Dillon v. United States’s Empirical Analysis
792 F.2d 849 · 1986
Citation profile
12 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 45 later decisions — most recently April 2019 · most notably United States v. Washington (1992), United States v. Willie (1991)
12 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 25 U.S.C. § 331 (White Earth Reservation Land Settlement Act of 1985) · 25 U.S.C. § 462 · 25 U.S.C. § 465 · 26 U.S.C. § 1 (Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2008) · 26 U.S.C. § 162 · 26 U.S.C. § 7852 · 26 U.S.C. § 894
Relies on S.S. Zoe Colocotroni v. Puerto Rico · Castor v. United States · Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington · Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones · Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“It is clear that the exemption accorded tribal and restricted Indian lands extends to the income derived directly therefrom.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“This allocation argument is essentially another attempt by taxpayers to broaden the rule in Capoeman to exempt smok-eshop income. The government’s perspective on this issue is correct: “The simple answer to taxpayers’ argument is that they did not receive any rental income with respect to their trust properties.” We reject taxpayers’ allocation theory of exemption for two reasons. First allocating imputed rent income to the trust property is not required or permitted under the Capoeman rule. The bare land’s fair rental value bears no rational relationship to the amount of income “derived directly” from the improved land. Such allocation would permit exemption of all income from a business on trust land up to the land’s fair rental value, even where the income is otherwise clearly outside the “derived directly” standard of Capoeman (for example, selling stocks and bonds from a telephone booth on trust land). See Critzer, 597 F.2d at 713 . Second, taxpayers and amici curiae have cited no authority (and we have found none) for imputing rental income to a taxpayer using his own property in the operation of a business. Nor, under general tax laws, may a taxpayer using his own property to generate business income, deduct the annual fair rental value of the property from his business income. Moreover, guaranteeing a tax exemption equal to the fair rental value of the property, where no rent was actually paid or accrued, is contrary to the business expense provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 1”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“an apportionment provision designed to establish the method of computing the number of representatives for each State and determine apportionment of direct taxes among the states. The phrase “Indians not taxed,” when viewed in context, is clearly descriptive, describing the fact some Indians are not taxed by the State in which they reside and should, therefore, be excluded from enumeration of its population. It does not restrain the Federal Government from taxing Indians.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.