Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

781 So. 2d 1136

Docket No. 4D00-4281.

Nava v. State

Bernard NAVA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided February 28, 2001.

Rehearing Denied April 19, 2001.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 2001-02-28

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently April 2008

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel shall not be filed more than two years after the conviction becomes final on direct review unless it alleges under oath with a specific factual basis that the petitioner was affirmatively misled about the results of the appeal by counsel.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 558 F. Supp. 2d 1233 - Osorio v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2001-02-28

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Bernard Nava, Blountstown, pro se.

¶2No response required for respondent.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4Petitioner, Bernard Nava, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel in connection with his direct appeal (Closed Case No. 97-860). Whereas the mandate issued in his direct appeal on February 6, 1998, and Nava's petition is dated November 27, 2000, we find that the petition is untimely on its face.

¶5Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(j)(3)(B)[1] provides:

A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel shall not be filed more than two years after the conviction becomes final on direct review unless it alleges under oath with a specific factual basis that the petitioner was affirmatively misled about the results of the appeal by counsel.

¶6Here, petitioner alleges that his attorney failed to inform him of this court's decision, which resulted in him not learning of the affirmance until April 22, 1999, when this court responded to his inquiry. Petitioner does not, however, allege that his attorney "affirmatively misled" him about the affirmance so as to qualify for an exception to the two-year rule. We, therefore, find the petition to be untimely, and dismiss it as such.

¶7STONE, STEVENSON and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.

NOTES

¶8[1] Effective January 1, 2001, this language now appears as rule 9.141(c)(4)(B).

/781/so2d/1136 · .json · Public domain