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← 792 F. Supp. 529 - In Re Moses

792 F. Supp. 529 - In Re Moses’s Empirical Analysis

1992

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
1
states following
April 2019
most recently cited

2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently April 2019

2 state decisions

70199220002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 11 U.S.C. § 305 · 11 U.S.C. § 343 · 11 U.S.C. § 349 · 11 U.S.C. § 521 · 11 U.S.C. § 523 · 11 U.S.C. § 704 · 11 U.S.C. § 707 · 11 U.S.C. § 727

Relies on Baxter v. Palmigiano · Garrity v. State of New Jersey · Lefkowitz v. Turley · United States v. White · Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis v. Carver

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(a) The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a hearing and only for cause including— (1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; (2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 128 of title 28; and (3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or such additional time as the court may allow after the filing of the petition commencing such case, the information required by paragraph (1) of section 521, but only on a motion by the United States trustee.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Section 727(a)(6)(C) generally preserves the right of a debtor who properly asserts the privilege against self-incrimination. In other words, that section provides that a court may not deny a discharge solely because a debtor has refused to testify because of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Thus, a court may not use denial of a discharge as a sanction for a debtor’s refusal to testify because of the privilege. However, nothing in § 727(a)(6)(C) prevents a court from denying a discharge when a debtor has failed to provide a trustee with enough information to administer the estate-even when that debtor’s failure to provide information is occasioned by his reliance on his Fifth Amendment privilege. The focus of § 727(a)(6)(C) is on a debtor’s refusal to testify, not on the information available to a trustee. This is [a] subde but important distinction. Congress clearly did not intend to permit a debtor to gain the benefit of a discharge on the basis of patently inadequate information. If it did, it would, in effect, be approving the use of the privilege as a sword instead of as a shield. Rather, it intended to prevent the situation in which a debtor is punished for the invocation of the privilege.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.