790 So. 2d 437 - Branch v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"In applying the Perkins test, we analyze the elements of the battery statute from which BOLEO derives its conduct element. Section 784.03 defines battery as (a) actually and intentionally touching or striking another person against the will of the other; or (b) intentionally causing bodily harm to an individual. . . . Under Perkins, for BOLEO to constitute a forcible felony, all three alternatives must involve the use or threat of physical force or violence. If one of the elements does not, then BOLEO can be committed without the use or threat of physical force or violence, and BOLEO would fail the Perkins test. . . . Existing case law makes it clear that any intentional touching, no matter how slight, is sufficient to constitute a simple battery. Therefore, BOLEO, like battery itself, may be committed with only nominal contact. . . . As Respondent argues, if BOLEO were considered a forcible felony based on its intentional touching element, it could lead to potentially outrageous results. For example, tapping a law enforcement officer on the shoulder without consent would constitute a forcible felony. A child shooting a spitball at a school police officer would be guilty of a forcible felony. The possibilities are limited only by the imagination. But such minor infractions are incompatible with the level of force the forcible felony statute contemplates. The felonies enumerated in section 776.08 include murder, treason, carjacking, home-invasion robbery, arson, kidnapping, d”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 961 So. 2d 211 - State v. Hearns · 884 So. 2d 1014 - Jenkins v. State

2. “The appellant meets the criteria for classification as a prison releasee reoffender, for within three years of his 1996 release from a D.O.C. state correctional facility, he committed battery on a law enforcement officer, a qualifying offense that falls within the ambit of statutory subsection (8)(a)(1)( o ), which includes `[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 884 So. 2d 1014 - Jenkins v. State

3. “Finally, in the `Summary of Argument' section of his initial brief, the appellant contends that the Act violates double-jeopardy protections. However, absent any argument whatsoever or case law to support this conclusory position, we deem the appellant to have waived this ground to challenge the Act.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Grohs v. State