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← 790 SW2D 307 - Willis v. State

Willis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1990

Citation profile

66
cited by 66 later decisions
2
states following
October 2017
most recently cited

65 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 66 later decisions — most recently October 2017 · most notably Muniz v. State (1993), Granger v. State (1999)

65 state decisions

280199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Sandstrom v. Montana · Patterson v. New York · Leary v. United States · County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen · Francis v. Franklin

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 66 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(2) if the existence of the presumed fact is submitted to the jury, the court shall charge the jury, in terms of the presumption and the specific element to which it applies, as follows: (A)that the facts giving rise to the presumption must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (B)that if such facts are proven beyond a reasonable doubt the jury may find that the element of the offense sought to be presumed exists, but it is not bound to so find; (C)that even though the jury may find the existence of such element, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the other elements of the offense charged; and (D)if the jury has a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a fact or facts giving rise to the presumption, the presumption fails and the jury shall not consider the presumption for any purpose.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “A perusal of the new Penal Code assures one that a defense does not merely negate an element of an offense. Rather, in all of the Code’s defenses, one principle runs consistently throughout: evidence which constitutes a defense requires the accused to admit the commission of the offense, but to justify or excuse his actions so as to absolve him of criminal responsibility for engaging in conduct which otherwise constitutes a crime.... Such a defense would consist of facts which exonerate the defendant and do not simply disprove an element of the offense. ... This Court has long held that, if the alleged defensive theory merely negates an element of the offense, then no affirmative charge must be given- The confusion perhaps lies in this Court’s failure to define the term "defense” and its ambiguous use of the terms "defensive theory or defensive issue.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “[I]f a defendant testifies that he believed certain items he purchased to have been honestly obtained by the seller, he merely negates an element of the offense of theft by receiving property stolen by another (i.e., that he obtained the items knowing they were stolen). He does not negate the entire offense (for he may still possess the items) but merely creates an issue of mistaken belief as to only the culpable mental state element of theft. In such circumstances, the defendant would be entitled to a defensive instruction of "mistake of fact" ... and should not be required to admit the other elements of the crime.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.