 1st, 1904, the accused, to whom said by-law had been expressly made known, went upon said cemetery grounds and, without the consent or direction of its president or superintendent, cut and trimmed herbage, growing upon said grounds, in wilful disregard of said by-law. The court admitted in evidence the records of the New London Cemetery Association showing the adoption of the law, against the objection of the accused that the only cemetery associations which could enact by-laws under said chapter 134 were those having no capital stock, and that said bylaw could only have been adopted by a two-thirds vote of the members of the association.</p> <p>The court refused to charge the jury as the accused requested, that the by-law was unreasonable and oppressive, and therefore void, and not one the violation of which was punishable under said chapter 134, but charged the jury, in substance, that the effect of the law was not to confer an arbitrary power upon the president or superintendent, and that it was a reasonable by-law.</p>

Action to quiet and settle the title to land, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to the complaint was overruled (Gager, J.') and later one to the answer (Thayer, J!) and the cause was afterwards tried to the jury before Gager, J.; the trial judge directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff, and from the judgment upon this verdict the defendants appealed.

Action in the nature of trespass qu. el. fr., brought by appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace to the Court of Common Pleas in New London County and tried the jury before Noyes, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for one cent damages, and appeal by the defendants.

Action upon a contract of guaranty, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New London County, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Peck, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $293 damages, and appeal by the defendant.

Wbit of habeas corpus issued against the sheriff of Fair-field County from the Court of Common Pleas for that county. His return showed that the plaintiff was held under a warrant from the Governor of Connecticut, directing his arrest as a fugitive from justice, in response to an executive requisition from the Governor of New York, and delivery to an agent of that State. The crime for which he was there charged was rape in the second degree.

Action by property-owners to restrain the construction of a street railway, and action by the street-railway company to restrain the property-owners from interfering with the construction of the railway, brought to the Superior Court' in New Haven County and tried together to the court, 'Sham-way J.; judgment for the railway company in each case, and appeal by two of the property-owners.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and heard in damages to the court, Rorabach, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $4,500, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to restrain an upper riparian proprietor from an alleged unreasonable use, obstruction and detention of the waters of the stream, and for damages, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Robinson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to compel the defendant, the alleged husband of the plaintiff, to. support her, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Ralph Wheeler, J. ; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Actioh by the indorsee against the maker to recover the amount of two promissory notes, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Reed, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $8,300, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover the'amount of a loss under an accident-insurance policy, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, where a demurrer to certain defenses of the answer was sustained (Curtis, J.') and the cause was afterwards reserved upon an agreed finding of facts for the advice of this court.

Applications in the nature of appeals from street paving assessments, taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to the first and third reasons of appeal was overruled ( Gager, J.), the facts were found and reported by a committee, and judgment in each case was rendered (Robinson, J.') for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed.

<p>Action to recover damages for the conversion of household goods left with the defendant on storage, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Hubbard, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs for $1,036, and appeal by the defendant.</p>

Shit for an injunction to restrain the defendants from removing certain buildings on land adjudged to belong to the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Ralph Wheeler, J., upon a demurrer to the answer and cross-complaint; the court sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendants appealed.

Action to recover' damages for the breach of a covenant of warranty, brought to the Superior Court at Waterbury and tried to the jury before Case, J.; verdict for the plaintiff, which the trial court on motion of the defendant set aside as' against the evidence, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action on assigned claims for goods scftd and delivered, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County where demurrers to two defenses were sustained, and the case was afterwards tried to the jury before Bishop, J. ; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Action on a note, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Bishop, J. ; verdict and judgment for defendant.

<p>An appeal by a street-railway company from any “ decision, denial, direction, or order ” of municipal authorities, under § 3832 of the General Statutes, carries up the whole proceeding for review de novo by the railroad commissioners, who have at least as great powers on such appeal as the municipal authorities originally had.</p> <p>In the present case the railroad commissioners declined to make any order respecting conditions imposed upon the street-railway company by the municipal authorities—which were the matters particularly specified as reasons of appeal—upon the ground that they had no power to do so. Held that this misconception of then-functions by the railroad commissioners justified the Superior Court, on appeal to it, in disaffirming their order and remitting the cause to them for their determination.</p> <p>Upon an application of a street-railway company for the approval of its proposed location and plan of construction, the municipal authorities gave their consent provided the company should (1) remove from the highway an abutment of an overhead bridge owned by a steam railroad company, which impeded the course of travel; (2) erect and maintain an electric light under the bridge'; (3) build a new broad iron bridge to replace a narrow one over a stream crossing the highway. Held that these conditions were germane to the subject-matter, and when imposed by the city became an incident to the proceeding and reviewable by the railroad commissioners on appeal from the order of the municipal authorities.</p>

