Callins v. State

¶1OPINION ON COURT’S OWN MOTION FOR REHEARING

¶2Appellant was convicted by a jury, in a single trial, of one capital murder and two aggravated robberies. Following affirmative findings to the special issues under Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., the trial court assessed punishment at death. In the two aggravated robbery offenses, the jury assessed punishment at life in prison and a $10,000 fine for each.

¶3Pursuant to Article 4.04, Section 2, Y.A. C.C.P., the conviction for capital murder was appealed directly to this Court. Appeal of the two robbery convictions was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas at Fort Worth, See Callins v. State, 680 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984) reversed 726 S.W.2d 555 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).

¶4On original submission of the capital murder, we reversed appellant’s conviction based upon the misjoinder of the offenses at trial. An indictment alleging the offense of capital murder was joined, in the same indictment, with allegations charging two separate offenses of aggravated robbery. Appellant was subsequently found guilty of capital murder along with both aggravated robberies. We granted this rehearing on our own motion to determine whether the reversal was the proper disposition, or whether the capital murder conviction and death sentence should survive despite the improper submission of the three misjoined counts in the original trial.

¶5The trial court entered a single judgment reflecting that appellant had been found guilty of all three offenses. We will, for the reasons expressed below, reform the judgment to delete the convictions in the two aggravated robbery cases. Thereafter, we will examine appellant’s numerous points of error raised in the appeal of the capital murder conviction and affirm the conviction and sentence of death.

¶6As the State noted, there have been several tests utilized to determine which of two or more improperly joined offenses should be vacated in a reformation. In Ex parte Siller, 686 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), the Court sustained the conviction for which the jury returned the first guilty verdict, and then vacated the other convictions. The same procedure was followed in Ex parte Ellison, 699 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). In Ex parte Prince, 549 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), the Court sustained the conviction which was entered first upon the judgment. In Ex parte Adams, 541 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), it was held that the case bearing the lowest number would be sustained absent a showing of which judgment was entered first. Finally, in Ex parte Barron, 568 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), the Court simply followed the trial court’s recommendation as to which conviction should be sustained.

¶7The original opinion cites Smith v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 273, 234 S.W. 893 (1921), for the proposition that the case should be reversed and remanded rather than reformed to show only a conviction for one offense, In Smith, the defendant was charged with three offenses: unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor, and unlawful possession of equipment for making intoxicating liquor. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty and assessed pun-ishmentj at two years. The trial court en*186tered judgment on the first two counts. This Court refused to reform the judgment to reflect only one conviction.

¶8Smithis distinguishable from the present case. This Court is authorized to reform judgments. Article 44.24(b), V.A.C. C.P. If, however, the jury enters a general verdict of guilty on a multiple count indictment and assesses one punishment, the judgment cannot be reformed if it is unclear whether the punishment was assessed for one or all of the offenses. Knott v. State, 93 Tex.Crim. 239, 247 S.W. 520 (1922). This Court in Smithcould not determine whether the two year punishment was for one, two or all of the offenses charged, therefore, it could not reform the judgment to reflect only one conviction.

¶9By way of contrast, Arnett v. State, 105 Tex.Crim. 132, 286 S.W. 989 (1926), indicated that, if it was possible to insure that the defendant was only punished for one offense, one of the offenses could be upheld to the exclusion of the others. In Arnettthe defendant was charged with rape and statutory rape. The jury returned a general verdict'of guilty and assessed punishment at five years. The five year term was the lowest punishment possible for either count, so the court was correct in entering a judgment of guilty on one of the counts and dismissing the other. It was apparent that the jury had assessed punishment on only one of the counts, therefore, the court could choose one of the offenses with no harm to the defendant.

¶10The present case is analogous to Arnettbecause it is possible to tell from the verdict that the jury assessed separate punishments for each of the three counts. This Court can choose one of the offenses to affirm because there is no danger appellant will be punished for more than one offense.

¶11The judgment in this case indicates the jury first found appellant guilty of capital murder. In addition, the probability for confusion during the punishment phase was minimal; the record reflects the jury separately considered the special issues under Article 37.071 and the penalty possibilities for the aggravated robberies. The judgment is not unclear as to the punishment assessed for capital murder after the unequivocal finding on the special issues by the jury. Therefore, we will reform the judgment to delete the convictions for the two aggravated robbery offenses. Ex parte Siller, 686 S.W.2d at 620; Ex parte Ellison, 699 S.W.2d at 219; and Ex parte Adams, 541 S.W.2d at 441.

¶12We will proceed now to consider appellant’s remaining points of error.

