Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance’s Empirical Analysis
784 F.2d 1325 · 1986
Citation profile
104 federal appellate · 14 district · 7 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 224 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2025 · most notably Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. (1986), United States of America, v. Microsoft Corporation, (2001)
104 federal appellate · 14 district · 7 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1 (§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 13 (§ 2 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914)
Relies on Brunswick Corporation v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc · Brown Shoe Co. v. United States · Parker v. Brown · United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. · Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 224 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[m]arket share is just a way of estimating market power, which is the ultimate consideration,”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[c]ompetition is a ruthless process. A firm that reduces costs and expands sales injures rivals--sometimes fatally. The firm that slashes costs the most captures the greatest sales and inflicts the greatest injury. The deeper the injury to rivals, the greater the potential benefit. These injuries to rivals are by-products of vigorous competition, and the antitrust laws are not balm for rivals' wounds.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“must be used with the greatest caution. Action that injures rivals may ultimately injure consumers, but it is also perfectly consistent with competition, and to deter aggressive conduct is to deter competition. Thus, the plaintiff faces a stiff burden in any section 2 litigation. “It is not enough that a single firm appears to restrain trade unreasonably, for even a vigorous competitor may leave that impression. For instance, an efficient firm may capture unsatisfied customers from an inefficient rival, whose own ability to compete may suffer as a result. This is the rule of the marketplace and is precisely the sort of competition that promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster. In part because it is sometimes difficult to distin guish robust competition from conduct with long-run anticompetitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur.””
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.