Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.’s Empirical Analysis
791 F.2d 304 · 1986
Citation profile
24 federal appellate · 14 district · 10 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 69 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2014 · most notably Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. (1987), Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc. (1990)
24 federal appellate · 14 district · 10 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Appellate journey
Relationships
Applies 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Alternative Water Sources Act of 2000) · 33 U.S.C. § 1318 · 33 U.S.C. § 1319 · 33 U.S.C. § 1342 · 33 U.S.C. § 1365 · 42 U.S.C. § 7604
Relies on United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs · Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn. · Kissinger v. Halperin · Campbell v. United States · United States v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 69 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“While the statute does not address directly the matter of monthly average limitations, it does speak in terms of penalties per day of violation, rather than penalties per violation. This language strongly suggests that where a violation is defined in terms of a time period longer than a day, the maximum penalty assessable for that violation should be defined in terms of the number of days in that time period.”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage“not to exceed $10,000 per day of such violation.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“[t]he illogic of the approach is further illustrated by considering a situation very similar to the district court’s hypothetical: The polluter just barely exceeds its daily maximum for each day of a month. This polluter would be subject to liability for thirty days of violation (a maximum penalty of $300,000), although its total discharge is only slightly more than the first polluter, who, according to [defendant’s] view, would be subject to only one day’s penalty ($10,000 maximum). [Defendant's] approach thus could act to deprive a district court of the flexibility to deal with similar cases similarly, imposing a drastic limitation on the court’s authority to assess "appropriate” civil penalties.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.