¶13In his first point of error appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to provide a definition of the term “deliberately” in its charge to the jury. This Court has consistently held that a trial court does not err in refusing to define the term “deliberately” because such term is to be understood in light of common usage. Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 375 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) cert. denied — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1972, 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989); Demouchette v. State, 731 S.W.2d 75, 80 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) cert. denied 482 U.S. 920, 107 S.Ct. 3197, 96 L.Ed.2d 685 (1987); and Russell v. State, 665 S.W.2d 771, 780 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) cert. denied 465 U.S. 1073, 104 S.Ct. 1428, 79 L.Ed.2d 752 (1984). Appellant’s first point of error is overruled.

¶14In his second point of error appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury’s affirmative finding to special issue number one pursuant to Article 37.071(b)(1), V.A.C.C.P. The opinion of this Court on original submission addressed in detail this point of error and concluded that it was without merit. Based upon our original opinion we will again overrule appellant’s point of error number two.

¶15In point of error number three appellant contends that the indictment is fundamentally defective in that it fails to allege the punishment criteria to make the murder a capital murder. In his argument under this point of error, appellant contends that the State must plead in its indictment each of the elements required under Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P. In other words, appellant would have the indictment make specific allegations as to each of the special issues which a jury must answer in order *187to return a verdict requiring the imposition of the death penalty. In his argument, appellant complains that such deficiency is both fundamentally erroneous and fails to provide sufficient notice of the charges against which he must defend.

¶16In Castillo v. State, 739 S.W.2d 280 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) cert. denied — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2889, 101 L.Ed.2d 924 (1988), this Court addressed the same contention now being raised by appellant. Citing Aranda v. State, 640 S.W.2d 766 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1982, no pet.), this Court concluded that a defendant who is charged under capital murder indictment is effectively put on notice that the special questions under Article 37.071, supra, will be issues in the case and that such procedural provisions need not be alleged in the indictment. See Vigneault v. State, 600 S.W.2d 318 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Appellant’s point of error number three is overruled.

¶17In point of error number four, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause to venireman Lewis Thomas Duran because such venireman had expressed racial prejudice against him. Specifically, appellant contends that venireman Duran expressed a view that blacks are more likely to commit aggravated robbery and murder than are members of other races because of the black culture. Based upon this interpretation, appellant contends he was wrongfully forced to use a peremptory challenge to strike Duran when his challenge for cause was overruled.

¶18During questioning by defense counsel, the following transpired:

“Q. Do you have any opinions about whether Black people are more likely to commit the crime of aggravated robbery or murder?

“A. (By Mr. Duran) Because of color, probably not, because of culture, probably yes.”

¶19Prior to such questioning by defense counsel, the prosecutor examined Duran as follows:

“Q. You know that the defendant is a Black man.

“A. Uh-huh.

“Q. Could you treat him just like anybody else of any other color.

“A. I don’t consider myself to be a prejudiced person.

“Q. All right.

“A. On the other hand I probably prefer my race, my friends, too maybe. I would try to be objective, I don’t think the race would be an issue.

“Q. If the evidence were to show that the victim, that the deceased, was a white person or a Cuban, would that make any difference now in determining his guilt or innocence?

“A. The answer is the same, race is not an issue.

“Q. Or punishment?

“A. No.”

¶20No further development of any kind was made as to the venireman’s comments relating to the race of appellant.

¶21At the conclusion of the examination of venireman Duran by defense counsel, the following occurred:

“(By Defense Counsel): Your Honor, the defense has no more questions, but does wish to challenge on the grounds that Mr. Duran very frankly leans toward the upper end of the punishment scale. He has obviously some preconceived feelings about the type of punishment that should be assessed in any murder case. He is very frank to admit that. And we think that he has a bias or feelings that would influence his verdict in this case and prejudicial to the defendant and we would challenge the qualifications on that ground.”

¶22The trial court thereafter denied the challenge for cause and appellant used a peremptory to remove him from the panel.

¶23Clearly, appellant’s challenge at trial to venireman Duran differs from the objection which he now raises on appeal. Therefore, nothing is preserved for review. Porter v. State, 623 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) cert. denied 456 U.S. 965, 102 S.Ct. 2046, 72 L.Ed.2d 491 (1982). Cf. Sawyers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), and May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), vacated 102 S.Ct. 497, *188454 U.S. 959, 70 L.Ed.2d 374, on remand 632 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).

¶24Additionally, appellant has waived any error with respect to this point by failure to request additional peremptory challenges. As the State correctly points out, appellant must establish the following: (1) the trial court overruled a valid challenge for cause; (2) appellant exhausted his number of peremptory challenges; (3) one or more disqualified jurors sat in the case, and (4) the trial court denied appellant’s request for additional peremptory challenges or would have done so had they been requested by appellant. Peters v. State, 575 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). The record revealed that having exhausted his peremptory strikes appellant requested and was granted one additional peremptory strike which was immediately used on venireman Nelson. Appellant never requested further additional peremptory strikes nor did he voice any objection to the jury or to any juror who was finally seated. Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) cert. denied — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 835, 102 L.Ed.2d 968 (1989). Appellant’s point of error number four is overruled.

