Camacho v. Perales’s Empirical Analysis
786 F.2d 32 · 1986
Citation profile
10 federal appellate · 3 district · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently March 2016
10 federal appellate · 3 district · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (§ 1601 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1396A (§ 1902 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 601 (§ 401 of the Social Security Act of 1935)
Relies on Harris v. McRae · Filmon v. Florida · Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles · Donovan v. Dewey · Mission Insurance v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“the primary concern of the states in providing financial assistance should be those persons who lack sufficient income to meet their basic needs -- termed the categorically needy.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The moratorium does not repeal [the same methodology provision] or suspend its effectiveness except to forbid the Secretary from taking enforcement action. And although the Conference Report suggests that the states may after all be allowed to depart from the methodology of the related cash assistance program and fashion their own less restrictive methodologies for determining the Medicaid eligibility of the medically needy, nothing suggests that the states must do so. Nor is guidance provided for determining the extent to which a state will be permitted to deviate. Here, for example, the State argues that it should be permitted two deviations, one less restrictive and one more restrictive, because its overall methodology is less restrictive than the SSI methodology. The intervenors, in contrast, argue that each step of the methodology must be no more restrictive than the corresponding step of the SSI methodology. Congress imposed the moratorium, which may last as long as 30 months, on the Secretary’s actions to enforce TEFRA “until the Congress has an opportunity to study and legislate on the matter.” H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1367, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2055. Until Congress has passed new legislation amending or rescinding § 1396a(a)(10)(C) (1)(III), we will apply that section as it was enacted.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Willey v. Ives · Roach v. Morse“medical assistance made available to persons receiving assistance under title I, IV, X, XIV, or XVI must not be less in amount, duration, or scope than that provided for persons receiving aid under any other of those titles. In other words, the amount, duration, and scope of medical assistance made available must be the same for all such persons. This will assure comparable treatment for all of the needy aided under the federally aided categories of assistance.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.