Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 794 F.2d 1207 - Probus v. K-Mart, Inc.

Probus v. K-Mart, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

794 F.2d 1207 · 1986

Citation profile

38
cited by 38 later decisions
3
states following
May 2021
most recently cited

25 federal appellate · 1 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 38 later decisions — most recently May 2021 · most notably City of Richmond Virginia v. Madison Management Group Inc (1990), Jones v. Lincoln Electric Co. (1999)

25 federal appellate · 1 district · 5 state decisions

19019861990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Monsanto Company v. Spray-Rite Service Corporation · Julius Goldman's Egg City v. United States · Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Ladd, Register of Copyrights · Lenard v. Argento · Spray-Rite Services Corp. v. Monsanto Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “improper comments during closing argument rarely rise to the level of reversible error.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[w]hen, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “[W]e agree with the majority view that the rule does apply to strict liability cases. We are not persuaded by the purely semantic argument to the contrary that since “culpable conduct” is not the issue in [a strict liability] case-the defendant is liable, at least prima facie, even if he is not blameworthy in the sense of being willful or negligent, provided that he caused the plaintiffs injury-the rule is inapplicable by its own terms.... A major purpose of Rule 407 is to promote safety by removing the disincentive to make repairs (or take other safety measures) after an accident that would exist if the accident. victim could use those measures as evidence of the defendant’s liability.... The analysis is not fundamentally affected by whether the basis of liability is the defendant’s negligence or his product’s defectiveness or inherent dangerousness. In either case, if evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible to prove liability, the incentive to take such measures will be reduced.... [T]he focus of negligence is on the defendant’s conduct, but the focus of strict liability is on the dangerousness of the product regardless of the defendant’s conduct.... But this distinction does not justify a refusal to apply Rule 407 in product cases. In those cases where the defendant would have no incentive to take remedial measures anyway, because the accident was unavoidable, Rule 407 is academic; there will be, by assumption, no subsequent remedial measures. But in other c”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.