Action by the surety upon a replevin bond to recover the amount he had been obliged to pay thereon, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to the second defense was overruled ( Grager, JJ) and the cause was afterwards tried to the court, Thayer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>The defendant, who owned a corner lot bounded east and south by highways, sold the northern part to the plaintiff and agreed in writing not to build on the southern part anything except a dwelling-house, which was to be at least fifty feet back from the west curb line of the east highway, and substantially in the center of the southern part, midway between the plaintiff’s lot and the retaining wall of the highway on the south, which wall was commonly regarded as the north line of such highway. Subsequently the city took a strip of the plaintiff’s land to widen the highway on the south of her lot, and she afterwards commenced the erection of a dwelling-house the middle line of which, east and west, was substantially coincident with the middle line of her lot as thus narrowed by the action of the city. The plaintiff claimed that the location of the house on that line was in violation of the defendant’s agreement, and sought to restrain its erection. Held that the agreement when reasonably construed, and especially when read in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the situation of the’ contracting parties at the time of its execution, did not sustain the claim of the plaintiff, nor justify the issue of an injunction against the erection of the dwelling-house on the site selected by the defendant.</p>

Action for a divorce or a decree of nullity, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and heard on default before Thayer, J., who dismissed the complaint.

Action against an indorser to recover the amount of a promissory note, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Reed, J. ; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Action of replevin to recover possession of a piece of linoleum, brought to the City Court of Waterbury and thence by plaintiffs’ appeal to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the court, Cowell, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiffs.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been caused by the defendants’ negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where a demurrer to the second defense was sustained (Thayer, J.j, one to the amended answer overruled (Reed, J.j, and the cause was tried to the jury before Reed, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to and heard in damages by the Superior Court in New Haven County, George W. Wheeler, J., at a special session, against the objection of the defendant and in its absence; judgment for the plaintiff for $2,750, and appeal by the defendant.</p>

<p>Action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the court, Tyner, Acting-Judge, upon demurrer to the complaint ; the court sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>This action was brought under the statute regulating mechanic’s liens. General Statutes, §§ 4135-4140. Paragraph three of the complaint alleges that “ the plaintiff, with the knowledge and approval of the defendant, rendered services and furnished materials in the construction of the above-described railroad, under an agreement ” by which the plaintiff was to render services in the construction of said railroad: The reasons specified in the demurrer are: 1. It</p> <p>does not appear in the complaint that the services rendered by the plaintiff in the construction of said railroad were rendered under any contract with or approved by the corporation owning said railroad. 2. It does not appear therein that the defendant corporation was the owner or engaged in the construction of the kind of railroad contemplated by the statutes on which the plaintiff bases his claim of lien; nor does it appear that the defendant corporation is a “ steam railroad” corporation. The court (Tyner, J.j ruled that the first ground of demurrer was insufficient, and sustained the demurrer on the second ground. This appeal challenges the sufficiency of both grounds of demurrer.</p>

Action to recover damages for alienating the affections of the plaintiff’s husband, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before. Ralph Wheeler, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $8,750, of which $2,050 was subsequently remitted, by order of the court, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $1,700, from which the defendant appealed.

Appeals from an order of the railroad commissioners abolishing a grade-crossing in the town of East Hartford, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Q-eorge W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered modifying the plan and order of the railroad commissioners, and appeal by several of the respondents.

<p>Actions to recover one half of several sums paid by the plaintiff as indorser of certain promissory notes upon which he was liable jointly and equally with the defendant’s testator, brought to the Superior Court in- Hartford County and tried to the court, Thayer, J., after the plaintiff had been permitted (Case, J.') to amend his complaints ; facts found and judgment rendered in one case for the defendant, upon his counterclaim, and in the other for the plaintiff, from which judgments the defendant appealed.</p>

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to and heard in damages by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Case, J. ; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $5,000, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover the amount of a loan to a school district, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Shumway, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff to recover ¿6,500 of the school district, but with interest at four per cent, only, and for the school district to recover, on its cross-complaint, ¿1,300 of the town, from which both the plaintiff and the town appealed.

Infoumation for selling intoxicating liquor without a license, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County and tried to the jury before Thayer, J.; Verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.

Melony, and be deducted from his share of the estate, taken by said son to the Superior Court in Windham County and tried to the court, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered reversing the action of the Court of Probate, and appeal by George W. Melony.

Action to recover for services rendered in effecting a sale of real estate, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Q-ager, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $1,350, and appeal by the defendant.

Suit to restrain the defendants from interfering with or obstructing the holding of religious meetings by the plaintiffs in a certain church edifice in Terryville, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Rorabaclc, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiffs. An appeal was originally taken to this court at the May Term, 1905.

Action to recover damages for criminal conversation and for alienating the affections of the plaintiff’s wife, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Gager, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,250, and appeal by the defendant.

Writ of error to reverse the judgment of a justice of the peace in an action of summary process, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Goats, J.; judgment for the defendant, and'appeal by the plaintiff.

Suit for the construction of the will of William S. Noyes of Stonington, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New London County, Ralph Wheeler, J, upon the facts alleged in the complaint, for the advice of this court.

