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790 S.W.2d 522

Dayringer v. State

Missouri Court of Appeals

Decided June 13, 1990

Missouri Court of Appeals · decided 1990-06-13

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently March 1993

5 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The motion court clearly erred by denying as untimely filed appellant’s motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035 because the absolute filing deadline imposed by Rule 24.035 operated to deny appellant due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 14 of the Missouri Constitution in that the absolute filing deadline arbitrarily denied appellant relief because the rule makes no provision for late filing of a postconviction relief motion for good cause shown, and Rule 24.035 provides the exclusive means for a person under detention pursuant to guilty plea judgments in Missouri to attack the constitutionality of that detention as guaranteed by the right to habeas corpus pursuant to Article I, Section 12 of the Missouri Constitution.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Chandler v. Purkett

Relies on Nicholas v. United States · Day v. State · Sloan v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1990-06-13

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

PREWITT, Judge.

¶1Following trial by jury movant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Dayringer, 755 S.W.2d 698 (Mo.App.1988).

¶2On July 6, 1989, he filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15. As defendant was sentenced on July 14, 1987, he had until June 30, 1988, to file a motion under Rule 29.15(m). Finding the motion untimely the trial court denied it. Movant appeals.

¶3Movant contends that the operation of the time limitations provided in Rule 29.-15(m) acted to deny him due process of law as guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution; denied him his rights to habeas corpus pursuant to article I, § 9 of the United States Constitution and article I, § 12 of the Missouri Constitution, and denied him equal protection of law provided by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 2 of the Missouri Constitution.

¶4His argument under due process of law is that he was arbitrarily denied post-conviction relief since Rule 29.15 makes no provision for late filing in cases where the motion is not filed through no fault of the movant. He claims that he was prevented from timely filing the motion through his placement in the special treatment unit of the penitentiary until February 15, 1989, and thereby had inability to research and prepare his motion “as well as not receiving necessary legal documents to prepare a postconviction motion in his case until that date”. Movant’s contention that he was denied equal protection of law is based on allegations that he was not informed of the strict time limitations contained in Rule 29.15 whereas defendants sentenced after January 1, 1988, are provided with an explanation and notice of the limitations.

¶5Contentions similar to those in movant’s first point, except those that relate to habe-as corpus, have been decided to be without merit in Day v. State, 770 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. banc 1989), cert. denied, Walker v. State (consolidated in Day), — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 186, 107 L.Ed.2d 141 (1989), and Kunkel v. State, 775 S.W.2d 579 (Mo.App.1989). See also Sloan v. State, 779 S.W.2d 580 (Mo. banc 1989); Reed v. State, 781 S.W.2d 573 (Mo.App.1989) (failure of a trial court to notify a defendant of the time limitations of Rule 24.035 or Rule 29.15 does not override the mandatory time limitations).

¶6White v. State, 779 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. banc 1989), disposes of movant’s habe-as corpus contention. The opinion states:

*524“Inasmuch as habeas corpus jurisdiction springs from the constitution, it may not be eliminated by statute or rule [citing authority]. Rule 24.085, therefore, does not operate as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.”

¶7Whiteis binding on this court and both Rule 24.035 and Rule 29.15 would be the same regarding the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Under the decisions above cited, movant’s contentions have no merit.

¶8The judgment is affirmed.

CROW, P.J., and PARRISH, J., concur.
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