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← 79 F.3d 43 - In the Matter of William Duke, Debtor-Appellant

In the Matter of William Duke, Debtor-Appellant’s Empirical Analysis

1996

Citation profile

52
cited by 52 later decisions
January 2019
most recently cited

8 federal appellate · 3 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 52 later decisions — most recently January 2019 · most notably Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (2000), In Re: Stephen J. Jamo

8 federal appellate · 3 district ·

250199620002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw · Brown v. Schweitzer · Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union · In the Matter of Judy Emely Edwards, Also Known as Judy Emely Glass, Debtor-Appellant · Matthews v. Rosene

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “• the agreement must be filed with the court; • the agreement itself must contain “a clear and conspicuous statement” advising the debtor that he may rescind the agreement within sixty days after it is filed or at any time prior to discharge; • if an attorney represented the debtor during negotiation of the agreement, the filed copy of the agreement must include a declaration by counsel that the agreement is “fully informed” and “voluntary,” that it does not impose an “undue hardship” on the debtor or his dependents, and that counsel advised the debtor of the legal effect and consequences of both the agreement and any default under that agreement; • if the debtor was not represented by counsel in the negotiation of the agreement, then the court must hold a hearing attended by the debtor and inform the debtor that he is not obliged to enter into a reaffirmation agreement and explain to the debtor the legal effect and consequences of both the agreement and any default thereunder; moreover, unless the debt is a consumer debt secured by real property, the court must review the agreement and find that it does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or his dependents and that it is in the best interest of the debtor.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The automatic stay provision of § 362, as noted above, generally prohibits the creditor from taking “any act” to collect pre-petition debts. Its purpose, as this Court explained in Matthews v. Rosene, 739 F.2d 249, 251 (7th Cir.1984), is “to benefit a debtor by preventing harassment and frustration of rehabilitation efforts through pursuit by creditors in individual actions.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““Taken to its logical extreme, § 362 could be construed to prohibit all contact between creditors and debtors after a petition has been filed, with respect to dischargeable debts. The courts have not pushed it that far, however, not least because to do so would create significant tension with the right to reaffirm.” In re Duke, 79 F.3d at 45 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.