¶25In appellant’s fifth and sixth points of error he contends the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for mistrial or a motion to quash the jury panel because of alleged contamination of the panel. During voir dire, venireman Pruitt testified that another prospective juror — identified as Mr. Cannon — had referred to the defendant as a “nigger” and speculated as to how the defendant could afford to pay for the attorneys assigned to his case. These remarks represent the foundation of the contamination theory set out in appellant’s points of error. In Johnson v. State, 151 Tex.Crim. 110, 205 S.W.2d 773 (1947), a case involving a prejudicial statement made before the jury panel by a prospective juror, this Court held that the defendant, in order to show harm after his motion to discharge the panel was denied, would have to meet the following criteria:

“It occurs to us that there is no error shown by the court’s ruling because, (a) it is not made to appear that any of the other members of the jury panel heard the remark, (b) that if they did hear it, they were influenced thereby to the prejudice of appellant, (c) that the juror in question nor any other juror who may have had a similar opinion was forced upon appellant. In the absence of which no injury to him is shown.” Johnson, 205 S.W.2d at 774.

¶26See Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287, 307-08 (Tex.Cr.App.1977) cert. denied 434 U.S. 1088, 98 S.Ct. 1284, 55 L.Ed.2d 794 (1978). Appellant points to no place in the record demonstrating that any other veniremen heard the remarks of Mr. Cannon or if they did hear the remarks they were influenced to the prejudice of appellant. Further, appellant has failed to show that any other venireman who may have had a similar opinion was forced upon him. In addition, the trial court granted appellant an additional peremptory challenge because appellant had expended one peremptory challenge excluding Mr. Cannon prior to the court learning of his racial prejudice. Appellant’s points of error five and six are overruled.

¶27In points of error seven and eight appellant complains the trial court committed reversible error because the verdict forms at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial failed to include a “not guilty” finding for each listed offense. Appellant’s timely objection sufficiently preserved error on this point. Appellant contends that the lack of a “not guilty” form for each offense represented an instruction to the jury to make a finding of guilt on all offenses and represented a comment on the weight of the evidence by the trial court that deprived appellant of due process.

¶28The verdict forms submitted to the jury at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial read as follows:

“VERDICT FORMS:

We, the jury, find the defendant, Bruce Edwin Callins, guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment.

/s/ William D. Ramsey

Foreman

*189(If you have found the defendant guilty of capital murder do not consider Counts Two and Three.) (emphasis in original)

We, the jury, having a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant of the offense of capital murder as inquired about in Count One of the indictment, find the defendant

Bruce Edwin Callins, guilty of murder as charged in Count Two of the indictment.

Foreman

We, the jury, having a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant of the offense of murder as inquired about in Count Two of the indictment, find the defendant, Bruce Edwin Callins, guilty of aggravated robbery as charged in Count Three of the indictment.

Foreman

We, the jury, find the defendant, Bruce Edwin Callins, guilty of aggravated robbery as charged in Count Seven of the indictment.

/s/ William D. Ramsey

Foreman

We, the jury, find the defendant, Bruce Edwin Callins, guilty of aggravated robbery as charged in Count Eight of the indictment.

/s/ William D. Bamsey

Foreman

We, the jury, find the defendant, Bruce Edwin Callins, not guilty of any of the foregoing offenses.

Foreman”

¶29In addition, the jury charge, in pertinent part, instructed the jury as follows:

“IV.

“Now, bearing in mind the above and foregoing definitions and instructions, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Bruce Edwin Callins, did, in Tarrant County, Texas, on or about the 27th day of June, 1980, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery, as hereinabove defined, upon Allen Huckleberry, intentionally cause the death of the said Allen Huckleberry by shooting him with a firearm, you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder and so say by your verdict. If you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of the offense of capital murder as charged in Count One of the indictment and next consider whether the defendant is guilty of murder as charged in Count Two of the indictment. If, however, you have found the defendant guilty of capital murder as charged in Count One of the indictment, you will not consider the offense of murder as charged in Count Two nor of aggravated robbery as charged in Count Three, but will proceed to consider whether the defendant is guilty of aggravated robbery as charged in Counts Seven and Eight, (emphasis in original)

“Therefore, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Bruce Edwin Callins, did, in Tarrant County, Texas, on or about the 27th day of June, 1980, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of an individual, Allen Huckleberry, by shooting him with a firearm, you will find the defendant guilty of the offense of murder as charged in Count Two of the indictment and so say by your verdict. If you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of the offense of murder as charged in Count Two of the indictment and next consider whether the defendant is guilty of aggravated robbery as charged in Count Three of the indictment.