Action for libel, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Ralph Wheeler, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $314, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Action under § 4053 of the General Statutes to settle the title to real estate, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to the complaint was overruled (Ralph Wheeler, J.') and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Robinson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants.</p> <p>The plaintiff, under the will of her husband who died in 1878, had a freehold estate in a small bit of land bounded by the sea. The defendants entered upon this land, occupied the same, built a boat-house thereon, and thereafter continued in occupation of the land. The plaintiff, claiming this entry and occupation to be wrongful, sought redress by an action which is set forth in the complaint as follows: “ 1. That she has an interest in certain land in said town of Guilford (describing the land), which land is a part of the estate of the said George A. Foote. 2. Her interest in said land is the right to lease the same, and enjoy the rents and income thereof, pursuant to the will of her late husband, the said George A. Foote. 3. Said defendants, Chester A. Brown and James Garfield Brown, have wrongfully entered on said land, placed a building thereon, claiming some interest or estate in said land adverse to the plaintiff, and continue in the occupation thereof. 4. Said land is worth $1,000. The plaintiff claims: (1) that each defendant be required to state the nature and extent of his interest in said land, and the source through which the same was derived ; (2) judgment settling the title; (3) judgment for the possession of said premises ; (4) $300 damages.”</p> <p>A demurrer to the complaint was overruled (Ralph Wheeler, J.~). The defendants filed separate answers. Each answer denied the first three paragraphs of the complaint, but the answer of the defendant Chester A. Brown contained also a disclaimer of all estate or interest in the land described in the complaint; and that of James G. Brown stated the denial of the third paragraph of the complaint in the form of an allegation that the land described was common land belonging to the town of Guilford, and that said town had authorized him to place a building on said land and occupy the same, and that in pursuance of said authority, and not otherwise, he had occupied said land; and further alleges that his interest and occupation of said land is not adverse to any title, interest, or claim that the plaintiff may have in said land.</p> <p>The case was tried to the court upon the issues raised by these pleadings. The court (Robinson, J.) made a finding, from which it appears that the following facts were found: 1. The land was not common land belonging to the town of Guilford, but was included in a farm belonging to the plaintiff’s husband at the time of his death. 2. At the time of the entry by the defendants the plaintiff was in possession of the land in pursuance of a valid title in her. 3. The defendants made wrongful entry upon the land, placed a building thereon, and have ever since continued in occupancy of said land. 4. Neither of the defendants has any title, right or interest in the land. The court thereupon rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The judgment describes the action as claiming judgment settling the title to the land described; possession of said land; and $300 damages. It then states that the court finds the issues for the plaintiff, and finds the facts as follows—reciting the facts substantially as above stated, with the additional fact that the plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages in the sum of $5. The judgment then proceeds : “ Whereupon it is adjudged that the defendants deliver to the plaintiff possession of said premises, and that the plaintiff recover of the defendants five dollars ($5) damages, and her costs.”</p> <p>The material errors assigned in the appeal are: In overruling the demurrer; in treating this case as an action of ejectment and not one of quieting title to said premises; in refusing to grant costs to the defendant Chester A. Brown upon his filing a disclaimer; in holding that under § 4053 of the General Statutes the plaintiff could maintain an action of ejectment and recover possession of the premises and money damages; in holding that the complaint sets forth an action of ejectment.</p>

Suit by the grantee of a deed to secure the cancellation of a subsequent deed as a cloud on his title, or for other relief, brought to the .District Court of Waterbury and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, George W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover the amount of a bond given to secure the faithful performance of the duties of treasurer of the plaintiff bank, brought to the District Court of Waterbury and thence, by the defendants’ appeal, to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to several defenses was sustained (Case, J.') and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Thayer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the sureties for alleged error in…

Action to recover damages for personal injuries caused by a fall on a sidewalk alleged to bave been defective through ice and snow, brought to and heard in damages by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $500, and appeal by the defendant.

Action upon a probate bond, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, Uliman, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action in. the nature of trespass qu. cl. fr., brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Oase, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiffs.

Action to recover for personal injuries alleged to lrave Leen caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to and heard in damages by the Superior Court in Fairfield Count}', Robinson, J. ;. facts found and judgment rendered for nominal damages only, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Stevens, deceased, taken, by an heir at law, to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Heed, J.; verdict and judgment for the contestant, and appeal by the executor.

Suit to obtain a reconveyance of land, pursuant to an agreement of the parties, or for other relief, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield Count}', Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>General Statutes, § 1037, provides that courts of equitable jurisdiction may order a sale, rather than a partition, of real estate owned by two or more persons, when that will better promote the interests of the owners. Held that unity of possession was essential to the maintenance of a suit for partition or sale, and therefore an alleged tenant in common who was actually ousted, could not, while so ousted, invoke the statutory remedy against his disseisor who was in exclusive possession under a claim of sole and absolute ownership.</p>

Action to recover a statutory forfeiture for neglecting, as administratrix, to file an inventory of a decedent’s estate, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Curtis, J., upon demurrer to the answer; the court overruled the demurrer pro forma, and, upon the plaintiff’s refusal to plead further, rendered judgment for him to recover but $1 damages, from which he appealed.

