¶1This action was commenced on the 21st day of November, 1879, for breach of covenant of warranty in a deed of conveyance. Before the end of the trial, the plaintiff discontinued his claim for damages on the covenant as to all the land described in the petition, except forty acres. The case was tried by a jury and resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $131.50, from which the defendant appeals. The facts appearing in the evidence of this case would have been disclosed more satis*189factorily if tlie law governing tliem had been more definitely declared and applied by the court as the case proceeded.
¶2It appears from the evidence that on the 18th day of March, 1865, the plaintiff purchased a tract of 173 acres of land from defendant for $900, which included the forty acres involved in the judgment of this case. The deed contained the usual statutory covenants and a covenant of warranty. In March, 1870, Ann E. Miller and others brought an action of ejectment against the plaintiff upon a paramount title. Judgment in the circuit court went in favor of defendant there, from which an appeal was taken by the adverse party to the Supreme Court. There were other actions pending in the Supreme Court which involved the same issues. After the decision of one of them which was styled Miller v. Bledsoe, 61 Mo. 96, the merits of the case against Jones, the plaintiff herein, were regarded by the parties as practically determined in favor of the paramount title. Accordingly the case of Miller v. Jones was by stipulation of the parties reversed, and judgment was entered in the circuit court for recovery of 11-36 of the forty acres described in this case.
¶3As to whether Mr. Whitsett had notice of the suit of Miller v. Jones and an opportunity to defend it, the testimony is apparently conflicting, but the evidence on the whole points but one way. The suit was defended by attorneys, who, in obedience to the ruling in Miller v. Bledsoe, signed the stipulation to reverse the judgment and enter up a judgment for plaintiff. Mr. Jones testified that although they acted in his name, he never employed them and never paid them. Mr. Whitsett disavows employing or paying them. Now, if this be true, then the attorneys must have occupied themselves in attending to a lawsuit in the circuit and Supreme Court about which the parties in interest were entirely indifferent. The same attorneys, or some of them, represent Mr. Whitsett in this case, and he admits that he had notice of the ejectment suit, but not a *190written notice, and that Jones looked to him on his warranty,, as indicated in a conversation with him after the suit was brought. The evidence tends to show that Jones paid on execution for costs about $150 by himself and his garnishee. Immediately after the recovery on the paramount title, it was bought in by Mr. "Whitsett, so that no actual ouster or dispossession of Jones was suffered by him or his grantees.
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¶5Besides, the evidence of Jones not being in possession when the ejectment suit was brought, is by no means clear of doubt. It rather tends to show that he was in possession of at least a portion of the forty acre tract. The defendant in his answer avers that after the deed to the land was made, the plaintiff" entered into possession, and that ever since, he and his grantees have been in possession of the same. The attorney who brought the ejectment suit, testifies that Jones was in possession when he sued, and that he sold to McDaniels pending the suit, and that McDaniels was sued in a distinct action for part of the forty acre tract. The plaintiff' admits in the bill of exceptions *191that McDaniels, his grantee, was in possession when the Miller suit was brought, but says nothing about his own possession. The record of the ejectment suit is not set out in the bill of exceptions, and the statements relating to it are silent as to the precise date of the institution of the same.
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¶8After Jones had conveyed to McDaniels, he was under no obligation to defend an ejectment suit except by virtue of his covenant in his deed of sale. The fact that the action was against him as possessor, could not change the law governing his rights and liabilities. If the action had been instituted against McDaniels, or any one else in possession, the obligation of Jones on his covenant would *193have been the same. In discharging the costs of such a suit he was discharging his liability to the owner of the land on his own covenant, and to the extent of such payment and discharge he was perfecting his right of action against his own covenantor. And as his verdict in this case did not exceed the costs he had actually paid, the damages were clearly recoverable from "Whitsett on his covenant.
¶9As there was no controversy in the ease about the validity of the paramount title which was asserted, I think the instruction given by the court of its own motion and the instructions given at the instance of defendant, placed the case fairly before the jury, and that the instructions refused by the court would not have added anything necessary to a proper understanding and decision of the issues submitted to them.
¶10The judgment is affirmed.