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78 Ill. 2d 88

398 N.E.2d 574

34 Ill.Dec. 751

People v. Gabbard

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided December 3, 1979

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1979-12-03

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge would lead a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person apprehended has committed the offense. [Citations.] In determining whether probable cause existed, this court has emphasized that the totality of facts and circumstances known to the officer when the arrest was made must be considered.” (People v. Gabbard (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 88, 101 , 398 N.E.2d 574 (Underwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).)”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 111 Ill. App. 3d 38 - People v. Grigsby

Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Brinegar v. United States · Beck v. State of Ohio

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1979-12-03

How this case has been cited

Cited by 112 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2018 · most notably 136 Ill. 2d 66 - People v. Foskey (1990), 117 Ill. 2d 194 - People v. White (1987)

4 federal appellate · 106 state decisions

69019791980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD,

¶1concurring in part and dissenting in part:

¶2I disagree with the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the documents seized from the defendant after his arrest should have been suppressed. In my judgment, sufficient evidence was presented during the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress to support the trial court’s finding that there was probable cause for the arrest. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 107 — 2(c), as defined in People v. Wright (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 523, 528.) A trial court’s determination as to probable cause should not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous, which it seems to me it is not. People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 501, 505, citing People v. Dailey (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 239; People v. Brooks (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 156.

¶3It is elementary, of course, that an arrest is supported by probable cause when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge would lead a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person apprehended has commited the offense. (Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103, 111, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 64, 95 S. Ct. 854, 862; Adams v. Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143, 148, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 618, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1924; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89, 91, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 145, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225; People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 276.) In determining whether probable cause existed, this court has emphasized that the totality of facts and circumstances known to the officer when the arrest was made must be considered. (People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 276; People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 501, 504.) Moreover, in deciding questions of probable cause courts deal with probabilities which are not technical but which are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Adams v. Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143, 149, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 618, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1925; Draper v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 313, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 332, 79 S. Ct. 329, 333; Brinegar v. United States (1949), 338 U.S. 160, 175, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1891, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310; People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 277;People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 501, 505.

¶4The testimony at the hearing indicated that six days prior to the incident the arresting officer had received a report describing a Federal prisoner who had escaped and was believed to be approximately 30 miles from the location of the arrest. Although the description of the escapee varied somewhat from the defendant’s appearance, the police officer testified that the report was on his mind when he drove his car onto the highway shoulder where the defendant had been walking. Moreover, one of the reasons the State troopers stopped persons walking along main highways was to ascertain whether the persons were in need of assistance. For these reasons, the officer stopped the defendant and inquired regarding his destination. When the defendant gave the anomalous answer that he was both going to and coming from Springfield, the officer asked for identification, and the defendant produced only personalized checks. Having seen a driver’s license tucked among the personal checks, the officer asked whether the defendant had any additional identification. When defendant denied that he did and started to place the checks and license in the bag he was carrying, he was arrested.

¶5The officer had testified that the defendant voluntarily approached the squad car after it stopped. While defendant testified the officer beckoned him to the car, the trial court apparently accepted the officer’s statements and found that the defendant acquiesced in the temporary questioning that transpired prior to his arrest. Accordingly, any characterization of that incident as a stop or seizure in the absence of any attempt to detain or restrain the defendant against his will is unsupp or table. (See, e.g., People v. Tilden (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 859, 862; People v. Kennedy (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 267, 273; People v. Jordan (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 660, 662-63; People v. Oritz (1973), 18 Ill. App. 3d 431, 433; People v. Hines (1973), 12 Ill. App. 3d 582, 588.) Even if regarded as a “stop,” however, the facts supporting it are “based on more substantial facts and circumstances than … a mere hunch.” (People v. McGowan (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 73, 77-78, citing Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 909, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883.) Once the defendant had denied the possession of any identification other than the checks, it seems to me the officer, who had seen a driver’s license, acted quite reasonably in arresting defendant in the belief that an offense had been committed by him.

¶6In my opinion the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized subsequent to the arrest.

¶7MR. JUSTICE RYAN joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.

MR. JUSTICE CLARK,

¶8also concurring in part and dissenting in part:

¶9The facts are not in dispute. The appropriate law is not in dispute. Application of the law to the facts is in dispute. I believe the majority opinions here and in the appellate court (67 Ill. App. 3d 945) have usurped the trial court’s responsibility. It is the function of that court to determine whether probable cause, or reasonable grounds (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 107 — 2(c); People v. Wright (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 523, 528-29), existed for the arrest; and that court’s finding should not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous (People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 501, 505).

¶10I agree with the majority here that the case does not involve a Terry stop (Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16), since, prior to the arrest (at the point of handcuffing), there was apparently no display of physical force by which Trooper Acup restrained the liberty of the defendant.

¶11The dissent in the appellate court (67 Ill. App. 3d 945, 951-52) cited the appropriate law: People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 276-77. There this court stated:

“In considering whether probable cause existed, we stated in People v. Clay, 55 Ill. 2d 501, 504-05, ‘Whether or not probable cause for an arrest exists in a particular case depends upon the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers when the arrest was made. [Citations.] In deciding the question of probable cause in a particular case the courts deal with probabilities and are not disposed to be unduly technical. These probabilities are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable men, not legal technicians, act. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 79 S. Ct. 329; People v. Fiorito, 19 Ill. 2d 246.’ Also it is proper to recognize in judging whether there was probable cause that ‘[p] olice officers often must act upon a quick appraisal of the data before them, and the reasonableness of their conduct must be judged on the basis of their responsibility to prevent crime and to catch criminals.’ People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 19.”

¶12Applying this to the factual situation here, the trial court was not manifestly in error, even though I might have viewed the totality of circumstances differently.

¶13The Illinois State Police, for example, in order to help motorists in distress or to facilitate public safety, has the policy of investigating pedestrians on a public highway. The defendant, a white male about 6 feet tall and carrying a gas-mask bag, was walking south on U.S. 66, towards Springfield, when he was spotted by Acup. At the time, there was a police bulletin, circulating in Acup’s area, which described an escaped Federal prisoner: white male, 5 feet 9 inches tall, 150 pounds, wearing jeans and army fatigue jacket, and carrying a backpack. That description is not so vague as the majority states. The defendant, walking along the highway and seen from a passing car, would not unreasonably fit that description: 5 feet 9 inches tall and a backpack, in the abstract, is not far removed from 6 feet and a gas-mask bag, in the concrete. According to Acup’s testimony, the defendant answered he was coming from and going to Springfield; the defendant identified himself with a checkbook; the defendant said he had no further identification although Acup noticed an Illinois driver’s license. The defendant was then arrested. I agree with the appellate court dissent (67 Ill. App. 3d 945, 951) that similarity between the dispatch’s description and the defendant’s appearance existed, and that the majority opinions here and in the appellate court have “become bogged down in a morass of details.” 67 Ill. App. 3d 945, 951.

¶14The totality of the facts and circumstances, known to Acup, justified the arrest. Accordingly, the evidence seized by authorities was also properly admitted by the trial court. I agree that the subsequent confession by — and the lineup identification of — the defendant were admissible. In determining that the arrest was invalid, however, the majority has utilized somewhat tortuous reasoning to uphold the admissibility of the defendant’s inculpatory statements. For these reasons, I would affirm the circuit court of Sangamon County; and I dissent in part and concur in part.

¶15MR. JUSTICE RYAN joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.

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