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780 So. 2d 216

Docket No. 5D00-3501.

Wright v. State

Donald Eugene WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided February 9, 2001.

Rehearing Denied March 8, 2001.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 2001-02-09

Cited by 31 later decisions — most recently August 2011 · most notably 38 Cal. 4th 682 - People v. McGee (2006), 91 Cal. App. 4th 212 - People v. Thomas (2001)

31 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Nothing in Apprendi overrules the Florida Supreme Court's holding in Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla.1980) that the determination that a defendant could be sentenced as an habitual felony offender was independent of the question of guilt in the underlying substantive offense and did not require the full panoply of rights afforded a defendant in the trial of the offense.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Frumenti v. State, 782 So. 2d 1000 - Simmons v. State

“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Robbinson v. State, Frumenti v. State

Relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey · 383 So. 2d 219 - Eutsey v. State · State v. Rucker

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2001-02-09

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Donald Eugene Wright, Daytona Beach, pro se.

¶2No Appearance for Appellee.

¶3PLEUS, J.

¶4Donald Eugene Wright appeals the summary denial of his Rule 3.800(a) motion in which he claimed that the habitual felony offender statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1993), is unconstitutional because it allows a defendant's punishment to be increased based on findings of fact made by a judge, rather than by a jury. We affirm.

¶5Defendant relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey,530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), in which the United States Supreme Court held that other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact which increases a defendant's punishment must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant argues that under the habitual felony offender statute, the trial judge must not only make a finding of fact that a prior conviction exists, but also must find that the conviction was for a qualified offense committed within five years, was not for a violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1993), and had not been vacated, or the defendant pardoned. Therefore, he concludes that under Apprendi, the statute is unconstitutional.

¶6The United States Supreme Court expressly acknowledged in Apprendi that recidivism is a traditional basis for increasing a sentence and is a fact which does not relate to the commission of the offense before the court. See also State v. Rucker,*217613 So.2d 460 (Fla.1993) (legislature enacted habitual felony offender statute to allow enhanced penalties for defendants who meet objective requirements indicating recidivism). Nothing in Apprendi overrules the Florida Supreme Court's holding in Eutsey v. State,383 So.2d 219 (Fla.1980) that the determination that a defendant could be sentenced as an habitual felony offender was independent of the question of guilt in the underlying substantive offense and did not require the full panoply of rights afforded a defendant in the trial of the offense.

¶7This court has previously affirmed orders denying the same claim. See Harris v. State,775 So.2d 302 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Coleman v. State,773 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

¶8AFFIRMED.

¶9SHARP, W. and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.

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