<p>A testator is qualified to make a will if, at the time of its execution, he possesses sufficient mind and memory to enable him to know and understand the business in which he is engaged.</p> <p>It cannot be said, as matter of law, that a person of weak intellect who was shown to have been insane twenty years before, and again twelve years after, the date of his will, was thereby incapacitated from making a simple testamentary disposition of his property.</p> <p>The question of capacity remaius one of fact for the trier upon all the evidence in the case.</p> <p>Where an issue was determined by a clear preponderance of evidence, the opinion of the trial court as to which side had the burden of proof is immaterial.</p> <p>An adjudication, in proceedings for the appointment of a conservator, that a person is incapable of managing his affairs, is not conclusive upon the question of his testamentary capacity twelve years before. The finding in an earlier case may be incorporated by reference in the finding on appeal, without repeating its recitals.</p> <p>A finding on appeal is admissible to show the scope of a judgment which is doubtful on its face.</p> <p>The recitals of a finding made for purposes of appeal are not adjudicated facts binding upon the parties in a subsequent litigation.</p> <p>The cross-examination of an attesting witness to a will is not to be restricted to what occurred at the time of its execution. But no advantage can be taken of such restriction on appeal, if the losing party afterwards examines the witness fully upon the matters previously excluded.</p> <p>In the present case a witness stated that the testator was of unsound mind, and that one of his characteristics was to “ break off in conversation”; and on cross-examination testified that a brother of the testator also did this. Held that on his redireet-examination he might be asked his opinion of the sanity of this brother.</p> <p>A witness present at the execution of a will, having stated what he saw and heard, may be asked whether one upon whom the testator relied performed any act or made any statement indicating coercion or an attempt to influence the testator; it being impossible to detail fully the facts upon which the conclusion of the witness is based.</p>

Appeal by certain creditors of the defendant from an order of the Superior Court in New Haven County, Robinson, J., directing how the funds in the hands of its receiver should be distributed, and denying the claims of such appellants to subrogation and set-off.

Amicable suit to determine whether certain cash dividends upon stock held in trust belonged to the life tenant or to the remainderman, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Oase, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.

Action to recover money paid by the plaintiff’s intestate upon a contract for the purchase of property, which he had failed to perform, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Thayer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $67,345, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to set aside a conveyance of real estate alleged to liave been made in fraud of a creditor, brought .to the Superior Court in Hartford Count}*-, where a demurrer to the complaint was overruled (Thayer, J.~) and the cause was afterwards tried to court, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants.

Shit to redeem certain land from a first mortgage lien, and also to foreclose a junior mortgage and a mechanic’s lien, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Q-eorge W. Wheeler, J., upon the defendant’s answer and cross-complaint; facts found and judgment rendered foreclosing the plaintiff’s mortgage and mechanic’s lien, and providing that, in case the defendant should not redeem that mortgage, the plaintiff’s interest under it should he…

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Huntington disallowing a payment of a mortgage debt of $1,800 made by the administrator without presentation of the mortgage note or any demand by the payee and mortgagee, taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Georye W. Wheeler, J., upon a finding of facts, for the advice of this court.</p>

<p>Shit to determine the title to real estate, for an injunction, and for other equitable relief, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed.</p>

Action to recover damages for assault and battery, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Gager, J. ; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for |400, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the charge of the court.

Action for money alleged to have been loaned by a wife to her husband, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Coats, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff Henrietta S. Witte.