“Therefore, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Bruce Edwin Callins, did, in Tarrant County, Texas, on or about the 27th day of June, 1980, then and there while in the course of committing theft of property, as that term is herein-above defined, and with intent to obtain and maintain control of said property, intentionally or knowingly threaten and place Allen Huckleberry in fear of imminent bodily injury and death, and said *190defendant did then and there use and exhibit a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery as charged in Count Three of the indictment and so say by your verdict. If you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of the offense of aggravated robbery as charged in Count Three of the indictment and so say by your verdict.”1

¶30In Bolden v. State, 489 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), the defendant complained that the not guilty form submitted to the jury was improper. In spite of the lack of objection to preserve error the Boldencourt concluded:

“Even if the matter were properly presented for review, we conclude that the jury was not misled by the form submitted. A more thorough form phrased like those for a finding of guilty should have been furnished. In construing the verdict and the charge as a whole which instructed the jury to find the appellant not guilty unless they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the act of robbery as alleged, we conclude no harm or reversible error has been shown.” Bolden, 489 S.W.2d at 302.

¶31See also Berghahn v. State, 683 S.W.2d 697 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) cert. denied 471 U.S. 1056, 105 S.Ct. 2120, 85 L.Ed.2d 484 (1985). The Boldenanalysis was an extension of the teaching of Harris v. State, 106 Tex.Crim. 539, 293 S.W. 822 (1927). In Harristhe defendant complained that an improper verdict form was submitted to the jury. The Court in discussing the verdict form problem stated:

“Our opinions are not in harmony upon the propriety of furnishing forms of verdict. Some hold it to be a commendable practice. [citations omitted]. Other opinions discourage the practice, [citations omitted]. But all are agreed that, if forms are provided, the court should include a form for every verdict which might be returned under the evidence and instructions of the court so as to avoid conveying to the jury any impression as to the judge’s opinion as to what particular verdict should be rendered, [citation omitted]. Unless the forms provided in the present case violate the latter principle, the action of the court should not be held to call for reversal.” Harris, 293 S.W. at 824.

¶32The Harriscourt, however, overruled defendant’s objection to the improper verdict form reasoning that the charge to the jury corrected any misapprehension the form may have conveyed to that body. Harris, 293 S.W. at 824.

¶33We will evaluate his asserted harm in light of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). In Almanza, we held:

“If the error in the charge was the subject of a timely objection in the trial court, then reversal is required if the error is ‘calculated to injure the rights of defendant, which means no more than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error.’ ” (Emphasis in original). 686 S.W.2d at 171.

¶34Further:

“[T]he actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of the probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” 686 S.W.2d at 171.

¶35With the Almanzatest in hand and with the analysis provided by Boldenand Harris, we turn to an examination of the instant case. The charge to the jury in this case explicitly sets out the guilty/not guilty alternatives available for the jury’s consideration. Considered as a whole, the substantive charge and the verdict forms gave the jury the opportunity to consider all legal possibilities in rendering its verdict. Further, the specific and thorough nature of the substantive charge eliminates the possibility that the jury would consider *191the verdict forms as a comment by the court on the weight of the evidence. Following Almanza, we hold that appellant has failed to demonstrate reversible error as a result of the submission of the jury forms and that the trial court did not engage in an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence in this case. Appellant’s points of error seven and eight are overruled.

¶36In point of error nine appellant argues that Article 37.071(b), Y.A.C.C.P., violates the general prohibition against the jury’s consideration of parole. Appellant’s theory is founded on the notion that the wording of the second special issue instructed the jury that (1) a person receiving a life sentence will be released early, and (2) the jury is ordered to consider that early release in establishing their sentence. Appellant then attempts to demonstrate the effect of Article 37.071(b)’s “parole instruction” through the juror affidavit of Treva Roberts.

¶37Appellant has couched his point of error in terms of an attack on Article 37.071(b) but the caselaw cited in support of his position relies entirely on juror misconduct in the context of motion for new trial. Appellant provides no support for his theory that Article 37.071(b) is, sub silentio, a jury instruction on parole. We reject appellant’s position on that portion of his point. We turn to the question of juror misconduct and examine that problem with the guidance of Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).

¶38In Sneed, this Court adopted a five-prong test for determining whether a jury’s discussion of parole law constitutes reversible error. It must be shown that there was:

“(1) misstatement of the law

(2) asserted as a fact

(3) by one professing to know the law

(4) which is relied upon by other jurors

(5)who for that reason changed their vote to a harsher punishment, (quotations omitted).” Sneed, 670 S.W.2d at 266.

¶39The affidavit of juror Roberts gave some indication that discussion of parole had taken place in the jury room and influenced the jury’s decision in assessing the death penalty. Juror Roberts, however, refuted the contents of that affidavit. While testifying at the hearing on motion for new trial Roberts was adamant in denying that discussion of parole took place in the jury room. Taken as a whole, Roberts testimony — the result of thorough direct and cross examination — revealed that none of the five prongs of the Sneedtest were implicated in the instant case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s motion for new trial. Appellant’s ninth point of error is overruled.

