Detson v. Schweiker’s Empirical Analysis
788 F.2d 372 · 1986
Citation profile
22 federal appellate · 3 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 37 later decisions — most recently November 2015 · most notably Guadamuz v. Bowen (1988), Constance DION, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellant (1987)
22 federal appellate · 3 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1320A (§ 1127 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (§ 1601 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 401 (§ 201 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 406 (§ 206 of the Social Security Act of 1935)
Relies on Heckler v. Campbell · Batterton v. Francis · Schweiker v. Gray Panthers · Testa v. United States · Herweg v. Ray
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“to which the claimant is entitled by reason of ... judgment....”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Baker v. Bowen · Motley v. Heckler“(a)Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, in any case where an individual— (1) is entitled to benefits under subchapter II of this chapter that were not paid in the months in which they were regularly due; and (2) is an individual or eligible spouse eligible for supplemental security income benefits for one or more months in which the benefits referred to in clause (1) were regularly due, then any benefits under subchapter II of this chapter that were regularly due in such month or months, or supplemental security income benefits for such month or months, which are due but have not been paid to such individual or eligible spouse shall be reduced by an amount equal to so much of the supplemental security income benefits, whether or not paid retroactively, as would not have been paid or would not be paid with respect to such individual or spouse if he had received such benefits under subchapter II of this chapter in the month or months in which they were regularly due. (b) For purposes of this section, the term “supplemental security income benefits” means benefits paid or payable by the Secretary under subchapter XVI of this chapter, including State supplementary payments under an agreement pursuant to section 1382e(a) of this title or an administration agreement under section 212(b) of Public Law 93-66. (c) From the amount of the reduction made under subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall reimburse the State on behalf of which supplementary payments”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Baker v. Bowen“The court recognized that this method of calculating the withholding amount would necessarily reduce attorney’s fees, thereby constituting a financial disincentive to representing disability claimants. The court was unpersuaded that the financial disincentive mandated a contrary result, however. The court observed that ‘the Secretary’s approach ... does produce a public benefit because it preserves a greater portion of the benefits for the claimant.’ The court also found that the Secretary’s approach does not disrupt the primary financial incentive of § 406. The court concluded that the primary financial incentive provided by § 406 is not the amount of attorney’s fees but is the direct payment of fees. Pursuant to § 406, the Secretary must pay the withheld attorney’s fees directly to the attorney, thereby avoiding problems of collection from the claimant. The court correctly stated that this financial incentive is unaffected by the Secretary’s method of calculating the withholding amount. Also, the court stated that ‘computation of attorney’s fees on the basis of the net amount of benefits is consistent with the Congressional goal of insuring that disability benefits are not consumed by attorney’s fees.’”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Baker v. Bowen
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.