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← 79 OHIOST3D 1 - State v. Williams

State v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis

1997

Citation profile

430
cited by 430 later decisions
1
states following
December 2025
most recently cited

8 federal appellate · 418 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 430 later decisions — most recently December 2025 · most notably State v. Treesh (2001), State v. Issa (2001)

8 federal appellate · 418 state decisions

15901997200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Wainwright v. Witt · Morgan v. Illinois · Ross v. Oklahoma · Parker v. Gladden · United States v. Shackleford (84-5995)

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 430 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “I would also reverse this 'conviction on the ground that Williams was not adequately protected from juror bias in favor of the death penalty. Of the nine prospective jurors for whom the trial court denied defense challenges for cause based on expression of death penalty bias, five were excused upon the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel, another was excused for personal reasons, the number of one of the jurors was not reached, and two, Eddleman and Camp, were seated as jurors. Appellant argues that each of these prospective jurors was biased in favor of the death penalty. With regard to Eddleman, Scanlon and Subecz, I agree. Juror Eddleman again presents the greatest difficulties. The majority admits that Eddleman contradicted herself on voir dire. Despite her repeated statements that she would prefer death and would not consider alternative life sentences, the majority concludes that the court’s rehabilitation of Eddleman was successful because “the trial judge’s questions were more than general inquiries regarding a juror’s ability to be fair and impartial.” I disagree. I believe this case represents precisely the sort of rehabilitation the United States Supreme Court intended to prohibit in Morgan v. Illinois when it held that general questions to a prospective juror by the court relating to fairness or impartiality cannot negate a statement by the prospective juror that he or she would automatically vote for death. 504 U.S. at 735-736 , 112 S.Ct. at 2233”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “In contrast, Eddleman made very few responses suggesting that she could set aside her bias. Following the preceding exchange, the judge elicited a general response. “The Court: Mrs. Eddleman, do you agree that you can listen to and follow the instructions of the Court?” “Juror Eddleman. Yes.” Then, after explaining the two phases of the trial and the sentencing options, the court asked, “Can you follow the instructions of law?” Eddleman answered, ‘Tes.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “[Defense Counsel] And are you saying that even though you know that these three alternatives should start out even in your mind? You are being honest with me.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.