784 So. 2d 611 - Crupi v. Crupi’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Because Casto really turns on the adequacy of the knowledge of the challenging spouse as a predicate for an unreasonableness challenge, it is restricted to those circumstances in which the adequacy of knowledge might plausibly be raised. The adequacy of knowledge can be plausibly raised only when the agreement was reached by marital parties in conditions of mutual trust and confidence and who were, therefore, not dealing at arm's length. The wife in this case attempts to imply that even when the parties are engaged in contested dissolution of marriage proceedings— when there has been ample opportunity for the party to make use of the procedural rules for discovery of financial resources —a party can still plausibly allege that they were dealing in mutual trust and confidence and not at arm's length or from inadequate knowledge of finances. ... [But,] [o]nce the parties are involved in full fledged litigation over dissolution, property and support rights, they are necessarily dealing at arm's length and without the special fiduciary relationship of unestranged marital parties.... [T]here can be no question of the adequacy of knowledge when an adversarial party has had the opportunity of financial discovery under the applicable rules of procedure. The Casto line of cases, therefore, logically has no application when the challenging spouse has had the benefit of litigation discovery through independently chosen counsel to learn the full nature and extent of the finances of the o”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 803 So. 2d 707 - MacAr v. MacAr · 860 So. 2d 1069 - Griffith v. Griffith

2. “Mediation may occur shortly after the petition is filed and before discovery is complete. For example, in Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 674 So.2d 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), the wife filed a petition for dissolution on March 3rd and participated in mediation (which resulted in the settlement agreement) just three weeks later. And, Florida Family Rule 12.741(a) specifically provides that unless stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the mediation process shall not suspend discovery. Because discovery may not complete by the time a mediated settlement agreement is reached, and it apparently was not in this case, [Note 3] I respectfully disagree that Petracca [ v. Petracca, 706 So.2d 904 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)] is relevant or applicable to this case. [Note 3] After the settlement was challenged, the trial judge felt it necessary to order an independent appraisal of the horse farm.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 803 So. 2d 707 - MacAr v. MacAr

3. “are involved in full fledged litigation over dissolution property and support rights, they are necessarily dealing at arm's length and without the special fiduciary relationship of unestranged marital parties.... [T]here can be no question of the adequacy of knowledge when an adversarial party has had the opportunity of financial discovery under the applicable rules of procedure.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 860 So. 2d 1069 - Griffith v. Griffith