Closson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Having weighed the testimony presented, the court finds that the agreement entered into by the State and Closson for immunity was as testified to on October 24, 1985, during testimony in support of the application for search warrant. The court finds that the terms of the agreement were as follows: The prosecution promised that a pending City assault and battery case would be dismissed and that Closson would not be prosecuted for theft of the gun provided that Closson had no further involvement in the shooting incident than had been disclosed to that point. Closson agreed to cooperate with the police including wearing a transmitter as often as required to by the police and to testify truthfully when called upon to testify at the hearing for the application of search warrant as well as at any other court hearings. Closson had been given assurances by police officers that his name would be kept confidential during the investigation and that they would do whatever necessary to protect his safety. [[Image here]] Enforcement of the Agreement: Closson asserts that he is entitled to specific performance of the immunity agreement. The court finds that Closson materially breached the agreement by failing to appear for testimony before the grand jury and that given that breach, the State is not obligated to perform. The court rejects the State’s argument that Closson materially breached the agreement by lying before Judge Stewart on October 24. While this indeed was a breach of the agre”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Closson v. State

2. “When doubt arises concerning the terms and scope of an immunity agreement, the trial court must consider the totality of the evidence, including the agreement itself and the circumstances under which it was made: In determining whether a governmental promise has been made and in ascertaining the scope of any such promise, it is appropriate for a trial court to consider not only the form and content of any written document purporting to incorporate the government’s representations to the defendant but also any oral statements made to the defendant as well as extrinsic evidence relating to the circumstances of the government’s dealings with the defendant. Consideration of extrinsic evidence is especially appropriate when the written document itself is ambiguous. Under such circumstances, a court’s task is not to rewrite the agreement but to construe it in a manner consistent with the 1 intent of the parties and the defendant’s right to be treated fairly by the government.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. MacHado v. State

3. “Immunity agreements are contractual in nature and general principles of contract law apply to the resolution of disputes concerning their enforcement and breach. In such cases, “[t]he law of contracts presents an apt model to guide and inform ... analysis.” There is nevertheless widespread recognition that cases involving immunity agreements cannot always be decided by mechanical application of contract law. Although the analogy between immunity agreements and ordinary contracts is useful, immunity agreements are subject to constitutional restraints, foremost of which is the due process clause’s overriding guarantee of fundamental fairness to the accused. [[Image here]] In keeping with general principles governing appellate review of contracts claims, a trial court’s findings on the terms and scope of an immunity agreement and on the issue of breach must be upheld unless clearly erroneous.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Betts v. State