¶1Hope Eastman, was on appellant’s petition for rehearing.
¶2Before ROBINSON, Chief Judge, GINSBURG, Circuit Judge, and McGOWAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
¶3ON PETITION FOR REHEARING Opinion PER CURIAM.
¶5On remand of this case from the Supreme Court,1 we affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the District Court under challenge.2 We analyzed appellant’s third cause of action in light of the Court’s decision in Heckler v. Chaney,3*253and held that the refusal of the Department of Justice to provide appellant with counsel fell within the “ ‘very narrow’ ”4 exception to the presumption of reviewability carved out by Section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act5 for action committed to agency discretion.6 We see no reason to retreat from that view, and accordingly deny the petition for rehearing filed by petitioner and supported by amicus curiae.
¶6Congress empowered the Attorney General to send a lawyer into court “to attend to the interests of the United States.”7 Congress has provided no further guide to exercise of this authority, however, and the Attorney General has imposed no self-restraint through regulation8 or practice.9 We have previously recognized both the entirely discretionary nature of the power10 and the breadth of that discretion.11 As we noted more definitively in our earlier opinion,12 neither the statute, nor any regulation, nor any administrative practice cabins this discretion or furnishes any standard by which to review the Attorney General’s determinations in this area.13
¶7We further observe that the Attorney General has long possessed the power to decide whether to provide counsel for a federal employee. This power dates back at least to the establishment of the Department of Justice in 1870,14 and agents of the Attorney General have appeared in court to defend federal employees at least since 1821.15 Although administrative decisions on provision of an attorney may not have enjoyed the deference traditionally commanded by those on prosecutions and enforcement actions,16 we certainly can say that in each of these situations, the Attorney General acts in the context of a lengthy history of discretionary authority.
¶8We face in this case no colorable claim that the Department’s refusal to furnish appellant with a lawyer transgresses any constitutionally protected right, and we in*254tímate no view as to the outcome proper were that the case.17 The record does not reveal, as appellant apparently would have us find, that she has been treated so dis-similarly from similarly situated employees as to implicate constitutional concerns.18 We are loath to suggest that the Attorney General may not, in exercising his discretion, consider how blameworthy or litigation-prone the employee seeking representation may be. Assistance to employees in these categories can drain the limited personnel and financial resources of the Department of Justice not only directly, by increasing the burden of representation, but also indirectly, by requiring the defense of a spate of suits seeking representation notwithstanding that the Attorney General has found it to be incompatible with the interests of the United States.19
¶9We emphasize that we do not read Heckler v. Chaney20 to require us to shift the general presumption of reviewability21 to one of unreviewability for the purposes of this case, and we have not done so.22 As we have heretofore had occasion to observe,23Chaney “concerned an agency’s refusal to take enforcement action under a statute,” and “[hjence, judicial review was inappropriate because of the lack of statutory guidelines and the longstanding tradition of absolute discretion in prosecutorial decisionmaking.”24 Here we conclude simply that some of the factors that led the Chaney Court to establish a presumption of unreviewability for agency enforcement decisions convince us that any presumption of reviewability of representation decisions has been rebutted.
¶10Petition for rehearing denied.