¶40In point of error number ten appellant argues that the State made improper references to parole during final argument. During the punishment phase of trial, in arguing for the death penalty, the prosecutor stated:

“The Defense counsel would suggest to you not to consider any violence that the Defendant might do in prison because that doesn’t — that’s not part of our society, but the evidence from the people who were present clearly indicates that those people do become part of our society again and they do affect our society.”2

¶41Defense counsel then objected on the ground that the argument was an invitation to consider parole. The trial court overruled the objection.

¶42Standing alone the statement made by the State during the punishment phase might be construed to represent an improper reference to parole. The record, however, reveals that the State was responding to a series of statements made by appellant’s counsel to the jury. Appellant’s attorneys repeatedly indicated that if the jury “put him in the penitentiary for life” *192that the appellant would never be a threat to society again.

¶43The remarks made by the appellant’s counsel placed the issue before the jury. The prosecutor, therefore, was entitled to answer the comments made by opposing counsel. No improper jury argument was made. See Holloway v. State, 525 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Daniels v. State, 633 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). Appellant’s tenth point of error is overruled.

¶44In ground of error number eleven appellant argues that Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., is violative of due process guarantees in that it fails to permit an individualized decision which takes into account all mitigating factors as well as mercy.

¶45Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), expressly upheld the constitutionality of the manner in which mitigating evidence is considered under the special questions submitted to Texas juries per Article 37.071. Complying with Jurek, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) and their progeny, this Court has resolutely declared that a defendant in any capital murder case is free to ask the jury to consider whatever evidence of mitigating circumstances the defense can bring before it. See Quinones, 592 S.W.2d 933, 947 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). See also Cordova v. State, 733 S.W.2d 175, 189-190 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2915, 101 L.Ed.2d 946 (1988); Johnson v. State, 691 S.W.2d 619, 625-626 (Tex. Cr.App.1984) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 184, 88 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985); Stewart v. State, 686 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 866, 106 S.Ct. 190, 88 L.Ed.2d 159 (1985).

¶46We note that appellant did not request additional instructions regarding mitigating evidence during the punishment phase of the trial. Appellant has, however, pointed to mitigating evidence in the record that he contends could not be properly considered by the jury unless some means was provided to the factfinder to consider that evidence outside the constraints of the special issues.3 Specifically, appellant directs our attention to that part of the record where testimony indicates that he told other parties at the scene of the crime — “y’ll can take care of him” (referring to the victim) as he departed the scene.

¶47Though phrased in terms of a facial attack on the constitutional validity of Art. 37.07, appellant has briefed this point in language that requires an examination of the constitutional validity of our capital murder statute as applied to him. In Penry v. Lynaugh, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held the Texas capital murder statute unconstitutional “as applied” in the face of a challenge based on lack of additional instructions concerning mitigating circumstances.4 None of the mitigating factors in Penry— mental retardation or child abuse — play a part in the instant case.

¶48Appellant’s point of error is more appropriately analyzed in light of Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (plurality opinion). In Franklin, the defendant sought a special instruction on the basis of evidence that showed he had no record of disciplinary violations while in prison. Franklin, at -, 108 S.Ct. at 2329, 101 L.Ed.2d at 168. The Franklinplurality held that “petitioner was accorded full opportunity to have his sentencing jury consider and give effect to any mitigating impulse that petitioner’s prison record might have suggested to the jury as they proceeded with their task.” Franklin, at -, 108 S.Ct. at 2329, 101 L.Ed.2d at 168.

¶49Concurring in Franklin, Justice O’Con-nor pointed out that an additional instruc*193tion might be warranted based on the facts of a particular case. As Justice O’Connor noted:

“If ... however, petitioner had introduced mitigating evidence about his background or character or the circumstances of the crime that was not relevant to the special verdict questions, or that had relevance to the defendant’s moral culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict questions, the jury instructions would have provided the jury with no vehicle for expressing its ‘reasoned moral response’ to that evidence. If this were such a case, then we would have to decide whether the jury’s inability to give effect to that evidence amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation.” Franklin, at -, 108 S.Ct. at 2383, 101 L.Ed.2d 173.

¶50Further, Justice O’Connor’s additional observation that relevant evidence outside the scope of the special questions such as “[ejvidence of voluntary service, kindness to others, or of religious devotion might demonstrate positive character traits that might mitigate against the death penalty” and thus be subject to an additional instruction does not militate in favor of appellant. Franklin, at -, 108 S.Ct. at 2333, 101 L.Ed.2d at 173.

¶51The offhand remark by appellant, as he departed the scene of the crime, that others could take care of the deceased allowed no more action than would have normally occurred in the aftermath of a shooting. The appellant did nothing immediately after shooting the deceased to ameliorate the damage he caused. Following Justice O’Connor’s reasoning in Franklin, we hold that appellant has not presented mitigating evidence that warrants an additional instruction to the jury. Appellant’s eleventh point of error is overruled.

