United States v. Manzella’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

69 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 93 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A court must first look at that nature of the news material in question to determine whether it is innately prejudicial; factors such as the timing of the media coverage and its possible effects on legal defenses are to be considered. Second, the court must ascertain the likelihood that the publicity has in fact reached the jury. The prominence of the coverage and the nature and number of warnings against viewing the coverage become relevant at this stage of the inquiry.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Hall · United States v. Tolliver

2. “Because this case is closer to Ricardo than to Herring on the facts, we affirm Provenzano's conviction despite the court's failure to voir dire the jury on December 12. Unquestionably, reference to his prior conviction is prejudicial, but we see the chances of its actual influence over the jury's decision-making as miniscule. The court had warned the jury against reading about the trial at least twice before December 12. While these warnings were not in the strongest terms imaginable, they nevertheless appear sufficient to impress upon the juror's minds the need to avoid media coverage. The December 12 article was no headline item of the Times-Picayune, although it did appear on the first page of an interior section. The inadmissible information — the prior conviction — again constituted one small paragraph at the end of the medium-length article.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Bey · 544 So. 2d 1040 - Salas v. State

3. “With the enactment of RICO, Congress has supplemented traditional “chain” and “wheel” theories with a new conspiratorial concept — the enterprise____ This new notion furnishes prosecutors a much broader scope of authority for joining defendants who are alleged to have participated in a common grouping or association. The RICO conspiracy consists of an agreement to violate the “substantive” RICO law, that is, a conspiracy “to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [the] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt,” 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c), rather than of a conspiracy to perform any particular predicate crime. The “gravamen” of this kind of conspiracy is the agreement on the “overall” objective, namely, to participate in the affairs of the enterprise____ Joinder under Rule 8(b), therefore, is automatically authorized simply through the RICO conspiracy charge, which supplies the “sufficient nexus” to tie the various defendants and the diverse predicate offenses together____ The limitations on the prosecution’s power to charge are virtually eviscerated by the RICO conspiracy device.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Arvanitis