Amos v. Lynch’s Empirical Analysis
790 F.3d 512 · 2015
Citation profile
12 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2242 · 18 U.S.C. § 2246 · 18 U.S.C. § 3509 · 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (§ 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (§ 237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (§ 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Taylor v. United States · Skidmore v. Swift & Co. · Stone v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · Immigration and Naturalization Service, v. Juan Anibal Aguirre-Aguirre
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Using Section 3509(a)(8) as a .“guide,” the BIA held in Rodríguez-Rodríguez that the crime of “sexual abuse of a minor” in Subsection (A) [of the INA’s 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43) ] was broad enough to encompass the Texas statute of “indecency with a child by exposure,” because the generic federal offense does not require as an element that the perpetrator have physical contact with the victim. Beyond this limited holding, however, the BIA did not provide direction regarding the elements of the generic federal crime of “sexual abuse of a minor.” See Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1157-58 [(9th Cir.) ] (explaining that Rodriguez-Rodrigmz did not offer a particularized meaning of the generic offense necessary to perform a Taylor [v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 , 110 S.Ct. 2143 , 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) categorical] analysis). Because the BIA did not supply a definition of the crime of “sexual abuse of a minor” in Rodríguez-Rodríguez, the portion of that opinion subject to Chevron deference is limited to the conclusion: (1) that the generic federal offense does not require as an element that the perpetrator have physical contact with the victim; and (2) that the Texas statute of “indecency with a child by exposure” falls within Subsection A [of 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43) ]. See Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 996 ; see also [INS v.] Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. [415,] 424-25, 119 S.Ct. 1439 , 143 L.Ed.2d 590 [ (1999) ] ... (holding that BIA’s interpretation of a term in the INA warr”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Whether the elements of a particular state offense are a categorical match with the elements of a [CIMT] requires an analysis of state criminal law, which does not lie within the BIA's authority or expertise.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Martinez v. Sessions“we do not defer to the BIA's application of [INA] definitions to particular state statutes.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Ramirez v. Sessions
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.