State v. Parish’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

18 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Under a statute which imposes a duty upon a motorist involved in an accident causing damage or injury to another to stop, identify himself, etc., knowledge of the damage or injury is generally a prerequisite to a conviction for the violation thereof, even though the statute does not expressly require knowledge on the part of an accused motorist. Knowledge of such damage or injury is, of course, particularly an element of the offense under a statute which imposes such duty upon a motorist who “knowingly” collides with or causes injury to any person. However, it is not absolute and positive knowledge which must be shown before the offense is proven, but rather it need only be shown that the circumstances were such that a reasonable man would have believed that an acci dent had occurred resulting in damage or injury to another. In other words, if an injury is inflicted under such circumstances as would ordinarily induce the belief in a reasonable person that injury would result, or had resulted, from the accident or collision, then it is the duty of the motorist to stop and otherwise obey the mandate of the statute. In a few jurisdictions it has been held that it is not necessary to allege and prove knowledge to convict a motorist of violation of a statute requiring motorists involved in accidents to stop, identify themselves, etc., where the statute does not make knowledge of the accident a part of the offense. It is reasoned that in most cases it would be impossible for the st”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 73 Wash. 2d 616 - State v. Martin

2. “(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident or collision resulting in injury or death to any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or collision, and any person violating this provision shall upon conviction be punished as provided in G.S. 20-182. (b) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident or collision resulting in damage to property and in which there is not involved injury or death of any person shall immediately stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident or collision and shall give his name, address, operator's or chauffeur's license number and the registration number of his vehicle to the driver or occupants of any other vehicle involved in the accident or collision or to any person whose property is damaged in the accident or collision .... Any person violating the provisions of this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined or imprisoned for a period of not more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court. (c) The driver of any vehicle involved in any accident or collision resulting in injury or death to any person shall also give his name, address, operator's or chauffeur's license number and the registration number of his vehicle to the person struck or the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with, and shall render to any person injured in such accident or collision reasonable assistance, ... and it shall be unlawful for any person to violate this provision, and such violator sha”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Fearing

3. ““ * * * ‘on the trial of a criminal action it is the bounden duty of the trial court, of its own motion, to give to the jury pertinent instructions by which the jury may be correctly informed with respect to the essential legal principles that are applicable to the evidence that has been adduced; and that failing in that regard, the fact that proper instructions have not been requested by either party to the action will not cure such error.’ * ijc sjt * * “ ‘Although it is not the duty of the court to give instructions to the jury upon specific points developed by the evidence unless such instructions are requested, it is nevertheless the duty of the court in criminal actions to give to the jury instructions on the general principles of law pertaining to the case on trial.’ :jc * ‡ s!: ‡ ‡ “We have no statute requiring the judge to advise counsel, beforehand, of what will be included in the instructions, and believe it to be the general practice of attorneys to rely on the judge, of his own motion, to give what are commonly referred to as ‘stock instructions,’ in criminal cases, covering such questions as ‘burden of proof’, ‘presumption of innocence’ and ‘reasonable doubt’, and to advise the jury as to the nature and elements of the crime charged. The practice is not general in this state, if it exists at all, of preparing requests for instructions stating the fundamental principles of law, applicable to all criminal cases, which are generally given by the judge of his own mo”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Freeman