Patterson v. Black’s Empirical Analysis
791 F.2d 107 · 1986
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently August 2005
4 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · United States v. Bagley · United States v. Agurs · Moore v. Illinois · United States v. Risken
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the Supreme Court stated that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196. In Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 , 92 S.Ct. 2562 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Brady holding and announced a three-part test for evaluation (sic) the constitutionality of prosecutorial actions in nondisclosure of information cases: The heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution’s suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment. Important, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence’s favorable character for the defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence. Moore, 408 U.S. at 794-95 , 92 S.Ct. at 2567-68 . The Supreme Court in United States v. Bagley, [473] U.S. [667], 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), reformulated the standard for materiality established in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 113 , 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2402 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), with the following test: The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of t”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[a]s a result, any reasonable probability could have been resolved by the district court as finder of fact without the inherent difficulty [present in a jury trial such as this] of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that ... the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor ....” Id. 16 . See note 10, supra. 17 . Appellant's contention that the mother purported to have observed considerable bleeding likely stems from a notation in the Emergency Treatment Report that”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“'a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.