State v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “As does its federal counterpart, Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1), La. C.E. art. 804(B)(1) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for testimony given by an unavailable declarant as a witness in another hearing in the same case “if the party against whom the testimony now offered ... had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.” The statute incorporates a firmly-rooted exception to the hearsay rule. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 , 15 S.Ct. 337 , 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1426 (9th Cir.1994), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 , 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). The provisions of art. 804(B)(1) subsume jurisprudential criteria designed to protect the defendant’s right to [ ^confrontation under the Sixth Amendment and La. Const. art. I, § 16. See State v. Hills, 379 So.2d 740, 743-44 (La.1980). In the present case, before the state’s disclosure of Artberry’s prior statements, the trial court, court of appeal, and this Court had all rejected respondent’s argument that La. C.E. art. 804(B)(1) did not apply to Artberry’s testimony at the suppression hearing because defense counsel was motivated by different concerns at that proceeding than he would have been at trial.... The subsequent revelation of Artber-ry’s prior statements does not change our view as to the admissibility at trial of the witness’s prior record”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 806 So. 2d 992 - State v. Vincent · State v. Boyer

2. “The Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of Artberry's motion hearing testimony, and whether defendant’s confrontation rights were violated. The court did suggest that defendant might introduce the statements 'to acquaint jurors with all of the circumstances surrounding the witness's identification of respondent and thereby allow them to reach a reliable determination as to the accuracy of the identification.'”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 601 F. Supp. 2d 769 - Jones v. Cain · 841 So. 2d 965 - State v. Jones

3. “Jurors will not have benefit of “ ‘a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.’ ” [Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64 , 100 S.Ct. at 2538 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 , 15 S.Ct. 337 , 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895).) ] However, the loss of this aspect of the Confrontation Clause in the present case stems not from the state’s withholding of Artberry’s statements before the suppression hearing but from the unexpected death of the witness before respondent’s first trial. Even assuming that counsel had thoroughly cross-examined Artberry at the suppression hearing about his prior statements, no jury in this case would ever have had the benefit of viewing Artberry’s demeanor as counsel questioned him with regard to the extent of his self-contradiction or motive and bias in the ease. The state’s failure to disclose Artberry’s prior statements promptly therefore has no bearing on the necessity arising from the witness’s untimely death that jurors must determine the reliability of Artberry’s identification on the basis of the cold record of his testimony at the suppression hearing, as tested by counsel’s detailed cross-examination a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 601 F. Supp. 2d 769 - Jones v. Cain