Diaz v. Broglin’s Empirical Analysis
1991
Citation profile
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Estelle v. Gamble · Haines v. Kerner · Thomas v. Arn
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“A prisoner can prove criminal recklessness only by demonstrating a defendant’s subjective mental state; liability cannot be predicated on an objective consideration of what a defendant “should have known.” McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir.1991); see Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498, 499-500 (7th Cir.1991). The requisite subjective intent may be established by: 1) showing that a defendant had “ ‘actual knowledge of impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant’s failure to prevent it,’ ” McGill, 944 F.2d at 348 , quoting Franzen, 780 F.2d at 653 ; or 2) showing that a defendant deliberately avoided acquiring knowledge of the impending harm. McGill, 944 F.2d at 350-51 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.