<p>Actios by the trustees under the will of Lawson C. Ives of Hartford, deceased, for a construction of his will; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. Answers admitting the truth of the allegations of the complaint were filed by all the defendants. Sophia L. Owen, a daughter of the testator, also made sundry allegations in her answer, to which the other defendants demurred. Their demurrer was sustained (Meed, J.') and a judgment rendered giving a construction to the will; from which all the defendants except Sophia L. Owen and those belonging to her family appealed.</p> <p>The testator died in 1867, leaving a large estate, real and personal. His will made certain charitable bequests, and contained the following provisions as to his residuary estate :—</p> <p>It was devised and bequeathed to trustees and to their successors as joint tenants in fee simple forever. They were to allow the widow to occupy the homestead and use its furniture during her widowhood; furnishing a home therein for her daughter Sophia, while the latter remained unmarried, she paying a reasonable compensation for her board. On the termination of this estate in the widow, Sophia was to have the furniture absolutely, and the use of the homestead so long as she desired and as the trustees deemed it expedient.</p> <p>The property, other than the homestead and furniture, was to be invested in productive property, and directions were given as to the disposition of the income, which appear in the foot-note.1</p> <p>The residuary estate was distributed to the trustees in 1877 at a valuation of over $650,000.</p> <p>The testator’s widow died in 1869. He left three surviving children, Philo, Walter, and Sophia. Walter died in 1893, leaving a widow born prior to the testator’s decease, and three children. Philo died in September, 1904, leaving a widow born prior to the testator’s decease, and four children. Sophia is married and has four children. Several of the grandchildren were minors in November, 1904, when this suit was brought.</p> <p>The trustees from time to time have paid over to certain of the testator’s children and their families portions of the principal of the estate. Such payments were not equally divided among such children and their respective families. They have filed their accounts from time to time in the proper Court of Probate, which has approved them, but it was not alleged that such approval was ever given on due notice to the parties in interest. The last account filed shows the present amount of the principal of the trust estate to he about §438,000.</p> <p>In behalf of Sophia and her family an answer was filed containing averments to the following effect: When the testator made his will and codicils his two sons had, as he knew, displayed tendencies toward wasteful and profligate habits, such as gave room for much anxiety concerning their future characters and lives. On the contrary, the testator’s daughter, Sophia Ives Owen, had led an exemplary life, had lived at home with her father and was held by him in particular regard and esteem, and this special regard and fondness of the testator for his said daughter is shown by the provisions of the will and codicils. Said trustees from time to time had reason to suppose, and did in fact suppose, that the interest or income bequeathed iir said will to said Philo L. Ives and Walter D. Ives, and to the legatees in their families, was being applied by said legatees, or suffered by them to be applied, to improper uses, and that said trustees did from time to time suppose, upon reasons that seemed ample to them, that said interest and income was being applied by said legatees, or suffered by them to be applied, to uses that in the-judgment of said trustees were not conducive to the comfortable maintenance and support of said legatees and their families; and said trustees, acting under the discretionary powers conferred by clause “ Nineteenth ” of said will, from time to time did suspend payments to said Philo and Walter, and to the legatees in their families, of portions of the interest or income bequeathed in said will to said respective legatees, and did from time to time invest portions of said suspended income and add the same to the residue and remainder of the estate. In the judgment of said trustees, the income given by the will to Sophia was insufficient at all times for her support and that of her family, according to her and their station in life, and said trustees, acting under the discretionary powers conferred upon them by clause “ Fourth ” of the first codicil, did from time to time duly pay over to or expend for the benefit of said Sophia and her family certain portions of the income of said estate, which, in and by clause “ Nineteenth ” of said will, was invested by said trustees from time to time and added to the residue and remainder of the estate; and also, acting under the discretionary powers conferred by the “twentieth” clause of the will, from time to time duly appropriated portions of the principal of said estate and paid the same over to the said Sophia and to her family, in addition to the income paid them under the terms of said will, for their comfortable maintenance and support in accordance with their station in life.</p> <p>To these allegations the other defendants demurred, because they set up irrelevant matters not germane to the complaint, and not such as tended to explain any ambiguity in the will.</p> <p>The ruling sustaining the demurrer was not assigned as a reason of appeal by any of the appellants.</p>

Action in the nature of ejectment, by an administrator de bonis non e. t. a., brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Boraback, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Application in the nature of an appeal from an assessment of sewer benefits made by tbe board of sewer commissioners of tbe town of West Hartford, brought to the Hon. William S. Case, a judge of the Superior Court, who dismissed the application upon the ground that it had not been made seasonably, from which judgment the applicants appealed.

<p>The practical impossibility of tracing back present corporate assets to their source for the purpose of attempting to establish .alleged equities therein between a life tenant and a remainderman, lias compelled the adoption, for general application, of the rule that assets distributed by a corporation in liquidation are to be regarded as capital and not income, and therefore go to swell the corpus of the trust fund and increase the interest of the remainderman. This rule is on the whole the most reliable, just, and effectual in •its operation of any which can be devised.</p> <p>In the present case a corporation voted to discontinue business and wind up its affairs, and to sell its plant and other assets, except cash on hand, bills and accounts receivable, and cash due on completed contracts, to another company, in return for certain shares of the latter’s stock and a stated sum of money. All the stockholders of the liquidating company agreed to and did accept, in the distribution of its effects, their proportionate share of the stock of the purchasing company. Pursuant to the foregoing action, all the reserved assets were sold and the proceeds thereof, together With the sum received from the vendee company, were paid by vote of the directors of the liquidating company to its stockholders in the form of cash dividends. Held that as between the executor of the life tenant and a remainderman, the assets so distributed belonged to the corpus of the trust fund and accordingly went to the remainderman.</p> <p>A testatrix having made bequests to an ecclesiastical society, and to several missionary societies and schools, directed the residue of her estate to be equally divid.ed “ among the schools and missionary societies ” mentioned in her will. Held that the ecclesiastical society was not included in this designation, and therefore was not entitled to share in the bequest of the residue.</p> <p>If the expressions of a will are free from ambiguity, they unalterably disclose the intent of the testator, and no extrinsic evidence of it is in such case permitted.</p>

Shit to restrain tile defendants, as State officers, from paying increased salaries to judges of the Supreme Court of Errors and of the Superior Court who were in office,* under a previous appointment, at the date of the passage of an Act of the legislature authorizing such increase, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Reed, J., upon a demurrer to the complaint.

