Marler v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1955
Citation profile
35 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 36 later decisions — most recently June 2009 · most notably Duree v. Maryland Casualty Company (1959), 129 So. 2d 816 - Fullilove v. US Casualty Company of New York (1961)
35 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Kientz v. Charles Dennery, Inc. · Curran v. Arkansas · Angelle v. State · Lewis v. State · Jones v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"The State further contends that Marler was guilty of both negligence proximately causing the accident and contributory negligence barring recovery herein in that he was traveling at an excessive rate of speed in the corporate limits of the village in violation of a municipal ordinance fixing a speed limit of 25 miles per hour. That Marler was driving at a speed greatly in excess of the aforesaid limit was established beyond question. The violation of a statute or an ordinance, unless such violation constitutes a proximate cause of an accident, is insufficient to prevent recovery of damages sustained therein. * * * * * * * * * "* * * Regardless of his speed, the Marler automobile had reached a point where, so far as its driver was concerned, the collision could no longer be avoided. Such speed, if excessive and exceeding the lawful limit, was only a condition and not a proximate cause of the collision. " (Emphasis added)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“"That Smith drove at a great, excessive and reckless rate of speed, which speed was in excess of fifty-five miles per hour, contrary to law, is subject to the requirements of law above stated and the factor of speed in order to create liability must not only cause the injury but must be a proximate cause of the injury. It is admitted that Smith was traveling at a speed of from eighty-five to ninety miles per hour when he first observed the approaching Robinson vehicle. After weighing every implication of this fact we still must find that the conduct of Robinson was the sole cause of the collision and the speed of the Smith vehicle was not a contributing factor. " (Emphasis added)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“But, manifestly, the statute contemplates two kinds of ‘active service’ — the ‘active service’ which follows upon call of the Governor, and the ‘active service’ which consists in merely being a member of the organization in good standing. The former withdraws the militiamen from the jurisdiction of the civil courts; the latter does not. In fact, the contention that a member of the militia is all the time not amenable to the powers of the courts can hardly be serious.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.