¶1Upon remittitur from the Court of Appeals, judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, rendered July 6,1977, upon a verdict convicting defendant of receiving unlawful gratuities, affirmed for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion on appeal herein (65 AD2d 443, 451-454). This court reversed defendant’s conviction, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case for determination of the facts with respect to the suppression of defendant’s statements (49 NY2d 928). Based upon our determination of those facts, and for the reasons set forth in the original dissenting opinion, we affirm. Contrary to the view in the present dissent of Justice Lupiano, we find no procedural obstacle to this court’s review of the facts, de novo. It is clear that the admonition by the previous majority that it “would reverse and direct a new trial in view of the deprivation of a fair trial” (People v Palumbo, 65 AD2d 443, 449) is dictum, and thus not binding since it was not necessary to the decision. (See Matter of Buehler v Board of Supervisors of Rensselaer County, 260 NY 268; also 343 E. 77th St. Corp. v Bloom, 45 Misc 2d 545.) Inasmuch as the previous determination by this court was to reverse and dismiss the indictment, the observation tliat it would direct a new trial in any event because of trial errors *519was neither essential to, nor supportive of, its determination and was purely gratuitous. In addition, whether the doctrine “law of the case” applies when a matter is still on appeal and has not been remanded is an unanswered question since the general application of the doctrine has concerned “the effect of … statements of law on the lower court, and the effect of … rulings on the appellate court itself in a later appeal.” (Note, Successive Appeals and the Law of the Case, 62 Harv L Rev 286.) Even when a second appeal is before the bench which has made previous determinations, the doctrine is less than inflexible. “In the absence of statute the phrase, law of the case, as applied to the effect of previous orders on the later action of the court rendering them in the same case, merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit on their power.” (Messinger v Anderson, 225 US 436, 444.) In a case in which the Appellate Division chose, after dismissing defendant’s first appeal on the issue of liability for failure to prosecute, to entertain consideration of the same issue on the second appeal, the Court of Appeals observed that it could not say that the Appellate Division’s exercise of its “reserved power” in this instance was error as a matter of law and stated that "Every court retains a continuing jurisdiction generally to reconsider any prior intermediate determination it has made”. (Aridas v Caserta, 41 NY2d 1059, 1061; emphasis added.) Recently, in Matter of Catholic Med. Center of Brooklyn & Queens v Department of Health of State of N.Y. (48 NY2d 967), the Court of Appeals affirmed an Appellate Division decision which ran contrary to a previous decision in the same case. The dissenter (Meyer, J.) claimed that the Appellate Division violated the doctrine of law of the case, but the majority did not address the issue. “ ‘[L]aw of the case’ is a rule of practice, an articulation of sound policy that, when an issue is once judicially determined, that should be the end of the matter as far as Judges and courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction are concerned” (Martin v City of Cohoes, 37 NY2d 162, 165). Although it sits in panels, the Appellate Division is one court and its panels are not courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Nor are we limited on this remittitur to only a review of the custody issue. The Court of Appeals expressly stated that the issue of the misuse of the taped conversation of defendant was “beyond the scope of our review” (People v Palumbo, 49 NY2d 928, 929-930). Thus the issue comes back to whether the majority’s observation on the original appeal that it would direct a new trial in any event was a holding of this court or dicta. In Getty v Roger Williams Silver Co. (181 App Div 413), upon which one of the dissenters relies on the custody issue, the court, after receiving the remittitur from the Court of Appeals, justified its determination to remand, rather than to affirm, in part on the fact that it had not changed its mind since its previous decision. By its language the court implied that if, indeed, it had changed its mind, it would not have felt constrained by its initial determination. The Bench which decided the original appeal here and the Bench which has received the remittitur from the Court of Appeals are not, as already noted, courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction but constitute the same Bench, although one of the original Judges is no longer a member of this court. Under our constitutional system the new members of the panel are not the mere proxies of the original majority. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Ross and Carro, JJ.; Markewich and Lupiano, JJ., dissent in separate memoranda as follows:
¶2The instant case reflects an element of “chance” or “fate” somewhat at variance with my judicial philosophy, which is predicated on the search for objective truth and a minimizing of the subjective element in the decision-making process. Without engaging in an appraisal of the imaginative, as compared or contrasted with the purely rational basis underlying the processes by which appellate courts resolve the questions and issues brought before them, it suffices to briefly delineate the procedural history of this matter. Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of receiving unlawful gratuities. The defendant’s subsequent appeal was heard by a four-man Bench, with the result that the majority of three concluded on this record that the interrogation of defendant at the time he made an inculpatory statement was custodial, as a matter of law, and that the failure of the authorities to give the required Miranda warnings rendered such statement inadmissible. Accordingly, the court concluded that the judgment convicting defendant should be reversed, on the law, and the indictment dismissed. The court also stated: “In any event, if we were not reversing and dismissing the indictment, we would reverse and direct a new trial in view of the deprivation of a fair trial” (People v Palumbo, 65 AD2d 443, 449). Upon the People’s subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court declared: “We cannot agree that this interrogation was custodial as a matter of law, i.e., that under no view of the evidence in the record could it be found to be noncustodial. Accordingly, we hold that the determination of the Appellate Division in this regard was error. The case must, therefore, be remitted to the Appellate Division for determination of the facts under CPU 470.40 (subd 2, par [b]). The other error on which the Appellate Division would have reversed *521(and granted a new trial)—namely misuse of the taped conversations of defendant—was not preserved for appellate review, no timely protest on this theory having been registered. Accordingly, that issue is beyond the scope of our review” (People v Palumbo, 49 NY2d 928, 929-930; emphasis supplied). The remittitur to this court limited to a factual determination on the issue of whether the interrogation was custodial or noncustodial comes before a somewhat different Bench—one of the three Justices formerly comprising the majority having left this court. Assuming the same Bench on the remittitur, the rationale of Getty v Roger Williams Silver Co. (181 App Div 413) would be most compelling. In that case, this court, on appeal from a judgment in plaintiff’s favor, after a jury trial in a wrongful discharge matter, held that the evidence clearly demonstrated that “the question of the justification for the discharge … is a question of law” and that there being proper justification, the complaint must be dismissed (162 App Div 513, 516). “On appeal to the Court of Appeals that court considered that there was a question of fact in the case, in that … different inferences might be drawn therefrom. (221 N. Y. 38) Consequently the cause was remitted to this court for consideration of the weight of the evidence. Unless we are required by the Court of Appeals to draw different inferences from the facts than those which we drew upon the former appeal, which I do not understand to be the effect of the decision of that court, there is nothing left for us to do except order a new trial. On the former appeal we were of the opinion that the verdict was absolutely against the evidence. Being still of that mind we are obliged of necessity to hold that it is against the weight of the evidence” (181 App Div 413, 414-415). The remaining two Justices of the original majority of three acknowledging the force of the Gettyrationale and the spirit of consistency mandated by the quite explicit and detailed record before this court as it pertains to the issue of whether the interrogation was custodial or noncustodial, find as a fact that the interrogation was custodial. That same spirit of consistency prevails upon the sole dissenter on the original appeal to adhere to his view that the interrogation was noncustodial. Thus, the two new Justices joining the dissenter in finding as a fact on this record that the interrogation was noncustodial, now constitute the new majority which has voted for affirmance of the conviction. With due respect to my colleagues of the new majority, a miscarriage of justice is the result. First, on this record, the same record which was before the court on the original appeal, a fair appraisal of the undisputed circumstances, coupled with reason and common sense, require the conclusion that a finding of noncustodial interrogation is clearly against the weight of the evidence. This view is urged, not out of blind devotion to the tenet of consistency, but as a reflection of objective truth. Second, in any event, the majority have clearly violated the principle of the law of the case in affirming the conviction and refusing the defendant the benefit of a new trial. The decision by the majority on the original appeal that “In any event, if (they) were not reversing and dismissing the indictment, (they) would reverse and direct a new trial in view of the deprivation of a fair trial” was beyond review by the Court of Appeals and was not subject to the remittitur from that court. “The effect of the law of the case is limited to a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, which ordinarily should not disregard an earlier decision on the same question in the same case” (10 Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac, § 70:406). “So long as the facts remain the *522same, a rule of law once laid down by the court of last resort remains the rule throughout the subsequent history of the cause in all its stages except under extraordinary circumstances” (10 Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac, § 70:405). On the issue of affording defendant a new trial because of deprivation of a fair trial, this court, on this record, is the court of last resort. We have already discussed and passed upon the question of whether defendant should be afforded a new trial because he was