¶52In appellant’s (second) point of error eleven and his twelfth point of error appellant argues that the trial court erred in permitting a single trial on capital murder and two aggravated robberies and in denying appellant’s motion to sever. Having previously reformed appellant’s judgment to delete the convictions for the two aggravated robbery offenses, we overrule points of error eleven (second) and twelve.

¶53In appellant’s thirteenth point of error he contends that during the punishment phase the trial court erred in submitting the robbery counts to the jury in the same trial as the capital murder case. Appellant’s theory is founded on the premise that the trial court’s submission of the punishment issue on the aggravated robberies followed by the punishment issue on the capital murder conviction created a trifu-cated trial structure which had a “severely prejudicial” effect on appellant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.

¶54Appellant specifically contends that as a result of the trifurcated punishment phase the jury wanted the “murder charge to be stronger than the robbery cases which had already been life and a 10,000 fine.” In support of his theory appellant cites Hood v. State, 169 Tex.Crim. 422, 334 S.W.2d 302 (1960), and Hill v. State, 169 Tex.Crim. 104, 332 S.W.2d 579 (1960). Both cases are inapposite; Hood and Hillgo to the question of misjoinder of offenses and have no bearing on this point of error. Other than bald faced assertions of prejudice, appellant has failed to provide any relevant case-law supporting his position. We decline his invitation to find a fundamental defect in the trial process under which he was convicted based on either the Texas or United States Constitution.

¶55In addition, we note that during the punishment hearing on the non-capital cases that the trial court ordered the prosecution to comply with the narrower rules of evidence under Article 37.07, V.A.C.C.P. During the punishment phase on the aggravated robberies the State only offered the testimony of three character witnesses. After the jury returned its verdicts on the aggravated robberies a second punishment hearing was held on the capital murder charge. It was only during this hearing that the State was permitted to introduce testimony about unadjudicated, extraneous offenses committed by appellant under the broader rules of Article 37.071, supra. *194This procedure assured appellant that the jury would not consider any inadmissible evidence when deliberating on punishment for the aggravated robberies. Further, no evidence adduced during thé first punishment phase would have been inadmissible in a single trial on capital murder. See Jurek, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). Any error in the procedure of the punishment phase was harmless error. See Harris v. State (No. 69,366, Tex.Cr.App., June 28, 1989), slip op. pp. 29-36. Appellant’s thirteenth point of error is overruled.

¶56In point of error number fourteen appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to quash the indictment on the grounds it failed to give proper notice of the crime charged by failing to name the person allegedly being robbed.

In part the indictment in this case states: “BRUCE EDWIN CALLINS ... THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY CAUSE THE DEATH OF AN INDIVIDUAL, ALLEN HUCKLEBERRY, BY SHOOTING HIM WITH A FIREARM, AND THE SAID BRUCE EDWIN CAL-LINS WAS THEN AND THERE IN THE COURSE OF COMMITTING AND ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE OF ROBBERY OF ALLEN HUCKLEBERRY; ...”

¶57The indictment in this case does allege the victim of the robbery and is therefore sufficient to bar subsequent prosecution against appellant for the same offense and to give him adequate notice of the offense with which he was charged. See King v. State, 594 S.W.2d 425 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Appellant’s fourteenth point of error is overruled.

¶58In appellant’s points of error numbers fifteen and sixteen, appellant argues that the trial court improperly excluded venireman Denton for cause on the basis that he was not unalterably opposed to the death penalty. Appellant’s points are grounded on the premise that a citizen cannot constitutionally be sentenced to death if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed religious scruples against the infliction of death.

¶59In the trial court, the proper standard to be used in disqualifying prospective jurors in death penalty cases is whether their views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with the instructions given and the oaths taken. Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 794 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046, 107 S.Ct. 910, 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987); Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 620 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) cert. denied — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 190, 102 L.Ed.2d 159 (1988). “[Tjhis standard ... does not require a juror’s bias [or prejudice] be proved with ‘unmistakable clarity.’” Ellis v. State, 726 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926, 107 S.Ct. 1388, 94 L.Ed.2d 702 (1987), quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). On appeal, we recognize that great deference must be given to the trial court judge who is in the best position to see and hear the prospective jurors and to evaluate their responses. The trial court is in the best position to evaluate the venireman’s answers and to rule accordingly. As stated in Wainwright:

“[A] trial judge’s finding that a particular venireman was not biased and therefore properly seated was a finding of fact subject to [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d). We noted that the question whether a venireman is biased has traditionally been determined through voir dire culminating in a finding by the trial judge concerning the veniremen’s state of mind. We also noted that such finding is based upon a determination of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within the trial judge’s province. Such determinations are entitled to deference even on direct review....” 469 U.S. at.428, 105 S.Ct. at 854 (footnote omitted).