Application in the nature of an appeal from an assessment of sewer benefits made by the borough of Bristol, brought to the lion. William 8. Case, a judge of the Superior Court, and referred to a committee who heard and reported the facts; a remonstrance to the acceptance of the report was overruled, and from a judgment for the defendant the plaintiff appealed.

Action by citizens of New York as creditors of a Missouri corporation which had been dissolved, to collect their debt from certain of its former shareholders and directors; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, where demurrers to the complaint were sustained, Case, J., and the action dismissed.

<p>Suit for the construction of the will of William E. Raymond of New Canaan, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, George W. Wheeler, J!, upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.</p> <p>William E. Raymond of New Canaan died in 1890, leaving a considerable estate and a will. There survived him his widow, and her sister, Susan E. Comstock, but no issue. By his will he gave his wife his personal effects, $5,000 in cash, $1,200 for her support during the first year after his decease, and the life use of certain real estate, including his homestead. Other legacies, amounting to $4,600, are contained in the will and codicil. All the rest and remainder of his estate was given in trust. The will, after defining the powers and duties of the trustees in the management of the trust estate, contains the following directions, recited so far as pertinent, as to the appropriation and distribution of the fund and its income, to wit: “ and after paying out of the annual income thereof all lawful taxes, and the necessary and reasonable expenses and charges incident to said trust, to pay out of the balance or net annual income thereof the sum of twelve hundred dollars in each and every year, and in that proportion for all the parts of a year, to my said wife, for her own use, during her natural life, in equal half yearly payments, at the end of every six months, or oftener as may be convenient for said trustees and for her.</p> <p>“ And out of any excess of said net annual income, after paying said annual sum to my said wife, I direct said trustees to pay in like manner the sum of seventy dollars annually to Susan E. Comstock, sister of my said wife, for her own use during her natural life.</p> <p>“ Seventh. I direct said trustees and their successors to expend such sums of money as they shall find necessary, not exceeding fifteen dollars in any year, out of said net income, in causing my cemetery lot, where I shall be buried, to be kept in a neat and proper condition, and the grass thereon properly cut; and if any repairs shall be needed thereon to any of the tombstones or structures or otherwise, I authorize such trustees to cause such repairs to be made out of said net income.</p> <p>11 Eighth. As soon as the net annual income of said residue of my estate so held in trust, after all the foregoing provisions of my will are fully satisfied, shall be sufficient therefor, and so long as said net income shall be so sufficient, I direct said trustees and their successors in said trust to employ, at a salary of sixteen hundred dollars per year, to be paid out of said net annual income in equal quarter yearly payments, an orthodox evangelical clergyman of the Congregational church, ... to serve as a home missionary or evangelist in laboring and preaching the Gospel of Jesus Christ in such places within the State of Connecticut and to and among such people therein as are destitute of or not easily accessible to, or not disposed otherwise to avail themselves of, the ordinary privileges of regular attendance upon divine worship. . . .</p> <p>“ Tenth. ... If at any time the net income shall not be sufficient for the purposes aforesaid, then while such deficiency continues, I direct that no such clergyman be so employed, but that the income be added to the principal and the fund accumulate until the same shall produce a sufficient income,- . . .</p> <p>“ Eleventh. If in any year there shall be an excess of said net income after fully satisfying all the provisions hereinbefore contained, including the employment during such year and the payment of such clergymen, then I direct such excess to be added to and to become part of the principal; provided that if such excess in any year shall be more than two hundred dollars, then I give all of such excess over and above said sum of two hundred dollars, to The American Home Missionary Society and The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, corporations known by those names respectively, to be equally divided between them, and to be applied to their respective charitable uses and purposes.</p> <p>“ Twelfth. But if said Congregational Society shall refuse to perform the duties imposed upon it by the provisions hereof, either at the commencement of said trust or at any future time, or shall by dissolution or otherwise become unable to do so, then, and from thenceforth, I direct that no such clergyman be so employed, and I direct that said trustees fully comply with all the directions herein contained in respect to the payment of said annual sums to my said wife, and to said Susan E. Comstock, and to the care of my cemetery lot, during the lives of my said wife and of said Susan E. Comstock, and of the survivor of them, and I direct said trustees to pay all the excess of said net income to The American Home Missionary Society, and to The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions aforesaid, in equal shares, annually, to be applied by them to their respective charitable uses and purposes. And at the decease of my said wife and of said Susan E. Comstock, or, as the case may be, upon the refusal of said Congregational Society thereafter at any time longer to discharge the duties so as aforesaid imposed upon it, then I give and bequeath out of said trust fund the sum of three hundred dollars to the New Canaan Cemetery Association; . . . and I give, devise and bequeath, all the residue and remainder of said estate so held in trust, free and discharged of said trust, to The American Home Missionary Society and The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions aforesaid, to be equally divided between them, and direct that the share of each of them therein shall be invested at interest and kept and maintained as a perpetual fund, the annual income only of which shall be used and applied by them respectively to their respective charitable uses and purposes.”</p> <p>The will provides that its provisions in favor of the wife should be in lieu of dower.</p> <p>The testator’s estate was duly settled, and the residue thereof passed into the hands of the plaintiffs, who qualified as trustees and have since so acted. For some years and down to 1899, the net income received by them sufficed to satisfy the annual payments to be made to the widow and sister. In the latter year a block of buildings, comprising a considerable part of the trust estate and the rents of which formed a large part of the income derived by the trustees, was burned After a considerable delay it was rebuilt. As a result of the destruction of the building the net income became insufficient to make said payments in full, and that condition continued until the death of Mrs. Raymond, February 7th, 1905. The sister still survives. The payments to Mrs. Raymond from the time that the income began to be insufficient as aforesaid until her death aggregated nearly $3,500 less than the amounts she would have otherwise received. The deficiency in those to her sister now amounts to nearly $500.</p> <p>Mrs. Raymond was in her sixty-first year when the will was republished by the codicil, and in her sixty-fourth at the time of the testator’s death. She and Mr. Raymond had lived happily together during some fifty years of married life. She had substantially no income after her husband’s death except such as came to her through her husband’s testamentary provision for her. The defendant executors are the duly qualified executors of her will. They claim that the trustees are required to pay to them out of accrued or accruing income such an amount as will, with the amounts received by her in her lifetime, make a sum equal to $1,200 a year from the commencement of the trust to her death, and also interest on all deferred payments. Susan E. Com-stock makes a similar claim upon the trustees for the deficiency in the amount of the payments to her, and interest.</p>

