¶1concurring.
¶2I concur only in the result reached by Justice Brookshire. As I understand Relator’s requests as well as the status of the law, I feel that our initial order granting Relator’s leave to file his Writ of Mandamus was improvidently granted. His motion for leave to file a Writ of Prohibition was denied. In his petition, Relator’s prayer states:
Relator respectfully requests this Honorable Court to issue its writs of prohibition prohibiting Respondent from proceeding with the capital murder charges against Relator, and to issue its writ of mandamus commanding Respondent to proceed to judgment upon Relator’s pleas of guilty to the offenses of murder contained as lesser included offenses in the indictments pending against him, commanding Respondent to enter a judgment of acquittal because Respondent wrongfully terminated the murder charges after jeopardy attached, or in the alternative, commanding Respondent to proceed to judgment and sentence upon Relator’s pleas of guilty to the offense of murder in each of the above enumerated causes.
¶3The remedies of mandamus or prohibition are drastic ones, to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances. See Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 2123, 48 L.Ed.2d 725, 732 (1976). Furthermore, mandamus issues only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy at law. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.1985), citing State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex.1984).
¶4The record reflects that at the February 26, 1990 hearing in which Respondent re*857jected the plea bargain agreement in each of the cases, the Respondent reset the cases for “a 28.01 hearing” on March 26, 1990. Later, Respondent states that he is unsure as to when a trial date would be. The last sentence Respondent utters at this hearing is, “Mr. Mayfield, we will have you back before the Court on March 26th for the pretrial hearing and we will pick a trial date at that time.” It seems glaringly obvious to me in examining the February 26 hearing that the Respondent was not through acting on relator’s cases. Justice Burgess, in his opinion, appears to recognize this as he states, “Under this record, we cannot determine if the trial court intended to sua sponte terminate the murder trial, thereby possibly requiring the entry of an acquittal, [citation omitted], or if the judge intended only to suspend or delay the entry of a judgment of guilt.” It further appears to me that these various options left open to the Respondent involve the exercise of discretion or judgment, and are far from mere ministerial acts or procedures. See, Tex. Dept. of Corrections v. Dalehite, 623 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
¶5Relator cites this court to Perkins v. Court of Appeals, 738 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) to support his contention that we have mandamus jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court. Perkins, however, stands for much more than this jurisdictional proposition. The circumstances with regard to the plea proceedings were remarkably similar to those involving relator. The one distinguishing difference in Perkinswas that the trial court found the defendant guilty at the first hearing with the trial court further stating, “it [was] possible that [he] would go lower than — that, [that he might] give [Le] something less than 25 years in view of [his, Le’s] testimony, in view of the letter that you’ve submitted to the Court and all of the evidence in this ease. It’s a possibility that [I] would do less than 25 [but I am] not [now] really sure how much that would be.” Perkins, supra at 279. Two weeks later the hearing reconvened for sentencing at which time the trial court informed the defendant that the trial court would “not accept the 25 years that I’d previously assessed in this case.” (emphasis mine). Perkins, supra at 280. It would appear from the language it used that the trial court was under the impression that a completed adjudication had taken place at the first hearing. The defendant was then allowed to withdraw his plea, but only under great protest by his counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals decided that:
[0]nce Relator accepted Le’s plea of guilty and approved the plea bargain agreement, under our law, he clearly was without any authority or power to do other than specifically enforce the agreement, except that he could have assessed a lesser punishment than the agreed upon maximum “cap” on the punishment that would ultimately be assessed. (emphasis mine). Perkins, supra, at 283.
¶6In the instant case, Relator was not found guilty by Respondent at the February 5, 1990 plea proceeding. Furthermore, Respondent did not formally approve any plea bargain agreement. In fact, during the oral admonishments, Respondent stated, “Now, your attorney, along with the State, is going to make a recommendation in each of these cases regarding punishment. Do you understand that Pm not bound by any recommendations they make?” (emphasis mine). The Relator responded, “Yes, sir.” It is readily admitted that some ambiguity arises when Respondent states at the close of the oral admonishments, “The Court will accept the judicial confession and accept the defendant’s plea.” However, the Respondent closes with the following:
The Court: Each of these cases will be reset for a PSI report for February 26th. Any questions at all you want to ask me,
Mr. Mayfield?
The Defendant: No, sir.
The Court: All right. We’ll see you back on February 26th, and Til let you know if Pm going to go along with the plea bargain. Go with the deputy.” (emphasis mine).
¶7*858Relator nor his attorney objected or made any comment with regard to the conditional language which Respondent used to characterize the just-concluded plea proceedings. Because of the open-endedness of Respondent’s statement, I feel a significant difference exists between the proceedings in the instant case and those described in Perkins. In no sense of the word could it be said that Respondent considered the first hearing a completed adjudication of the Relator. As such, I find Perkinsto be inapplicable to the instant case, and further find no abuse of discretion nor violation of any duty imposed by law on the part of Respondent. Any opinion directing Respondent to act or proceed in a particular form or fashion is premature by my reading of the record and the law of mandamus. It was improvident to grant Relator leave to file his petition for a Writ of Mandamus. His petition should, therefore, be denied.