¶60As such, we will reverse a trial court’s ruling on these issues only when the record shows a clear abuse of discretion on the trial court’s part.

¶61Venireman Denton testified as follows:

*195“Q. Could you personally, acting as juror, ever vote so that the death penalty would be inflicted?

“A. I can’t say right now. I don’t believe I would. I have no objection to a life sentence, but I don’t know how I would react at the time, but I don’t think I could do that.

“Q. We seem—

“A. I hope I couldn’t do it.

[[Image here]]

“A. I believe the death penalty is dumb. I — I—I—I just can’t imagine a state that would — would condone a death penalty. It’s — it’s_

“Q. I take it, then, Mr. Denton, that you personally would exclude the death penalty as a punishment that you personally could vote to inflict?

“A. I have up to now. Again, I don’t know how I would react if I was on a — the jury. I’m not sure if it came right down to it, but that’s the way I feel now.

[[Image here]]

“A. I told you I don’t believe in the death penalty. You asked me if I could enforce it. Right now I could not. I would vote against the death penalty.

“Q. Okay, and that would be, I take it, regardless of what facts might be developed at a trial?

“A. Well, yeah, yeah, sure.

“Q. Okay, so as you sit there right now, the death penalty that you would automatically exclude as one that you would assess?

“A. Yes.”

¶62Defense counsel then examined venireman Denton as to his beliefs regarding the death penalty in the context of a brutal set of facts; in other words, would the juror vote yes under those particular circumstances. Juror Denton answered:

“I think the reason that I did not give a more definite answer is that whenever this decision has to be made, it’s going to be down the road sometime, three weeks, maybe four weeks. I would assume that I’ll feel the same way. I’m not sure that I would. I can only answer what I would do now.”

¶63At the end of the venireman’s examination the State’s challenge for cause was granted over appellant’s objection. The State is entitled to jurors in a capital case who “will consider and decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court.” Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589 (1980). Our reading of the record, accompanied with the trial judge’s opportunity to observe the venireman’s demeanor, leads us to the conclusion that juror Denton was properly dismissed for cause. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 431-35, 105 S.Ct. at 856-58; Landry v. State, 706 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Cr.App.1985) cert. denied 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 242, 93 L.Ed.2d 167 (1986). Under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State’s challenge for cause. Appellant’s points of error fifteen and sixteen are overruled.5

¶64In his seventeenth point of error appellant argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s challenge for cause to venireperson White. White testified:

“Q. I take it then that you would — you personally would automatically exclude the death penalty as a punishment that you could assess for any crime?

“A. Yes.

“Q. And no matter what the facts were?

“A. (No response.)

“Q. Well, in Texas, it could only be a murder. That’s all. A capital murder is the only offense that we have that we assess the death penalty in.

“A. Those are my feelings, yes.

*196“Q. Okay. And I take it that that’s a deep-seeded feeling that you have?

“A. Very deep.

“Q. And one which you would not set aside or could not set aside?

“A. If it involved family, I don’t know what I would do. I don’t know what my feelings would be.

“Q. You mean your own family?

“A. If it were someone in my own family-

“Q. If it were your own family, you would never be called upon to be on the jury.

“A. I know that, yes.

“Q. But aside from that, you would not ever personally do it?

“A. Yes. Correct.”

¶65In O’Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), we confronted a similar problem; that is, a venireman stating that he would consider the death penalty only if the victim of the crime were a member of his family. We held:

“In such a circumstance, venireman Bowman would be unable to serve as a juror because of his interest and prejudice in the case. Article 35.16, Vernon’s Ann.C. C.P. The ability to consider capital punishment as a tool of vengeance by a person aggrieved by the loss of a family member is surely not within the contemplation of Witherspoon [v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) ].... The voir dire of Bowman revealed that he would not vote for capital punishment in a case where he was otherwise qualified to sit as a juror. In those situations, Bowman was resolved to vote against capital punishment, regardless of the evidence produced. He was properly excused under Witherspoon.” O’Bryan, 591 S.W.2d at 473.

¶66In this case, as in O’Bryan, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State’s challenge for cause. Point of error seventeen is overruled.

¶67In point of error eighteen appellant asserts that venireperson Wolfe was improperly excluded from the jury. Appellant points to selected portions of the record in attempting to show equivocation on the part of Wolfe regarding imposition of the death penalty. The record reflects nothing of the sort. Venireperson Wolfe was unwavering in her opposition to the death penalty. Under Wainwright, supra, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State’s challenge for cause.

¶68In point of error number nineteen appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying appellant the right to impeach State’s witness Ricky Henderson on the basis of Henderson’s probationary status of deferred adjudication.

