Johnson v. Duckworth’s Empirical Analysis
793 F.2d 898 · 1986
Citation profile
47 federal appellate · 3 district · 30 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 118 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2018 · most notably Missouri v. Frye (2012), Missouri v. Frye (2012)
47 federal appellate · 3 district · 30 state decisions — followed in 21 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Boykin v. Alabama · Faretta v. California · Hill v. Lockhart · Cuyler v. Sullivan
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 118 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[I]n the ordinary case criminal defense attorneys have a duty to inform their clients of plea agreements proffered by the prosecution, and that failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance' of counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Apart from merely being informed about the proffered agreement, we also believe that a defendant must be involved in the decision-making process regarding the agreement’s ultimate acceptance or rejection.”
7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“In his brief, Johnson argues that but for [counsel's] actions he "would have been able to tender to the state trial court a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter." (emphasis added). Johnson does not argue or allege in his brief, however, "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would have accepted the plea agreement." Hill v. Lockhart, 106 S.Ct. at 370 . Although he argues that he would have been able to accept the agreement but for [counsel's] actions, his freedom to act does not establish a reasonable probability that he would have acted. It is true that, for the first time in his reply brief, Johnson does cite his testimony from the post-conviction challenge to his attorney's actions which he claims illustrates his desire to plead guilty in conjunction with accepting the plea agreement. Nonetheless, Johnson cites no evidence prior to his conviction which would indicate any desire on his part to plead guilty to a lesser charge. Under these cireumstances, we seriously doubt whether Johnson's after-the-fact testimony regarding his wishes in and of itself would be sufficient to establish that prior to trial, but for [counsel's] actions, there was a reasonable probalbility he would have accepted the plea agreement. See Hill v. Lockhart, supra.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.