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← 787 SW2D 340 - State v. Griffith

State v. Griffith’s Empirical Analysis

1990

Citation profile

13
cited by 13 later decisions
1
states following
December 2011
most recently cited

13 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 13 later decisions — most recently December 2011

13 state decisions

90199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on North Carolina v. Pearce · Benton v. Maryland · United States v. DiFrancesco · Commonwealth v. Pierce · United States v. Kuck

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The court shall ... possess the power to revoke the sentence imposed at any time due to the conduct of the defendant or the termination or modification of the program to which the defendant has been sentenced, and the court may resentence the defendant to any appropriate sentencing alternative, including incarceration, for any period of time up to the maximum sentence provided for the offense committed, less any time actually served in any community-based alternative to incarceration.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““The guarantee against double jeopardy arising out of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). The Tennessee Constitution also prohibits a person being twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense. Article 1, Section 10. The guarantee consists of three separate constitutional protections: ‘It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.’ North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980), the Supreme Court set out several principles regarding double jeopardy rights as they pertain to sentencing. In DiFrancesco , the Court upheld a statutory provision which allows the government to appeal a sentence imposed upon a ‘dangerous special offender’ and held that neither government appeal of the sentence nor increase of the sentence on appeal violates the double jeopardy clause. In upholding the statute’s validity, the Court held that a ‘criminal sentence, once pronounced is [not] to be accorded constitutional finality on conclusiveness similar to that which attaches to a jury’s verdict of acquittal.’ 449 U.S. at 132 , 101 S.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “In sentencing an eligible defendant to any community-based alternative to incarceration, the court shall possess the power to set the duration of the sentence for the offense committed at any period of time up to the maximum sentence within the appropriate sentence range, and shall retain the authority to alter or amend at any time the length, terms or conditions of the sentence imposed.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.