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to and heard in damages by the Superior Court in Windham County, Robinson, J. ; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $5,000, and appeal by the defendant. The plaintiff’s intestate, Leander Blackwell, was killed while attempting to cross the tracks of the defendant at the grade-crossing just north of the South Windham station.

Action upon a probate bond, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Shumway, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $8,490 damages, and appeal by the defendants.

Action to restrain the defendants from using a certain label in hats manufactured and sold by them, which was an alleged counterfeit or imitation of the label of the United Hatters of North America, in whose behalf the plaintiff sued, also for an accounting and damages, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where demurrers to the complaint were overruled (Robinson, and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Shumway, J. ; facts found and judgment rendered for…

<p>Ineoemation iu the nature of quo warranto to determine the respondent’s title to the office of city surveyor of Bridgeport, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fair-field County, STmmway, J., upon the respondent’s demurrer to the replication; the court sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment for the respondent, from which the relator appealed.</p> <p>The charter of the city of Bridgeport provides that the common council shall consist of the mayor and twenty-four aldermen ; that the mayor shall preside at the meetings of the common council; that all elections or appointments within the gift of the common council shall be by ballot, and that the person receiving a plurality of ballots shall be elected; that the common council shall have power to pass ordinances relative to the election of city surveyor, also relative to the removal of any officer for corruption or misfeasance. Special Laws of 1895, p. 515 ; id. 1901, p. 1202.</p> <p>An ordinance of the city provided that the common council in March, 1899, and triennially thereafter in the same month, should elect a city surveyor, who should hold his office for three years. On March 20th, 1905, the common council, at a meeting warned for the purpose, duly elected a city surveyor for the term of three years. At this meeting there were four ballots taken. Upon the first ballot Horace G. Scofield (the relator) received a plurality of ballots ; upon the second and third ballots no one received a plurality; upon the fourth ballot William W. Starr (the respondent) received a plurality. Starr accepted the office, duly qualified, and entered upon the performance of its duties.</p> <p>The State’s Attorney filed this information alleging the election of Scofield, that Starr usurps the office of Scofield, and praying process against Starr requiring him to answer by what right he claims to hold said office. The plea of the respondent denies the election of the relator, alleges that at said meeting the common council, in the proceedings to elect a city surveyor, voted by ballot four times ; that the first vote was irregular, in that twenty-five ballots were cast, one of which was blank, whereas but twenty-four persons were present who were entitled to vote (exclusive of the mayor who did not vote) ; that because of said irregularity no person was announced or declared elected by the mayor presiding; that upon the fourth vote by ballot, in which twenty-four ballots were cast by the aldermen, thirteen were cast in favor of the respondent and eleven in favor of the relator, and thereupon the mayor presiding declared the respondent elected, and thereupon the respondent accepted the office, duly qualified, and entered upon its duties. The plea further recites in detail the facts alleged to have occurred from the commencement to the close of the process of voting by ballot, including the fact that upon the first vote one blank and twenty-four ballots were cast, of which thirteen were for the relator and eleven for the respondent.</p> <p>In his replication the relator admits that four ballots were taken before any person was declared elected by the mayor presiding; that upon the fourth ballot the mayor did announce and declare the respondent elected, and that the respondent duly qualified and entered upon the duties of the office. He admits the details of the proceeding substantially as recited in the plea, except as to a blank ballot being east upon the first vote, and this is denied; subsequently the relator amended his replication by adding a fourth paragraph, by which he admits that there was among the ballots cast upon the first vote a blank piece of paper similar in appearance to said ballots, but alleges that said piece of paper was attached to the back of one of said written ballots by accident in the cutting of the ballots for said use of said aldermen, and adhered to such written ballot in such a manner that it could not be detected, and that the ballot to which it adhered was innocently cast, as the ballot of such alderman, without his knowledge or the knowledge of any person that such blank piece of paper was so attached; that said blank piece of paper was not cast by any alderman as a separate ballot, nor intended to be so cast or counted. The relator further alleges that each member of the council cast one separate, written ballot, making twenty-four lawful ballots in all, and that the tellers counted twenty-four ballots in all, thirteen for him and eleven for Starr, without said blank paper being separated from the ballot to which it adhered, and communicated that result to the mayor; but that before the mayor announced that result, one of the tellers found said piece of paper, detached it, and thereupon the mayor announced there were thirteen ballots for Scofield, eleven ballots for Starr, and one blank ballot, and that, as there were more ballots than members voting, no person had received a plurality of votes for said office as required by law; and that thereupon, against the protest of members of said council, another and other ballots were taken, as set forth in the respondent’s plea.</p> <p>The respondent demurred “ to so much of the fourth paragraph of the amendment of the replication, dated June 20, 1905, as in substance alleges that a blank ballot was innocently and ignorantly cast by a member of the common council.”</p> <p>The appeal assigns error in sustaining the demurrer, and in holding that it was within the power of the common council to disregard the first ballot and proceed to further ballots.</p>

