concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part">*952VAIDIK, Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

While I concur as to all the other issues, I respectfully disagree with the majority's decision to revise Bennett's sentence. Admittedly, our supreme court has signified that it wants us to closely examine sentences. Walker v. State, 747 N.E.2d 536, 538 (Ind.2001). However, in doing so, we must refrain from merely substituting our opinions for those of the trial court. Slip op. at 17.

In light of the recent revision to Appellate Rule 7(B), which now requires that a sentence be shown to be "inappropriate" before it is revised, rather than the more arduous burden of showing the sentence to be "manifestly unreasonable," it is likely that as an appellate tribunal we will be called on more frequently to review sentences. However, we must exercise great restraint in answering this call because the trial court is in a far better position to assess the proper sentence to be imposed as it has heard all of the evidence first hand, thereby gaining valuable impressions from inferences that the trier of fact was privy to in hearing the entire testimony in a cause. See, eg., Caden v. Caden, 152 Ind.App. 451, 454, 283 N.E.2d 804, 806 (1972) ("[The opportunities of the trial court are so vastly superior to those of the reviewing court in that they are able to see the witnesses face to face, to observe their conduct, appearance and demeanor on the witness stand and thus judging all their intelligence, fairness and candor and many other means of weighing evidence that the reviewing court cannot have."). We, however, are aided only by a sterile record, which does not permit us these same opportunities. Accordingly, we should only revise sentences when the trial court has imposed a sentence that is unmistakably inappropriate.

Inappropriateness defies definition but when present is obvious. When it is not obvious that a sentence is inappropriate, "due consideration" should be afforded to the trial court's sentence as mandated by Appellate Rule 7(B). This is not to say that we should never revise a sentence that is based on valid aggravators and mitigators and falls within the statutory parameters; rather, as an appellate court we should revise only those sentences which are so inconsistent with the vast majority of sentences that they are grossly unfair.

Commentators point to consistency as one of the reasons for appellate review of sentences. A system based on consistency makes it easier to identify sentences that are inappropriate:

The requirement of consistency addresses the concept of proportionality by directing the court to consider sentences imposed upon different offenders in the same case or on offenders in similar cases. The consistency concept gives legal relevance to sentences of other judges. It adopts the premise that an overwhelming majority of judges sentence similarly, that a relatively small minority sentence outside of the mainstream, and that sentences outside of the mainstream of judicial practice are inappropriate.

Burt W. Griffin & Lewis R. Katz, Sentencing Consistency: Basic Principles Instead of Numerical Grids: The Ohio Plan, Case W. Res. L.Rev. 1, 12-13 (2002). In addition to helping to identify inappropriate sentences, consistency also adds credibility to the judicial system.

While as an appellate tribunal we help to maintain consistency, the establishment of consistency is primarily a legislative function, not a judicial one. While other jurisdictions have established sentencing guidelines or sentencing review committees, our legislature has chosen to set forth mitigating and aggravating factors to be consid*953ered by the trial judge when imposing a sentence, as well as minimum and maximum sentences, thereby vesting greater discretion in our trial judges. Thus, our principal role in promoting consistency is to review sentences to ensure that they are based on appropriate aggravators and mit-igators and are within the minimum and maximum sentences prescribed by our legislature. After all, it is by maintaining our focus on the statutory parameters of sentencing established by our legislature, rather than second-guessing the trial court, that Indiana will continue to advance in the direction of consistency in sentencing. Rodriguez, 785 N.E.2d at 1176-77.

The foregoing leads me to believe that we should hesitate to find a sentence inappropriate if it is based on valid aggravating and mitigating factors and falls within the parameters established by our legislature. To do otherwise is dangerous, as we begin to inject into the mix our own personal feelings as to what is appropriate. For the reasons stated, we are ill-equipped to make such determinations. Moreover, such subjective second-guessing of the trial court's sentence determination poses a serious disservice to trial courts, as they are given no guidance for the future. Rather, such usurpation of the trial courts' role breeds uncertainty and undermines the discretion with which our trial courts are ostensibly armed. This is not a desired result.

Here, the trial court based its sentence on statutorily prescribed aggravators and mitigators, none of which the majority finds to be erroneous. Moreover, the sentence imposed fell within the statutory parameters. Additionally, as pointed out by the majority, the instant cireumstances are more egregious than a typical robbery. Bennett, as a treasurer for the Eagles Lodge prior to the robbery, held a position of trust with the Lodge and all its members. Nonetheless, Bennett used this position to maximize the damage to his victims by carefully planning to rob the Lodge on the night of the week that the Lodge would have the most eash on hand. Further, Bennett pointed a loaded handgun at and threatened to kill individuals that were his friends. Bennett also ordered his friends into the restroom, stripped them of any cellular phones, and barricaded them inside by piling chairs in front of the door. Moreover, Bennett engaged the police in a high-speed chase, thereby posing a danger to the public at large. Even on a cold record, Bennett's actions exude an air of callousness and utter disregard for the law. In light of these facts, I would not find this sentence inappropriate and respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to revise Bennett's sentence.

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