deprived of a fair trial (cf. Rankin v Shanker, 25 NY2d 780). The search for truth, devotion to justice, due regard for reason and awareness of the danger of an overly subjective approach, serve as bulwarks against arbitrary or merely fortuitous consequences in the appellate process. Whether the doctrine invoked be termed res judicata, stare decisis, or the law of the case, the underlying principle is the same—to protect against sua sponte arbitrary action or abuse of power. As so aptly stated by the Court of Appeals in Rankin v Shanker (supra, pp 781-782): “It is wisely established, as we had occasion to say some 70 years ago (Matter of Laudy, 161 N. Y. 429, 434-435) ‘[w] hen the court has jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, its judgment is conclusive between the parties and their privies, not only in all other actions, but also in all other proceedings in the same action. (Roberts v. Cooper, 61 U. S. 467-481; Wells, Res Adjudicata, 370; Ram on Legal Judgments, 292; Herman on Estoppel, 274.) The principle established in all jurisdictions is that so long as the facts remain the same, the rule of law once held by the court of last resort remains the rule throughout the subsequent history of the cause, in all its stages, except under extraordinary circumstances, which do not exist in this case.’ ” Indeed, in observing this “salutary principle” the Court of Appeals followed its prior view upon the precise question subsequently urged again by the appellants in Rankin v Shanker (supra)“solely on constraint of Rankin v Shanker (23 NY2d 111) ” (Rankin v Shanker, supra, p 782; emphasis supplied). As one eminent legal scholar has declared: “Since the doctrine of res judicata technically requires a final judgment on the merits in one action and an attempted relitigation in a second, it has no application within an action. The doctrine of the ‘law of the case’ was devised to close that gap. It applies to various stages of the same action or proceeding; its purpose is to avoid the retrial of issues already determined in it. For practical purposes, the doctrine of the law of the case can be considered as a kind of intra-action res judicata. … * The law of the case doctrine makes a decided point, within a ease, binding not only on the parties, but on all other judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction. … A disposition claiming to be the law of the case will usually be found to be embodied in a court order, but that is not indispensable. If one judge’s decision on a point is clear, it concludes other coordinate judges whether embodied in a formal order or not” (Siegel, New York Practice, §448). The observation by the majority on the original appeal that error arose mandating a new trial to defendant because he was deprived of a fair trial phrased as follows “In any event, if we were not reversing and dismissing the indictment, we would reverse and direct a new trial in view of the deprivation of a fair trial” (emphasis supplied) was a considered reflection upon the question presented to this court, inter alia, as to whether defendant had obtained a fair trial. That issue was fully briefed by both parties on the original appeal. Defendant’s motion, prior to trial, to suppress his statement of June 3, 1976, was denied. Accordingly, the statement was ad*523mitted by the trial court during the course of the jury trial. Defendant’s appeal from the subsequent judgment of conviction brought up for review the propriety of the prior order denying his motion to suppress his statement. Thus, the briefs on the original appeal to this court from that judgment specifically discussed "two critical issues—(1) whether the June 3 statement should have been suppressed and, apart from that issue, (2) whether defendant received a fair trial in light of other evidence introduced by the People at the trial. The latter issue was framed in the context of the propriety of the prosecutor’s introducing evidence at the trial which the jury would interpret as an unwillingness on defendant’s part to co-operate with the authorities in the investigation of unspecified and unrelated charges of “corruption” within the city’s real estate department—matters immaterial to the instant charge and about which defendant may have had no actual knowledge, in that they partook of rumors, gossip and “loose” talk. Succinctly stated, defendant claimed that the People may not support their case against him by indirect reference to corruption within the city real estate department with the obvious implication that he was involved in other uncharged misdeeds. It was pointed out by defendant that this theme was further emphasized during cross-examination of him at trial and may not be condoned on the ground that it was an attempt to impeach his credibility, because there was no valid proof of any other wrongdoing on his part. The import of such cross-examination was to demonstrate that defendant was withholding information. Further, it was shown that on its direct ease, the People questioned Deputy Commissioner Lupkin in such a manner as to convey the impression that the defendant was brought to the former’s office on June 3, 1976, for the purpose of supplying information about “official corruption” and that defendant failed to co-operate in the investigation. The People’s endeavor to justify this evidence on the ground that it was relevant to the issue of the voluntariness of the June 3 inculpatory statement by defendant misses the point. While this evidence may have obtained some relevance, it was completely immaterial, because all the People needed to show that the statement was voluntary, was the manner of defendant’s