Volume 78 — New York Supreme Court Reports

Appeal by the defendant, Oliver T. Beard, from an order made at a Special Term of the Supreme Court, and entered in the office of the clerk of Dutchess county on the Ith day of March, 1893, denying the defendant’s motion to charge Peter B, Hayt with the costs and disbursements of the action.

Ai peal by the petitioner, Benjamin Tuthill, a judgment creditor of Guy C. Goss, deceased, from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of Richmond county, entered on the 13th day of March, 1893, adjudicating that the administratrix of the said decedent is not accountable for any money or property whatever.

<p>Riparian owners right of access to the Hudson river — accretions — occupation by a railroad —grant from the State.</p> <p>The owner of upland along the navigable waters of the Hudson river has such a title to accretions to his land, in the sense of having the right to unobstructed access to the shore, as entitles him to restrain the occupation of such accretions by a railroad company which has acquired no title thereto nor made compensation-therefor to the owner, and to compel the removal of its tracks therefrom.</p> <p>A former owner of upland on the east side of the Hudson river, in front of which there was a bay, gave a deed to the Hudson River Railroad Company, for a strip of land under water seventy-three feet wide across the bay, on which the company constructed its road; the right of the grantor to cross the railroad was recognized in this deed, by a covenant to that effect on the part of the company; thereafter the company filled up the land to the east of the strip conveyed to it and laid tracks thereon, and finally the whole bay, from the original high-water line west to the original railroad embankment, was filled with earth so as to exclude the water.</p> <p>In an action brought by the present owners of the upland to restrain the use by the railroad company of the land so formed, between the strip covered by its deed and the upland, it appeared that the State had by letters patent granted the land under water west of the railroad line to the plaintiffs’ grantors.</p> <p>Held, that the deed to the railroad company could not be deemed to affect the right of the grantor to pass from the original shore over the parcel conveyed thereby without obstruction, at least as far as the east line thereof; especially after the State by letters patent had granted the land west of the railroad to the plaintiffs’ grantors.</p> <p>The defendant, the railroad company, insisted upon its right to the land in question by virtue of the right bestowed upon the Hudson River Railroad Company by chapter 30 of the Laws of 1848, to alter its line and file a new map and acquire the lands within the new location, the filing of such new map and a grant from the Commissioners of the Land Office of the State of New York, in 1873, of land under water on both sides of the original road bed of the Hudson River railroad from New York to Albany.</p> <p>Held, that neither the charter of the company nor the filing of maps conferred any title upon the defendant to the land in question, and that the grant from the Commissioners of the Land Office was ineffectual in so far as it assumed to convey a strip of land under navigable water in front of the shore of the Hudson river without any reservation in favor of the shore owners, and thus to deprive them of their exclusive rights of access to the water.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiff, Port Richmond and Prohibition Park Electric Railroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of Kings county on the 2d day of March, 1893, upon a decision of the court dismissing the complaint, rendered after a trial by the court at the Kings County Special Term.

Appeal by tlie defendant in the first above-entitled action, and plaintiff in the second, Mary E. Post, as administratrix of Augustus T. Post, deceased, from the judgments of tlie Supreme Court, entered in tlie respective actions in tlie office of tlie clerk of Kings county on tlie 4th day of November, 1892, upon a decision of the court rendered afffir a trial by the court, at the Kings County Special Term.

Appeal by tbe defendant, Grace E. 'Wliyard, from a judgment of tbe County Court of Rockland county in favor of tbe plaintiff, entered in tbe office of tbe cleric of tbe county of Rockland on tbe 17th day of September, 1892, upon a verdict for $400 rendered at tbe Rockland County Court, and from an order entered in tbe said clerk’s office of Rockland county on tbe 81st day of October, 1892, denying tbe defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.

Appeal by the defendant, Annie L. McCahill, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered pursuant to the decision of the court, rendered at a Special Term thereof, in the office of the clerk of the county of ’Westchester on the 17th day of April, 1893.

Appeal by the defendant, Thomas J. McCahill, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, dated the 28th day of November, 1892, and entered, after a trial at the Westchester Special Term, in the office of the clerk of the county of Westchester, and from the decision of the court upon the trial, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

Appeal by Louis Marshall, an alleged creditor of Lewis II. Red-field, a person entitled to a distributive share in the estate of Anna Maria Redfield, from so much of the decree of the Surrogate’s Court of Onondaga county, entered in the office of said surrogate on the 1st day of December, 1891, as directs the administrator of that estate to pay to the assignee of Lewis II. Redfield the amount of his distributive share in the personal property of the estate.

Appeal by tbe defendants, the town of Salina and the members of the board of town auditors, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the cleric of Onondaga county on the 10th day of November, 1892, upon a decision of the court rendered after a trial by the court at the Onondaga Special Term.