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← 782 F.2d 409 - Ahmad v. Redman

Ahmad v. Redman’s Empirical Analysis

782 F.2d 409 · 1986

Citation profile

44
cited by 44 later decisions
2
states following
August 2018
most recently cited

23 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 44 later decisions — most recently August 2018 · most notably Derrick v. Rs Peterson (1990), Lambert v. Blackwell (2004)

23 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions

2001986199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Chapman v. State of California · Wong Sun v. United States · Johnson v. Zerbst

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]he voluntariness of a defendant's waiver of Miranda rights is a mixed question of law and fact, subject to plenary review by federal habeas courts.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a Stale court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit— (1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing; (2) that the factfinding procedure was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing; (4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding; (5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitutional rights, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding; (6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or (7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding; (8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “determinations on mixed questions of law and fact or on purely legal issues are not subject to the presumption [of correctness] * * * When reviewing conclusions reached by a state court on mixed or legal issues, a federal habeas tribunal’s standard of review is plenary * * *. The statutory presumption of correctness does attach, however, to the subsidiary findings of historical fact that are relevant to the resolution of mixed questions and questions of law.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.