¶1OPINION
¶2Carla L. Beck (“Beck”) was found guilty of criminal recklessness,
I. Whether Beck’s sentence of 365 days was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender; and,
*521II. Whether the trial court erred when it sentenced Beck to a combined term of jail time and probation that exceeded one year.
¶3Because we find that Beck’s sentence of 365 days was not inappropriate but that the trial court erred when it sentenced her to a combined jail term and period of probation that exceeded one year, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶4Facts and Procedural History
¶5On October 14, 2001, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Debra Gahimer (“Gahimer”) was driving in the Wal Mart parking lot in Plainfield, Indiana. She drove to the end of a parking lane, and as she checked for traffic, she saw several pedestrians in the crosswalk and saw Beck’s car traveling toward her about one and a half lanes away. Gahimer knew that Beck would have to slow for the pedestrians, so she proceeded to turn out of the parking lane. Instead of slowing, Beck’s car sped up, and when Gahimer came up next to Beck, she told Beck to slow down. Tr. p. 17. The male passenger in Beck’s car jumped out of the car, and he and Beck both yelled some profanities at Gahimer. Tr. pp. 18-19.
¶6Gahimer then drove away and proceeded to leave the parking lot and drive to the Tractor Supply Company (“TSC”), which was nearby. To do so, Gahimer drove east, turned onto Perry Road, and headed toward U.S. 40. As she crossed U.S. 40, she saw Beck’s car coming at her more quickly than it should have been. Gahimer entered the TSC parking lot and realized that Beck was chasing her. Beck’s car was close enough to Gahimer that she was able to see Beck in the rearview mirror. Gahimer then dialed 911 on her cell phone.
¶7When Gahimer began to pull into the TSC parking lot, Beck’s car was not more than two car lengths behind her. Gahimer drove into the parking lot one way, while Beck drove in another wfcty. Gahimer testified at trial that she thought that if she could get into the store, then Beck could not get to her, so she attempted to pull into a parking spot. Tr. p. 24. However, Beck was coming at her so fast that Gah-imer thought that Beck was going to ram her. Tr. p. 25. Gahimer then began to leave the parking lot and drive toward U.S. 40. She was still on her cell phone with the 911 operator. Gahimer had to stop for a red light before turning onto U.S. 40. As she was stopped, Beck drove up behind her and stopped. The male passenger again began to exit the car and walk toward Gahimer’s car. Traffic had cleared so Gahimer turned onto U.S. 40. The male passenger returned to the car, and Beck continued to chase Gahimer. The 911 operator told Gahimer that if she could get down to Cinergy, there were three officers waiting for her. Tr. p. 25.
¶8As Gahimer drove, she attempted to stay even with the car next to her, so Beck could not get next to her and ram her. Gahimer stayed in the left lane, slowing down and speeding up to stay with the traffic. Beck was following Gahimer, swerving back and forth between lanes, and “running up” on Gahimer’s car and the car next to her. Tr. p. 26. Beck’s car came within two to three feet of Gahimer at times. Police stopped Beck and pulled her over near Cinergy.
¶9On November 19, 2001, Beck was charged with criminal recklessness, as a Class A misdemeanor. A bench trial was held on September 20, 2002, and the trial court found Beck guilty. She was sentenced to 365 days in the Hendricks County Jail with 351 days suspended and credit for seven days actually served prior to *522trial. Beck was placed on probation for a period of 365 days. Beck now appeals.
¶10I. Inappropriate Sentence
¶11Sentencing decisions are entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of manifest abuse of that discretion. Elisea v. State, 777 N.E.2d 46, 50-51 (Ind.Ct. App.2002). This court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B); see also Williams v. State, 782 N.E.2d 1039, 1050 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), trans. denied.
¶12Beck argues that her maximum sentence of 365 days was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. She claims this is because she had no prior criminal history and because this was a “relatively minor, short-lived, isolated altercation.” Br. of Appellant at 5. Beck believes that the maximum sentence permitted by statute should be reserved for the very worst offenses and offenders. We agree, but hold that Beck’s suspended sentence of 365 days is not the maximum sentence permitted by statute.
¶13In the present case, Beck was found guilty of criminal recklessness, as a Class A misdemeanor and sentenced to 365 days in the Hendricks County Jail. The maximum sentence for a Class A misdemeanor is one year. Ind.Code § 35-50-3-2 (1998). Our supreme court has determined that “the maximum possible sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst offenders.” Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind.2002).
¶14Before this incident, Beck had no prior criminal history. When this incident occurred, Beck was forty-five years old, a mother of two, and was working as a custodian at a church. This court has previously stated that leniency is encouraged toward defendants who have not previously been through the criminal justice system. Biehl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. This mitigation is especially appropriate for a defendant like Beck, who was forty-five years old at the time of the crime and had lived a law-abiding life for many years. See id.
¶15Beck was found guilty of criminal recklessness in the form of “road rage,” an offense that should not be treated lightly. She did not have any prior criminal history, and therefore, while sentenced to the maximum sentence of 365 days, she did not receive the maximum punishment of an executed sentence. We believe Beck’s suspended sentence was well within the court’s discretion.
¶16II. Combined Jail Term and Probation
¶17Beck also claims that the trial court erred when it sentenced her to a combined jail term and period of probation that exceeded 365 days. Under Indiana Code section 35-50-3-1, when a trial court suspends any part of a misdemeanor sentence, it may place the defendant on probation for a period of not more than one year. Ind.Code § 35-50-3-l(b) (1998 & Supp.2002). However, the combined term of imprisonment and probation cannot exceed one year. Id. Our supreme court had held “that a combined term of probation and imprisonment exceeding one year is inconsistent with the maximum term for conviction for a misdemeanor.” Smith v. State, 621 N.E.2d 325, 326 (Ind.1993).
¶18Here, Beck was found guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and sentenced to 365 days imprisonment with 351 days suspended and credit for seven days actually served prior to trial. The trial court also placed Beck on probation for 365 days. Because *523the sentence imposed a term of probation that caused Beck to serve more than one year of combined imprisonment and probation, the trial court erred. We therefore remand this case to the trial court for a determination of the probation period, not to exceed 351 days.
¶19Conclusion
¶20The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Beck to a 365-day suspended sentence, but it erred when it sentenced her to a combined period of imprisonment and probation that exceeded one year.
¶21Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶22. Ind.Code § 35-42-2~2(b)(l)(l) (1998).