State v. Higa’s Empirical Analysis
1995
Citation profile
120 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 121 later decisions — most recently June 2020 · most notably State v. Arceo (1996), State v. Toyomura (1995)
120 state decisions — followed in 26 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on United States v. Halper · Cities of Charlottesville v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. · Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch · Nebraska v. Wyoming · Baehr v. Lewin
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 121 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[T]he main benefit of administrative revocation is that it allows the State to remove a drunk driver’s license before the culmination of a lengthy prosecution under the criminal statute. Currently, a person charged with driving under the influence must be allowed to continue driving until he or she is found guilty in a court of law. This process takes an average of seven or eight months in Hawaii, and even longer, and while this process is going on, the dangerous driver, who quite likely is an inveterate repeat offender, remains on the road.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage“Double jeopardy protects individuals against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Kalua. · State v. Mundon“Double jeopardy protects individuals against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Lessary, 75 Haw. 446, 454 , 865 P.2d 150, 154 (1994); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989). Here Higa asserts that the first and third protections of double jeopardy have been violated. With respect to the first protection, Higa seemingly argues that, because the ADLRO proceeding “ended in his favor,” he should not be forced to undergo a second prosecution for the same offense. In other words, Higa implicitly equates “ended in his favor” with an “acquittal,” thus implicating the first protection enunciated in Lessary and Halper . However, because we conclude in the following discussion that the ADLRO proceeding does not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution, whether the ADLRO proceeding “ended in his favor” or resulted in an “acquittal” is immaterial. We therefore turn to the issue regarding multiple punishments for the same offense. Higa argues that he is being exposed to multiple punishments for the same offense, and that, by permitting the government two chances to revoke his driving privileges via a civil administrative proceeding and a subsequent criminal prosecution, both the letter and the spirit of the protection that the double jeopardy clause was designed to ensure is violated. Both H”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Toyomura
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.