Nicks v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[i]t is well settled that `the procedural bars of Rule 32 apply with equal force to all cases, including those in which the death penalty has been imposed.'”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Boyd v. State · Slaton v. State

2. ““Nicks claims that the circuit court erred in denying his Rule 32 petition because, he says, the circuit court failed to hold a hearing to determine his competency to stand .trial, despite what he says was sufficient evidence that he was incompetent to, stand trial. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 , 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). Nicks, in support of this claim, also makes the following arguments: “A. That the court had a continuing obligation to conduct a competency hearing at any point during trial at which a ‘bona fide’ doubt as to his competénce to stand trial surfaced; “B. That Alabama law required that any competency hearing be conducted in front of a jury and that any competency determination be -left to the jury; “C. That the evidence of his lack of competence to stand trial was sufficient to. require the circuit court to hold a competency hearing; and “D. That the remedy for the circuit court’s error is to hold a retrospective hearing on his competence to stand trial, or, if that is not practical, to vacate his conviction. “The state argues, and we agree, that this competency claim is procedurally barred by Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5), Ala. R. Crim. P., as a claim that could have been, but was not, raised at trial or on appeal. See Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1106 (11th Cir. 1995)(stating ‘[a] Pate claim “can and must be raised on direct appeal”’)- Cf. Matthews v. State, 671 So.2d 146 (Ala. Cr. App. 1995), and Dill v. State, 600 So.2d 343 (Ala. Cr. App.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 233 So. 3d 1010 - Mays v. State

3. ““The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), established a two-pronged test to determine whether counsel was ineffective. “‘A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.’ “Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 . To establish the prejudice component, ‘the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 . “ ‘Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 62 So. 3d 1071 - Roberts v. State