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← 792 P2D 1352 - Pena v. State

Pena v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1990

Citation profile

33
cited by 33 later decisions
6
states following
September 2022
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 1 district · 23 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently September 2022 · most notably Commonwealth v. Williams (1997), Motley

5 federal appellate · 1 district · 23 state decisions

1901990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Morrissey v. Brewer · Griffin v. Wisconsin · National Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe of Indians · Sims v. Central Intelligence Agency · United States v. Hewes

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “At the suppression hearing, Pena argued that the August 5th search violated his fourth amendment rights because it was conducted without a warrant and without his consent. The trial court ruled there was consent and denied Pena's motion to suppress. The trial court coupled Pena's invitation to the parole officers to enter his house, with the fact that Pena, as one of the conditions for his parole, had signed a "Parole Agreement and Parole Grant" (Agreement), to find that Pena had consented to the search. Pena's parole officer testified at the suppression hearing that the Agreement granted the parole officers the "authority" to conduct a warrantless search of Pena's house. The state's argument is that Pena, through his signature on the parole agreement, agreed that his house was subject to a search "at any time." We agree that Pena's status as a parolee permits parole officers to conduct warrantless searches of his home. Pena, however, is still entitled to the fourth amendment mandate that searches be "reasonable." In other words, a warrant based upon probable cause is not generally required before a parole officer may conduct a search to determine whether the parolee is violating the terms of his parole. State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1983). This does not mean, however, that individuals who have signed a parole agreement, providing for warrantless searches, relinquish their fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The Utah Supreme Court tre”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a belief * *”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “to conduct a warrantless search of Pena's house. The state's argument is that Pena, through his signature on the parole agreement, agreed that his house was subject to a search”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.