State v. Stasio’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 37 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(I)t is not the case that every defendant who has had a few drinks may successfully urge the defense. The mere intake of even large quantities of alcohol will not suffice. Moreover, the defense cannot be established solely by showing that the defendant might not have committed the offense had he been sober. (citation omitted) What is required is a showing of such a great prostration of faculties that the requisite mental state was totally lacking. That is, to successfully invoke the defense, an accused must show that he was so intoxicated that he did not have the intent to commit an offense. Such a state will likely exist in very few cases. (Emphasis added)”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. R.T. · State v. Cameron

2. “... Second, if intoxication so impairs a defendant's mental faculties that he does not possess the wilfulness, deliberation and premeditation necessary to prove first degree murder, a homicide cannot be raised to first degree murder. State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 544 (1967); State v. Trantino, 44 N.J. 358, 369 (1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 993 , 86 S.Ct. 573 , 15 L.Ed. 2d 479 (1966). Under this exception the influence of liquor "no matter how pervasive that influence may be, will not lead to an acquittal. It cannot reduce the crime below murder in the second degree, and this because of the demands of public security." State v. Maik, supra, 60 N.J. at 215 . Third, a felony homicide will be reduced to second degree murder when intoxication precludes formation of the underlying felonious intent. Parenthetically, it may be noted that since voluntary intoxication does not eliminate responsibility for the felony, it could be contended that the defendant should remain liable for first degree felony murder. On the other hand, considerations of fairness indicate that such a defendant should be treated the same as one charged with ordinary first degree homicide requiring premeditation.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 442 So. 2d 244 - Linehan v. State · 183 N.J. Super. 273 - State v. Selby

3. “[D]istinguishing between specific and general intent gives rise to incongruous results by irrationally allowing intoxication to excuse some crimes but not others. In some instances if the defendant is found incapable of formulating the specific intent necessary for the crime charged, such as assault with intent to rob, he may be convicted of a lesser included general intent crime, such as assault with a deadly weapon. In other cases there may be no related general intent offense so that intoxication would lead to acquittal.... ... [W]here the more serious offense requires only a general intent, such as rape, intoxication provides no defense, whereas it would be a defense to an attempt to rape, specific intent being an element of that offense. Yet the same logic and reasoning which impels exculpation due to the failure of specific intent to commit an offense would equally compel the same result when a general intent is an element of the offense.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Gullett · 708 So. 2d 918 - Frey v. State