Ex Parte Duvall’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"We notice a difference between certain critical language in the statute, § 6-5-338 (a), and certain critical language in the Cranman restatement describing the conduct immunized. That is, the statute refers to `conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties' while immune category (4) of the Cranman restatement refers to conduct `exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons.' In the particular case now before us, we need not decide whether or how the difference between the language of the statute and the language of the Cranman restatement affects the scope of the immunity, since the record does not establish without dispute or as a matter of law that the act of the policeman . . . fits within either description of immune conduct. Nor does the record establish without dispute or as a matter of law that the act of the policeman fits within any of the other Cranman categories of immune conduct. Thus, we cannot rely on the § 6-5-338 (a) immunity, as described by either the statute itself or the Cranman restatement, to affirm the summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim for vicarious liability for the act of the policeman."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hollis v. City of Brighton · Blackwood v. City of Hanceville

2. “"Given the divergence between the scope of the immunity granted by § 6-5-338 (a) — `conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties' — and summarized in category (4) of the Cranman restatement — `exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State. . . .' — we conclude that immune category 4 of the Cranman restatement should be expanded to restate the law of immunity in this area so as to reflect § 6-5-338 (a). "Because the peace officers' immunity statute does not limit the availability of immunity to `enforcement of the criminal laws,' we today modify category (4) of Cranman to read as follows: "`A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's "`. . . . "`(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons, or serving as peace officers under circumstances entitling such officers to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338 (a), Ala. Code 1975.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Kennedy

3. “Given the divergence between the scope of the immunity granted by § 6-5-338 (a) — `conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties' — and summarized in category (4) of the Cranman restatement — `exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State. . . .' — we conclude that immune category 4 of the Cranman restatement should be expanded to restate the law of immunity in this area so as to reflect § 6-5-338 (a).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Kennedy