Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

79 Tex. Crim. 169

183 S.W 1153

Mason v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1916-03-01

<p>1. Criminal Law <§=>448(11) — Homicide <§=> l90(l) — Threats—Demeanor—Evidence.</p> <p>On a murder trial, where the defense was self-defense, a witness testified that deceased told her he was mad at accused, wanted to ldll him, and was going to get rid of him. She was then asked whether deceased was mad at the time he made such remarks, and answered that he was. Held that such evidence was not incompetent as a mere opinion, but was admissi-</p> <p>Me since the statement made by deceased was a threat, and his demeanor at the time of making it, showing whether the threat was jocular or serious, was important as bearing on the issue of who started the difficulty which resulted in the homicide!</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1036, 1041: Dec. Dig. @=> 448(11); Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 399; Dec. Dig. @=>190(1).]</p> <p>2. Cbiminal Law @=>448 — 'Threatening Con-duci^Impbession Made on Witness.</p> <p>Where the defense was self-defense, and there was an issue as to who started the difficulty resulting in the homicide upon accused, approaching deceased for the alleged purpose of adjusting their difficulty, it was proper to allow a witness who saw the affray to testify that when deceased reached down and picked up a rock and drew back his hand to throw, such conduct made the impression on the witness’ mind that deceased was going to immediately attack accused and strike him with the _ rock, such impression being an original impression of the witness from a view of the occurrence and a part of the res gestae.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1036-1039, 1041-1043, 1045, 1048-1051; Dec. Dig. @=>448.]</p> <p>3. Homicide @=300(5) — Provoking Assault —Defective Ghaege.</p> <p>Where the defense was self-defense, under an alleged attack by deceased when approached by accused for the purpose of settling a difficulty, a charge on the intent and conduct of accused in approaching deceased, which told the jury that if accused’s acts, or words, or both taken together, were reasonably “calculated” to provoke, and did provoke, deceased to make an attack on defendant, defendant could not justify the homicide on the ground of self-defense, was defective, since defendant must do something or utter words which actually provoke the difficulty ; it not being sufficient that such. acts or words were calculated to provoke.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 619; Dee. Dig. @=>300(5).]</p> <p>4. Homicide @=>300(12) — Chabge—Bukden— Reasonable Doubt.</p> <p>In a prosecution for homicide, the defense was self-defense against an attack upon accused by deceased when approached by defendant for the purpose of adjusting a difficulty. The court charged that if: (1) The defendant did not go to deceased with the intent of provoking a difficulty; or if (2) he did so, he did not, upon reaching deceased, use words or do acts with the intent of provoking a difficulty with the apparent intent of killing deceased if he resisted; or (3) if defendant did start out with the intent of seeking deceased, and used words or committed acts calculated to provoke an assault by deceased, but did not use such words or commit such acts with the intent of provoking an attack by deceased for the purpose of killing him; and, if the jury believed either one or all of such propositions, they should find for defendant on the issue of provoking a difficulty. Meld, that such charge was defective in apparently throwing the burden of proof on defendant by requiring the jury to affirmatively find that defendant did not approach deceased with the intent of provoking the difficulty; whereas a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s purpose in approaching deceased entitled him to acquittal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 627, 630; Dec. Dig. @=>300(12).]</p> <p>5. Homicide @=>307(2) — Ciiaege—Failube to State Offense.</p> <p>Such charge was further defective in failing to inform the jury of wliat appellant would be guilty, or what should be the verdict in case the jury found for him on the issue of provoking a difficulty; manslaughter and murder being both charged.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 639; Dec. Dig. @=>307(2).]</p> <p>6. Homicide @=>300(14) — Chabge — Right to Akms — Self-Defense.</p> <p>It being in evidence that accused was armed when he approached deceased, and there being an issue whether he had armed himself expressly for the purpose of approaching deceased to provoke a difficulty, such charge was further defective in failing to tell the jury that deceased had the right to self-defense upon an assault by accused when accosting him for the purpose of settling the difficulty, though the court correctly charged that defendant had the right to arm himself before seeking deceased if he believed himself to be in danger of death or injury from him.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 629; Dec. Dig. @=>300(14).]</p> <p>7. Homicide @=>188(5) — Deceased’s Chabac-teb — Evidénce.</p> <p>It was error to exclude testimony that witness considered deceased a fighting dangerous man and a man of high temper, since defendant was not restricted to his statutory right to prove deceased’s general reputation, but might prove that deceased was dangerous by any testimony which showed that fact, the question being not so much one of reputation as of fact which can be proved, either by reputation or by knowledge of the facts independent of reputation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 395; Dee. Dig. @=>188(5).]</p> <p>8. Homicide @=>188(5) — Deceased’s Reputation — Evidence—Competency.</p> <p>Where a witness was asked if she knew whether deceased was a fighting man and a man of high temper, to which she answered, “Yes, we considered him so,” such testimony was competent as evidence of deceased’s reputation under the statute, where all the people in the vicinity seemed to have known all the parties, and knew the standing and reputation of both accused and deceased and the circumstances and incidents that occurred culminating in the homicide.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 395; Dec. Dig. @=>188(5).]</p> <p>Prendergast, P. J., dissenting.</p>

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently March 1941

3 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed · Decided 1916-03-01

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

PRENDERGAST, P. J.

¶1 (dissenting). The trial judge was clearly right in refusing to permit Albert Mason to testify the impression made on his mind by what he said deceased did when he picked up a rock. Men are neither condemned nor exonerated by the impression made on the mind of another. The decision in the Latham Case to the contrary is not the law. So the court was correct in excluding the testimony of Mrs. Mason as to deceased being a dangerous, etc., man. The cases cited by Judge DAVIDSON do not so hold. They are not in point.

¶2 About the only just criticism of the court’s charge is in the second paragraph of the eighth subdivision, wherein he submits the converse of the first paragraph in numbers (1), (2), and (3), in not following “if you believe” with “or have a reasonable doubt.” It may be that, taking the charge as a whole, this even was supplied.

/79/texcrim/169 · .json · Public domain