delivery to the office, the mode of questioning and the circumstances directly related thereto. By bringing before the jury evidence that defendant failed to co-operate with the investigation into corruption with the city real estate department, under the guise of explaining why he was summoned to the office, the People impermissibly connected defendant with uncharged “corruption.” It should be noted that, assuming the relevance of defendant’s failure to co-operate outweighed consideration of materiality, the trial court was confronted with a delicate observance of defendant’s right to a fair trial by giving appropriate rulings and guidance to the jury. The record herein, as the prior majority of this court duly noted, did not demonstrate that defendant received a fair trial. It is also noteworthy and compelling that the Court of Appeals, in reversing our prior determination and remitting the appeal to us, viewed the issue of the propriety of the refusal to suppress defendant’s statement as both appealable and reviewable, whereas the other error on which we would have reversed and granted a new trial, to wit, the deprivation of a fair trial issue encompassing the “misuse of the taped conversations of defendant” was deemed nonreviewable. Simply stated, the Court of Appeals viewed the first issue—the suppression issue as presenting a question of law, whereas the second issue— *524the fair trial issue involving misuse of the taped conversations, did not present a question of law only. (It appears, therefore, that despite our prior determination and the view of that determination taken by the Court of Appeals, I am the sole Justice of the original Bench invocating the law of the case doctrine in. concluding that defendant is entitled on the remittitur to at least a new trial.) Accordingly, the statement by the majority on the fair trial question was not mere dicta and has the force of judicial utterance. “The rule of necessity to the actual determination, although a usually reliable guide in separating dictum from holding, cannot be followed in all cases … it is well settled that where a court passes upon certain questions presented to it for consideration, the fact that the determination of any one of these questions alone would have decided the case does not render the court’s ruling upon the other questions dicta” (1 Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac, p 45). “It cannot be said that a case is not authority on one point because, although that point was properly presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the cause, something else was found in the end which disposed of the whole matter” (Railroad Cos. v Schutte, 103 US 118, 143; see, also, People v Railway Express Agency, 188 Misc 342, 344, affd 297 NY 703, reh den 297 NY 783). This court is, of course, not a court of subordinate jurisdiction to itself or other Appellate Division Departments. Accordingly, the doctrine of the law of the case applies to this court with respect to its own decisions. In effect, we are co-ordinate with ourselves as regards jurisdiction. As we perceptively noted in Walker v Gerli (257 App Div 249, 251) : “The law of the case in this court is not binding on the Court of Appeals. If the present record were under consideration by the Court of Appeals, that court would not be circumscribed by an earlier decision of the Special Term … nor even of this court … There is no reason to apply a different rule when this court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction reviews an order of the Special Term of the Supreme Court … Surely, we are not required to accept a conclusion which we realize to be untenable unless constrained to do so by a previous decision of this court in the same case” (emphasis supplied). Two distinct aspects of the law of the case are (1) the effect of the appellate court’s determination on a legal question on the lower court, and (2) the effect of such determination on the appellate court itself in a later appeal or in a subsequent stage of the same appeal. The fact'that on a subsequent appeal in the same action or a subsequent stage of the same appeal in the same action, the membership of the appellate court has changed, does not eliminate the doctrine (5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, § 746). A successor appellate court is bound by the law of the case established by the predecessor appellate court.
¶3. “(I)t frequently is applied as a matter of judicial discretion or out of respect for the judgment of fellow judges at the same level of the judiciary” (5 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 5011.09).
¶4. It is noteworthy that the law of the case is being applied in this criminal matter not against, but for, the defendant’s entitlement to a fair jury trial.
¶5. It is noted that defense counsel did object during the course of trial to the use the prosecutor was making of the taped conversations of defendant.
¶6. Of course, the law of the case does not apply to pure questions of fact, and it is recognized that the new majority are not encumbered by our prior holding respecting the issue of custodial interrogation, however unseemly the result in the “eyes" of the dissent. Insofar as the issue of deprivation of a fair trial is concerned, the new majority’s exercise of power to refuse to follow the law of the case (and even apart from invocation of that doctrine), constitutes an abuse of power, as a matter of law, because it is based on no exceptional or unusual justifying circumstances, ignores the reality of the record and serves to frustrate the fundamental and cherished right of a defendant to obtain a fair trial.