In Re: Dale Chimenti, Lizabeth Chimenti, Joey Chimenti, and Stefanie Chimenti’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Courts have consistently interpreted the “saving clause” to preclude removal of maritime actions brought in state court and invoking a state law remedy, provided there is no independent federal basis for removal, such as diversity jurisdiction. Although the Supreme Court has never directly held that removal is prohibited, lower courts have relied on strongly worded dicta in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 , 79 S.Ct. 468 , 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959), which support preserving the plaintiffs choice of forum. Romero’s actual holding was that general maritime law claims do not fall under Congress’s grant of federal question jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . Id. at 378-79 , 79 S.Ct. 468 . In arriving at such a conclusion, though, the Court observed that if the rule were otherwise, the historic option of a maritime suitor pursuing a common-law remedy to select his forum, state or federal, would be taken away.... By making maritime cases removable to the federal courts it would make considerable inroads into the traditionally exercised concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts in admiralty matters — a jurisdiction which it was the unquestioned aim of the saving clause of 1789 to preserve. Id. at 371-72 , 79 S.Ct. 468 . Earlier in the opinion, the Court noted, “The removal provisions of the original Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 79 , conferred a limited removal jurisdiction, not including cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In none of the statutes ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Kiesgen v. St. Clair Marine Salvage, Inc. · 149 F. Supp. 3d 963 - Brown v. Porter

2. “(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to attain the relief desired. (2) The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal. (3) The district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. (4) The district court’s order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules. (5) The district court’s order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first impression.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re: Gregory Lott

3. “Although the availability of permissive interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b) should normally militate against granting the writ, it is plain that any attempt to obtain certification in this case would have been futile. . . . There was no apparent likelihood that the Chimentis would succeed in convincing the district court to certify a § 1292(b) appeal.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Briscoe