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787 F.2d 827

Docket No. 1015, Docket 85-7934.

Soso Liang Lo v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued April 8, 1986.

Decided April 9, 1986.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1986-04-09

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“based upon a charge involving exactly the same facts as the first [right to sue letter] ... whether the present action is time barred must be determined with reference to only the first Notice of Right to Sue. Otherwise, the time limitations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1) would be meaningless, because potential Title VII plaintiffs could evade those requirements simply by seeking additional Notices of Right to Sue whenever they pleased.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 484 F. Supp. 2d 100 - Crane v. NATIONAL CABLE SATELLITE CORP.

Relies on Donald R. CLEVELAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT COMPANY, AKA McDonnell-Douglas Corporation, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · Dowdell v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1986-04-09

How this case has been cited

Cited by 35 later decisions — most recently March 2022 · most notably Sandella S. Spears v. Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources (2000), Hill v. Rayboy-Brauestein (2006)

5 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

11019861990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Soso Liang Lo, pro se.

¶2*828Richard Schoolman, New York City, for defendants-appellees.

¶3Before VAN GRAAFEILAND, WINTER and MINER, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM:

¶5Appellant filed a charge of racial discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against defendant in 1978. She received her Notice of Right to Sue on February 9, 1979. However, she failed to bring an action within the next 90 days. Having failed to initiate a timely action after the first Notice, appellant secured a second Notice of Right to Sue on November 30, 1979 and brought the present action in February, 1980. The second Notice is concededly based upon a charge involving exactly the same facts as the first Notice. We hold that whether the present action is time barred must be determined with reference to only the first Notice of Right to Sue. Otherwise, the time limitations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) would be meaningless, because potential Title VII plaintiffs could evade those requirements simply by seeking additional Notices of Right to Sue whenever they pleased. See Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 509 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir.1975) (per curiam); Dowdell v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 107, 115-16 (M.D.Ga.1981).

¶6Because none of the other issues in this case are of any jurisprudential consequence whatsoever, we dispose of the remainder by summary order under our Rule § 0.23.

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