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← 79 Wash. App. 101 - State v. Breedlove

79 Wash. App. 101 - State v. Breedlove’s Empirical Analysis

1995

Citation profile

60
cited by 60 later decisions
1
states following
July 2020
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 57 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 60 later decisions — most recently July 2020 · most notably State v. Stenson (1997), 132 Wash. 2d 668 - State v. Stenson (1997)

3 federal appellate · 57 state decisions

3501995200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Faretta v. California · Rhode Island v. Innis · Wrenn v. McFadden · Padilla-Martinez v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “well before’’ trial and unaccompanied by a motion for continuance, then the defendant's right to self-representation is not subject to a”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “A person accused of a crime enjoys the constitutional right to self-representation. . . . The right, however, is not unqualified; it may not be used to impede the efficient administration of justice. While the authorities agree that the right must be unequivocally and timely asserted, there is disagreement about what constitutes timeliness and about the consequences of an untimely request. Some federal courts, for example, hold that assertion of the right to self-representation even as late as the morning of trial, if it precedes selection of the jury, is timely as a matter of law, and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Other courts hold, as did the trial court here, that requests made prior to, but on the day of, trial are per se untimely. We reject a categorical rule of either stripe. We decline to hold that a motion to proceed pro se made on the day of trial is timely as a matter of law so long as it precedes the selection of the jury. We also reject the rule that a motion delayed until the day of trial is per se untimely. In exercising its discretion to grant or deny a defendant’s request to proceed pro se, a trial court must first determine whether the request is timely. Unless a request is made in ample time before the date set for trial, it is incumbent upon the trial court to determine whether the request is made for purposes of delay or to gain tactical advantage, and whether the lateness of the request may hinder the administration of justice.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “[T]he seriousness of the present charge against the defendant; defendant's temperament and character; his age and physical attributes; his past record; past escapes or attempted escapes, and evidence of a present plan to escape; threats to harm others or cause a disturbance; self-destructive tendencies; the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others; the possibility of rescue by other offenders still at large; the size and mood of the audience; the nature and physical security of the courtroom; and the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.