Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Ambassador Church Finance/Development Group, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
788 F.2d 1208 · 1986
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 1 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 22 later decisions — most recently February 2015
4 federal appellate · 1 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 12 U.S.C. § 194 · 15 U.S.C. § 78A (§ 1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78F (§ 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78K (§ 11 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78L (§ 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)
Relies on Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green · Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour · Nicholas v. United States · Federal Deposit Insurance v. First Empire Bank-New York · Ticonic Nat Bank v. Sprague
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[SIPC] argues that since liquidation under the SIPA parallels a bankruptcy proceeding, the District Court could award interest against Ambassador’s estate only if the estate’s assets were sufficient to satisfy the principal amount of all valid claims against the estate. Essentially, a liquidation under the SIPA is a bankruptcy proceeding ... * * * * * * Under bankruptcy law, with certain exceptions not applicable in this case, a court cannot award post-petition interest against the debtor’s estate unless a surplus exists, [footnote omitted] In Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678 , 86 S.Ct. 1674 , 16 L.Ed.2d 853 (1966), the Supreme Court stated: “It is a well-settled principle of American bankruptcy law that in cases of ordinary bankruptcy, the accumulation of interest on claims against a bankrupt estate is suspended as of the date the petition in bankruptcy is filed.” Id. at 682 , 86 S.Ct. at 1678 (citation omitted). In Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 163 , 67 S.Ct. 237, 240 , 91 L.Ed. 162 , (1946), the Supreme Court explained the reason for the rule: Exaction of interest, where the power of a debtor to pay even his contractual obligations is suspended by law, has been prohibited because it was considered in the nature of a penalty imposed because of delay in prompt payment — a delay necessitated by law if the courts are properly to preserve and protect the estate for the benefit of all interests involved. Furthermore, the rule reflects “t”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“To the extent moneys are advanced by SIPC to the trustee to pay or otherwise satisfy the claims of customers, in addition to all other rights it may have at law or in equity, SIPC shall be subrogat-ed to the claims of such customers with the rights and priorities provided in this chapter, except that SIPC as subrogee may assert no claim against customer property until after the allocation thereof to customers....”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““First, courts allow interest where the allegedly bankrupt debtor ultimately proves solvent. Second, courts allow interest to secured creditors when the secured property generates income. Third, courts have awarded interest on secured claims when the value of the security exceeds both the principal and interest due.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.