¶1also dissenting:
¶2I agree with Mr. Justice Underwood that, assuming the admission of the evidence of arson was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I would go one step further, however, as I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority that the evidence of arson was inadmissible.
¶3Our cases have consistently held that evidence which tends to prove a fact in issue is admissible despite its tendency to show that the accused has committed a crime other than the crime for which he is being tried. It has been broadly held that evidence of other offenses is admissible if relevant for any purpose other than to show propensity to commit a crime. (People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 448, 455.) I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the arson as a separate and distinct offense unrelated to the commission of the armed robbery and murder of the decedent.
¶4Ina Lewis, granddaughter of the victim, niece of defendant’s ex-wife, girlfriend of defendant, and codefendant, testified concerning the sequence of events surrounding this bizarre and brutal homicide. Her testimony, if believed, establishes that defendant, on the one-month anniversary of his divorce from the victim’s daughter, murdered his former father-in-law. Her testimony also establishes, if believed, that shortly after this murder, defendant set his ex-wife’s home in flames. Despite the closely interwoven relationships among those who figured prominently in the events surrounding the commission of this crime, the majority has found that the arson was a separate and distinct offense, unrelated to the crimes charged. In my opinion, the arson was part of a continuing narrative so closely connected to the murder that it could be considered part of one continuous transaction. As such, evidence referring to the circumstances surrounding the arson necessarily has relevance to the issue of guilt of the crime charged. People v. Hall (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 308, 315.
¶5MR. JUSTICE RYAN joins in this dissent.