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789 So. 2d 974

Docket No. SC00-686.

Lewis v. State

Vashon Oland LEWIS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Florida

Decided July 5, 2001.

Supreme Court of Florida · decided 2001-07-05

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently August 2006

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“). The Supreme Court held that the Fifth District's interpretation of subsection (8)(c) of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act was contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Grant : To the extent that [the district's ruling] implies that dual sentences under the Act and another recidivist statute are never allowed, and to the extent that it implies that a sentence under the Act must always be the longest in duration of any sentence imposed, Grant is controlling. As we stated in Grant ,”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Michel v. State

“Because the PRR sentence is the longer of the two incarceration alternatives, it is the one that must be imposed.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Michel v. State

Relies on Grant v. State · 751 So. 2d 106 - Lewis v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2001-07-05

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Brynn Newton, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, FL, for Petitioner.

¶2Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kellie A. Nielan and Angela D. McCravy, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.

¶3LEWIS, J.

¶4We have for review Lewis v. State,751 So.2d 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

¶5Lewis challenges his sentences under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act ("the Act") and the habitual violent felony offender statute. The district court interpreted subsection (8)(c) of the Act to mean that it "does not provide for dual sentences." 751 So.2d at 107.[1] This unqualified statement is contrary to our determination in Grant v. State,770 So.2d 655, 657-59 (Fla.2000), in which we determined that the imposition of sentences under both the Act and the habitual felony offender statute did not violate principles of double jeopardy. However, we did determine that the imposition of equal, concurrent sentences violated the language of the Act itself. Lewis was sentenced here to fifteen years as a prison releasee reoffender and to ten years as a habitual violent felony offender along with ten years of probation. The district court stated in its decision that "[b]ecause the [prison releasee reoffender] sentence is the longer of the two incarceration alternatives, it is the one that must be imposed." Lewis,751 So.2d at 107 (footnote omitted). To the extent that this statement implies that dual sentences under the Act and another recidivist statute are never allowed, and to the extent that it implies that a sentence under the Act must always be the longest in duration of any sentence imposed, Grant is controlling. As we stated in Grant, "section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes [a sentencing] court to deviate from the [Act's] sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration." Grant,770 So.2d at 659 (emphasis added). Therefore, the district court was correct in vacating the lesser sentence and we approve the result.

¶6It is so ordered.

¶7WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

NOTES

¶8[1] Section 775.082(8)(c), Florida Statutes. (1997), reads:

¶9Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084 or any other provision of law.

¶10Section 775.084(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), contains the language regarding habitual violent felony offenders.

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