Application by the accused, who had been convicted of larceny, for an order directed to the clerk of the Superior Court at Waterbury requiring him to show cause why he should not file the request of the accused for a finding of facts and the accompanying draft of a proposed finding, and for a like order directed to the trial judge requiring him to show cause why he should not make a finding in the case.

Action of book-debt, brought to and tried by the District Court of Waterbury, Peck, Acting-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Action by a wife to compel her husband to contribute to her support, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and referred to a committee who heard and reported the facts; the court, Case, J., accepted the report of the committee, found the statements of facts therein to be true, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff for $100 a month, from which the defendant appealed.

Action to recover damages for libel, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and withdrawn by agreement of the parties and without the knowledge of the plaintiff’s attorney, who thereupon filed a written application that the ease be restored to the docket; the court (Robinson, J.) denied the application, from which the plaintiff’s attorney appealed in the name of the plaintiff.

Suit by a junior mortgagee to secure tbe cancellation and discharge of a prior mortgage, upon the ground that it had been paid, and for other relief, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

of the police commissioner of Derby removing the appellant from his position of policeman of said city, taken to the lion. Edwin B. Gager, a judge of the Superior Court, who sustained a demurrer to the appeal and confirmed the action of the commissioner, from which judgment the appellant appealed.

<p>A registrar of voters in appointing and employing an assistant, under General Statutes, § 1599, acts as an agent of the law, and is not personally liable to the latter for his services, unless he pledges his own credit by plain words.</p> <p>Under the so-called common count for work and labor {Form, 85) a plaintiff cannot recover for “ money had and received.”</p>

<p>A tax voluntarily paid, with a full knowledge of all the facts, cannot be recovered, although no legal obligation to make the payment may have existed.</p> <p>Pending her appeal from the action of the board of relief, the plaintiff paid, under protest, a tax assessed against her, although no coercive measures had been taken' to collect the tax and none were then threatened or possible. Held that such a payment was voluntary, and none the less so because she might have been influenced to make it in the expectation of thereby saving interest if the tax should afterward be adjudged valid.</p>

<p>A losing party cannot justly complain of a charge which covers in substance every material request made by him, and is otherwise correct and sufficient as a whole for the guidance of the jury in the case before them.</p> <p>A photograph which is admitted in evidence may properly be inspected with the aid of an ordinary magnifying glass ; and it is not necessarily improper for counsel, during or after argument, to state to the jury that the use of such a glass as he then holds in his hand will disclose something in the photograph tending to support his claim as to a matter in dispute.</p> <p>It is within the discretion of the court to allow the jury, upon their request during their deliberations, to receive and use such a magnifying glass.</p>

Action of interpleader, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven Count}*-, Robinson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered awarding the larger portion of the fund to the First National Bank of New Haven, and appeal by the other claimant, Nathaniel R. Bronson, trustee.

Action upon two bonds given to secure the performance by the Eastern Paving Brick Company of contracts for pav-. ing-brick, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the Eastern Paving Brick Company failed to appear; the court (Shumway, J. j overruled a demurrer to the answer of the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, the other defendant, and the cause was afterward tried to the court, George W. Wheeler, J. ; facts found and judgment rendered against the…

t. a. upon the estate of Betsey G. Sperry, deceased, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to and heard in damages by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Slmmway, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff • for $1,500, and appeal by the defendant.