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← 791 F.3d 677 - Ellmann v. Baker

Ellmann v. Baker’s Empirical Analysis

791 F.3d 677 · 2015

Citation profile

22
cited by 22 later decisions
March 2025
most recently cited

Relationships

Applies 11 U.S.C. § 350 · 11 U.S.C. § 521 · 11 U.S.C. § 522 · 11 U.S.C. § 704

Relies on Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz · 134 S. Ct. 1188 - Law v. Siegel · Nichols v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. · Lucius v. McLemore · American Civil Liberties Union v. McCreary County

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[l]ower courts are obligated to follow Supreme Court dicta, particularly where there is not substantial reason for disregarding it, such as age or subsequent statements undermining its rationale.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[I]t is clear that [ Law ] prohibits the bankruptcy court from disallowing the debtors' claimed exemptions because of their alleged bad faith and fraudulent conduct. While Lucius previously held that bankruptcy courts may use their equitable powers to sanction a debtor's misconduct by disallowing exemptions in property concealed from the trustee, the Supreme Court's superseding decision unambiguously abrogates their ability to do so. Some courts have characterized these principles in [ Law ] as mere dictum, but this court has explained that lower courts are obligated to follow Supreme Court dicta, particularly where there is not substantial reason for disregarding it, such as age or subsequent statements undermining its rationale. No such reason in favor of disregarding [ Law ] exists here, and many lower courts-including nearly all that have identified the language above as dictum-have adhered to [ Law ]'s pronouncements. Indeed, another panel of this court, while declining to rely on [ Law ] to reverse a bankruptcy court's disallowance of an amendment, explained that [ Law ] strongly suggests that the bankruptcy court exceeded its authority when it disallowed an amendment based on prejudice to creditors-a ground absent from the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, to the extent Lucius conflicts with [ Law ], the Supreme Court has effectively overruled it.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “But even assuming the Bankruptcy Court could have revisited Law’s entitlement to the exemption, § 522 does not give courts discretion to grant or withhold. exemptions based on whatever considerations they deem appropriate. Rather, the statute exhaustively specifies the criteria that will render property exempt. See § 522(b), (d). Siegel insists that because § 522(b) says that the debtor “may exempt” certain property, rather than that he “shall be entitled” to do so, the court retains, discretion to grant or deny exemptions even when the statutory criteria are met. But the subject of “may exempt” in § 522(b) is the debtor, not the court, so it is the debtor in whom the statute vests discretion. A debtor need not invoke an exemption to which the statute entitles him; but if he does, the court may not refuse to honor the exemption absent a valid statutory basis for doing so.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.