¶69Appellant cites Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), in support of his position. In Davis, petitioner was denied his constitutional right of confrontation because he was not allowed to impeach a witness on the basis of his juvenile record regarding probation for burglary. Unlike this case, the petitioner in Daviswas able to show that the witness might have been subject to undue pressure from the police and made his identification of petitioner under fear of possible probation revocation. This showing by the petitioner overcame the State’s asserted interest in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile delinquency proceedings. In the instant case, however, appellant has not made any showing that witness Henderson testified against him as a result of bias, motive or ill will emanating from his status of deferred adjudication. Appellant has failed to lay the necessary predicate that would invoke the right of confrontation. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Cf. Evans v. State, 519 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Defendants’ right of confrontation denied when they were not allowed to impeach State’s witness on the basis of his felony indictment in order to show bias in testimony). Appellant’s nineteenth point of error is overruled.

¶70The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶76concurring.

¶77I agree with the majority opinion that this Court may choose one of the convictions to affirm and reverse the other two because there is no danger appellant is being punished for more than one offense. I disagree, however, with the method the majority opinion uses to determine which conviction shall survive. I write to summarize the several tests used by this Court in the past and to suggest a test for appellate courts to use when making this determination.

¶78A number of different methods of choosing which conviction to affirm have been utilized but vary with the facts of the individual case. The five predominant methods are as follows:

1 — The most popular method is to choose the offense that the defendant was convicted of first. Ex parte Ellison, 699 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Ex parte Siller, 686 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Ex parte Prince, 549 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ex parte Easley, 490 S.W.2d 570 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).

2 — At other times this Court has affirmed the conviction that had the lowest number on the charging instrument. Ex parte Adams, 541 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Price v. State, 475 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).

3—In Beaupre v. State, 526 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 1037, 96 S.Ct. 573, 46 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975), this Court chose the offense that was alleged first in the indictment.

4—In Jones v. State, 482 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), cert. den. 410 U.S. 932, 93 S.Ct. 1377, 35 L.Ed.2d 594 (1973), this Court chose the conviction for possession of heroin over the conviction for possession of marijuana because there was “more proof” for possession óf heroin.

5—In Barron v. State, 568 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), no reason was offered to justify affirming a conviction for murder and dismissing a conviction for robbery by assault.

¶79This multiplicity of tests arose because none of the tests works well in all situations. It is often impossible to tell which conviction technically came first. As a practical matter, in a majority of cases all of the convictions are decided together. It makes little sense for an appellate court to place significance on the order the convictions were entered or the order the offenses were alleged in the indictment when the order was arbitrary at the trial level. When each offense is charged in a separate charging instrument it is easy to pick the offense with the lowest number. Unfortunately, in most cases, all of the offenses are joined in one charging instrument. Finally, it is inappropriate for an appellate court to decide which offense was supported by “more evidence”. As long as there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, the relative “weight” of the evidence should not be considered.

¶80In order to avoid the arbitrariness that necessarily flows from having a number of different rules, or in some cases no rule at all, I believe that there should be one rule that can be applied every time a defendant is convicted of more than one offense. A rule that is most consistent with the objectives of the Penal Code as articulated in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, sec. 1.02, would be one that mandates affirmance of the conviction for the most serious offense.

¶81This proposed rule, choosing the conviction for the most serious offense, is superi- or in a number of ways to all of the other rules previously used.

¶82First, it will be applicable to all cases where there is misjoinder of offenses.

¶83Second, it does not attempt to make arbitrary distinctions based bn which allegation or conviction preceded the others. The outcome of a case will not depend on the coincidence of the order of offenses in an indictment or jury charge.

¶84Third, it assumes that if the State had been made to elect an offense, it would have chosen the most serious one. This *198will be true in a majority of the cases. It cannot be said that the State would usually pick the first offense.

¶85Last, it is the most consistent with the objective of the Penal Code “to insure the public safety through: (A) the deterrent influence of the penalties hereinafter provided.” Y.T.C.A. Penal Code, sec. 1.02.

¶86The rule then should be that in the absence of harm that vitiates all convictions obtained from one indictment when a defendant is charged with and convicted of more than one offense in violation of Art. 21.24, V.A.C.C.P.,1 the appellate court will affirm the most serious offense (as determined by the sentence and other relevant factors) and dismiss the other convictions.

¶87Applying this new rule to the case sub judice would result in our affirmance of the capital murder conviction and dismissal of the two aggravated robbery convictions. Capital murder is, obviously, a capital felony which carries the ultimate penalty, death by lethal injection, which appellant was assessed as punishment. Aggravated robbery is, by comparison, a less serious offense in that it is only a first degree felony carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and $10,000 fine, both of which appellant received in this case. Thus, under this proposed rule, I reach the same result as the majority opinion.

¶88Additionally, as to point of error nineteen, I believe that any error resulting from the trial court’s denial of appellant’s right to impeach Henderson is harmless error under Tex.R.App.Proe. 81(b)(2), so I concur in the result reached on that point.

¶89With these additional comments, I join the remainder of the majority opinion.