Anaya v. Hansen’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate · 4 district · 9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the communi ty; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Levasseur · 836 F. Supp. 336 - United States v. Burgess

2. “The Burén court used the concept of ‘distinctive group’ in a case where women were subjected to discrimination. It is fair to assume that the court wanted to give heightened scrutiny to groups needing special protection, not to all groups generally. There is nothing to indicate that it meant to take the further step of requiring jury venires to reflect mathematically precise cross sections of the communities from which they are selected. Yet if the age classification is adopted, surely blue-collar workers, yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts, and an endless variety of other classifications will be entitled to similar treatment. These are not the groups that the court has traditionally sought to protect from underrepresentation on jury venires.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Ford v. Seabold

3. “If certain people are specifically and systematically excluded from jury duty, then the jury-administrating authority would have created its own group. Clearly, the state has no right to deliberately exclude specific classes or groups from juries without some very special reason. Thus, it may not forbid blue collar workers, chess players, Masons, etc. from serving on juries. But if there are, as in the present case, mere statistical imbalances, unexplained, the problem is different.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Cecil